Brian Michael Micner

Edward Dienaar, a 63-year-old man, was sentenced for two offences: failure to comply with a Long-Term Supervision Order (LTSO) by not reporting a change in his domestic situation, and possession of child pornography (CP).

The court considered the massive and depraved nature of the CP collection (313,482 images and 5,098 videos), Dienaar's prior convictions for similar offences, and the significant victim impact statements.

Despite mitigating factors such as a guilty plea, health issues, and community support, the court imposed a sentence of six years for possession of CP and one year and three months consecutive for the breach of the LTSO, resulting in a net sentence of 4 years and 15 days after pre-trial credit.

Additionally, a 10-year LTSO was imposed, along with a lifetime Section 161 order, DNA order, and Sex Offender Information Registration Act reporting requirements.

During a murder trial involving multiple accused, the Crown brought a motion asking the court to reconsider a prior evidentiary ruling admitting a hearsay statement from a former girlfriend of an alleged alternate suspect.

The Crown argued new evidence from two witnesses and digital communications demonstrated a strong motive for the declarant to fabricate the statement.

The court held that the new evidence constituted a material change in circumstances permitting reconsideration of the earlier ruling.

However, applying the relaxed threshold reliability standard applicable to defence evidence, the judge concluded the statement retained some reliability and should remain admissible.

The Crown was permitted to call reply evidence from the new witnesses to challenge the credibility and reliability of the hearsay statement.

During a joint first‑degree murder trial, concerns arose that the spouse of a juror had attended court proceedings and communicated limited information about the case to the juror via text messages and made comments in the courthouse hallway supportive of a police witness.

Following two judicial inquiries, the accused sought either a mistrial or the discharge of the juror on the basis of juror contamination and reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court held that although the spouse’s conduct demonstrated poor judgment, there was no evidence that the juror discussed the case with the spouse or was influenced by her views.

Applying the presumption of juror impartiality and the reasonable apprehension of bias test, the court found no basis to conclude the juror could not remain independent and impartial.

The mistrial application and request to discharge the juror were denied, though the spouse was excluded from further attendance at the trial.