5 total
Custody Case allowed
Edward Dienaar, a 63-year-old man, was sentenced for two offences: failure to comply with a Long-Term Supervision Order (LTSO) by not reporting a change in his domestic situation, and possession of child pornography (CP).
The court considered the massive and depraved nature of the CP collection (313,482 images and 5,098 videos), Dienaar's prior convictions for similar offences, and the significant victim impact statements.
Despite mitigating factors such as a guilty plea, health issues, and community support, the court imposed a sentence of six years for possession of CP and one year and three months consecutive for the breach of the LTSO, resulting in a net sentence of 4 years and 15 days after pre-trial credit.
Additionally, a 10-year LTSO was imposed, along with a lifetime Section 161 order, DNA order, and Sex Offender Information Registration Act reporting requirements.
Accused acquitted of driving offences due to reasonable doubt on driver identity and unequivocal refusal.
The accused was charged with three counts: refuse roadside approved screening device, impaired care and control, and dangerous driving, all occurring on June 11, 2017.
The Crown relied on civilian witness testimony describing erratic driving and police observations at the accused's residence.
The defence argued the accused did not operate the vehicle and that the refusal charge was improper.
The court found reasonable doubt as to identity of the driver, acquitting on dangerous driving and impaired driving counts.
On the refusal charge, the court found the refusal was not unequivocal and that the officer failed to provide a final opportunity to comply, resulting in reasonable doubt as to mens rea.
The accused was acquitted on all three counts.
Mandatory minimum two-year sentence for producing over 500 marihuana plants struck down as unconstitutional.
The applicants, convicted of producing over 500 marihuana plants, brought a constitutional challenge against the two-year mandatory minimum sentence under s. 7(2)(b)(v) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.
They argued the provision violated s. 12 of the Charter.
The court found that while the sentence was not grossly disproportionate for the applicants themselves, it was grossly disproportionate for reasonably foreseeable hypothetical offenders, such as those involved in regulatory licensing infractions.
The court concluded the provision violated s. 12, was not saved by s. 1, and declared it of no force or effect.
Hearsay statement in alternate suspect defence remains admissible despite new impeachment evidence.
During a murder trial involving multiple accused, the Crown brought a motion asking the court to reconsider a prior evidentiary ruling admitting a hearsay statement from a former girlfriend of an alleged alternate suspect.
The Crown argued new evidence from two witnesses and digital communications demonstrated a strong motive for the declarant to fabricate the statement.
The court held that the new evidence constituted a material change in circumstances permitting reconsideration of the earlier ruling.
However, applying the relaxed threshold reliability standard applicable to defence evidence, the judge concluded the statement retained some reliability and should remain admissible.
The Crown was permitted to call reply evidence from the new witnesses to challenge the credibility and reliability of the hearsay statement.
Juror retained despite spouse’s comments; no reasonable apprehension of bias.
During a joint first‑degree murder trial, concerns arose that the spouse of a juror had attended court proceedings and communicated limited information about the case to the juror via text messages and made comments in the courthouse hallway supportive of a police witness.
Following two judicial inquiries, the accused sought either a mistrial or the discharge of the juror on the basis of juror contamination and reasonable apprehension of bias.
The court held that although the spouse’s conduct demonstrated poor judgment, there was no evidence that the juror discussed the case with the spouse or was influenced by her views.
Applying the presumption of juror impartiality and the reasonable apprehension of bias test, the court found no basis to conclude the juror could not remain independent and impartial.
The mistrial application and request to discharge the juror were denied, though the spouse was excluded from further attendance at the trial.