Graham R. Wakefield

The defendant was charged with "Over 80" after a traffic stop and breath tests.

The defence brought a Charter application arguing a breach of the defendant's right to counsel under section 10(b) due to a language barrier.

The court found that the defendant's comprehension of English was too deficient to understand his rights, and the officers failed to assess "special circumstances" or provide an interpreter.

Applying the Grant criteria, the court deemed the breach serious, excluded the breathalyzer readings, and found the defendant not guilty.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and 'over 80'.

The court found the defendant was the driver and impaired based on pre-arrest observations.

However, significant breaches of the defendant's Charter right to counsel (s. 10(b)) occurred at the police detachment, including insufficient explanation of counsel options, failure to address dissatisfaction with duty counsel, lack of a Prosper warning, and delayed facilitation of counsel access during breath testing.

Applying the Grant criteria, the court excluded the breathalyzer readings for the 'over 80' charge, resulting in an acquittal on that count.

The evidence for impaired care and control, obtained prior to the Charter breaches, was not excluded, leading to a conviction on that charge.

The defendant brought a Charter application to exclude breathalyzer readings, alleging a breach of his s. 10(b) Charter rights due to a five-minute delay in providing rights to counsel after arrest.

The court found that a breach of s. 10(b) did occur, as the officer's explanations for the delay (retrieving driver's licence and cell phone, calling for a tow) did not amount to justification.

However, applying the Grant analysis, the court determined that the breach was comparatively less serious, with a medium impact on the defendant's rights, and that the societal interest in adjudicating impaired driving cases on their merits outweighed the impact of exclusion.

Consequently, the Charter application was denied, and the breathalyzer readings were admitted.

The accused was charged with multiple counts of domestic violence, including assault, threats, and assault causing bodily harm against his wife and daughter.

The trial judge found the complainant subjectively persuasive but noted significant reliability concerns regarding unauthenticated digital photographs and a lack of corroborating investigation.

Applying the W.D. framework and the Aslami standard for digital evidence, the court found that the Crown failed to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The defendant, a young person facing sexual assault and forcible confinement charges, brought a s.276 Criminal Code application to question the complainant about alleged prior statements regarding her intention to engage in sexual activity.

The defendant argued these communications were relevant to counter assumptions about young people's sexual decision-making and to contradict the complainant's assertion of friendship.

The court denied the application, finding no evidentiary foundation for the proposed cross-examination, as the communications were not relied upon for consent or mistaken belief in consent, nor were they relevant to disabuse the court of any assumptions, and there was no basis for contradiction.

The court emphasized the need to avoid expressing opinions on s.276 factors without a proper evidentiary foundation.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and refusing to provide a breath sample.

The police stopped the accused on the private driveway of his condominium after receiving a civilian complaint about his driving.

The court acquitted the accused of impaired driving due to reasonable doubt regarding the arresting officer's memory and observations, which were contradicted by video evidence.

However, the court found the accused guilty of refusing to provide a breath sample, rejecting his Charter arguments under s. 10(b) and his reliance on R. v. McColman regarding the private driveway stop.

An application for unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter was also dismissed, as the delay was attributed to both parties underestimating the required trial time.

The accused was sentenced for extortion, pointing a firearm, and using a firearm.

After applying enhanced credit for 140 days of pre-sentence custody, the court imposed a sentence of two years less a day, followed by one year of probation.

The court also imposed a lifetime weapons prohibition under s. 109 of the Criminal Code, a DNA order, and waived the victim surcharge.

The defendant was charged with possession of cocaine and marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown's case relied heavily on circumstantial evidence, primarily the defendant's fingerprints found on drug packaging discovered in a neighbour's yard, and the proximity of the defendant's parents' residence.

The defendant testified, denying knowledge or involvement with the drugs, explaining his fingerprints by routine household activities.

The court found the police investigation to be lacking and, despite suspicion, concluded that the circumstantial evidence did not amount to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, as the defendant's testimony might reasonably be true and other inferences could be drawn from the evidence.

The defendant was found not guilty on both charges.

Anthony Jallim was sentenced for armed robbery and residence invasion.

The court imposed a four-year concurrent incarceration sentence, acknowledging his youth, early acceptance of responsibility, and the offence being at the lower end of the spectrum for such crimes.

Ancillary orders included a DNA sample, a 10-year weapons prohibition (lifetime for certain items), and a no-contact order with victims.

Victim surcharges were waived.

This is a sentencing decision for an offender convicted of sexual assault, two counts of common assault, and one count of breach of undertaking.

The court considered the principles of sentencing under section 718 of the Criminal Code, including deterrence, denunciation, and rehabilitation, alongside the offender's subjective circumstances, such as his youth, psychological challenges (ADD/ADHD, learning disability), community service, and stable employment.

The court rejected a conditional sentence due to the seriousness of the sexual assault and the breach of undertaking, which undermined public confidence.

A total sentence of 11 months incarceration was imposed, followed by a two-year probation order, a DNA order, a 10-year SOIRA order, and a 10-year firearms prohibition.

The defendant was convicted of two counts of causing an accident resulting in bodily harm while having a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

The court considered sentencing principles, including denunciation and general deterrence, and the severe, life-changing injuries sustained by the two victims.

Despite mitigating factors such as genuine remorse and rehabilitation efforts, the court found that an intermittent sentence was insufficient.

The final sentence was 15 months incarceration, three years probation, and a three-year driving prohibition, aligning with the Crown's recommendation due to the judge's self-imposed restriction on exceeding the Crown's position without further submissions.

The accused, Andrew Tucker, facing charges including assault, sexual assault, and criminal harassment, brought a Charter application to exclude an in-custody statement.

The application was based on a breach of his s. 10(b) right to counsel, as he was not re-advised of his rights when his jeopardy significantly changed with additional charges.

The Crown conceded the s. 10(b) breach was egregious.

Applying the s. 24(2) analysis, the court found the breach serious and its impact on the accused's rights significant.

Given that the statement was not essential to the Crown's case, the court concluded that its exclusion would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Consequently, the accused's in-custody statement was excluded from evidence.

Following a judge-alone criminal trial, the accused was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference involving a young child in the household.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework and held that, although the accused withstood cross-examination and merely denying the allegations could in many cases raise a reasonable doubt, the complainant's evidence contained internally specific details and was reinforced by corroborative post-disclosure evidence.

The court also considered prior similar fact ruling context but warned itself against propensity reasoning.

On the totality of the evidence, the Crown proved both offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant, Michel Varalo, was charged with sexual assault, sexual interference, and sexual invitation involving an underage complainant.

The Crown's case relied on the testimony of the complainant and her father, as the defendant did not testify.

The court assessed the complainant's credibility and reliability, considering inconsistencies in her testimony and that of her father, as well as the context of her age and delayed disclosure.

The court found the complainant's testimony reliable and credible regarding the fundamental elements of the charges, leading to convictions on all three counts.

A conditional stay was entered on the sexual assault charge due to the Kienapple principle.

The accused was charged with an offence arising from an incident involving spitting.

The Crown and defence reached a resolution whereby the accused entered into a 12-month common law peace bond with conditions including no contact with the complainant, a 100-metre distance requirement, and a prohibition on possessing weapons.

The underlying criminal charges were withdrawn upon the accused's acceptance of the peace bond terms.

The Crown applied for the appointment of counsel for a youth who was the subject of a third party records application under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The court considered whether it had jurisdiction to appoint counsel for the youth in third party records proceedings.

The court reviewed relevant case law and concluded that it possessed inherent jurisdiction to control its own process and to appoint counsel for the youth, emphasizing the importance of youth having access to legal representation in proceedings affecting their interests.

The defendant was convicted of two counts of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood and causing bodily harm, contrary to section 255(2.1) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant was acquitted on two counts of impaired driving causing bodily harm.

The defendant challenged the constitutionality of section 255(2.1), arguing it lacks sufficient fault requirement and is overbroad.

The court upheld the constitutionality of the section, finding it contains adequate fault requirements and is not saved by section 1 of the Charter, as it pursues the important objective of deterring drinking and driving and employs proportionate means.

A youth was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference of his sister spanning from approximately age twelve until September 2018.

The complainant provided detailed allegations in a first video statement, then recanted entirely in a second video statement, claiming she had fabricated the allegations based on a television show storyline.

At trial, the complainant retracted her recantation and reasserted the abuse allegations.

The defendant denied all charges.

The trial judge found that while the complainant's testimony was subjectively persuasive, the complete retraction of allegations—forcefully asserted during the second interview—created a reasonable doubt that could not be overcome.

The defendant was acquitted on all charges.

The accused was sentenced following a guilty plea to charges involving child sexual abuse material.

The court imposed an 18-month custodial sentence with credit for 12 days of pre-sentence custody, resulting in approximately 17.5 months remaining to be served.

The sentence was followed by three years of probation with conditions including counselling and participation in rehabilitative programs.

A section 161 order was imposed for 10 years, a lifetime SOIRA order was made, and a forfeiture order was issued for seized materials.

The court emphasized the denunciatory nature of the sentence while considering the accused's Gladue report factors, including Indigenous heritage and potential FASD diagnosis.

The proceedings were adjourned to February 7, 2020, to allow the accused to reaffirm his plea comprehension while sober, after he disclosed consuming marijuana before court.

The accused was charged with two counts of breaching an undertaking by communicating with his former partner.

The accused was self-represented, and the court appointed counsel under s. 486 of the Criminal Code to cross-examine the complainant.

The court found the accused guilty of the first breach based on the corroborating testimony of the accused's brother, who confirmed the accused met with the complainant at a park.

However, the court acquitted the accused of the second breach (a telephone call), finding that the s. 486 counsel's cross-examination of the complainant was wholly inadequate and failed to properly test her evidence.

The court held that it would be dangerous to accept the complainant's untested testimony where the accused was precluded from making full answer and defence due to the ineffective cross-examination by court-appointed counsel.