Suzette Ann Moss

The defendant, a young person facing sexual assault and forcible confinement charges, brought a s.276 Criminal Code application to question the complainant about alleged prior statements regarding her intention to engage in sexual activity.

The defendant argued these communications were relevant to counter assumptions about young people's sexual decision-making and to contradict the complainant's assertion of friendship.

The court denied the application, finding no evidentiary foundation for the proposed cross-examination, as the communications were not relied upon for consent or mistaken belief in consent, nor were they relevant to disabuse the court of any assumptions, and there was no basis for contradiction.

The court emphasized the need to avoid expressing opinions on s.276 factors without a proper evidentiary foundation.

The Respondent Father brought a motion to set aside, amend, or vary a 2014 final order concerning equalization, spousal, and child support, and to reinstate his pleadings, alleging fraud and misrepresentation by the Applicant Mother.

The Father also sought an order compelling the Mother to sell a New York City property.

The court dismissed the Father's motion, finding he failed to satisfy the three-part test for varying an order: he did not move without delay after learning of the default order, did not adequately explain his persistent defaults (including non-disclosure and contempt of prior orders), and lacked an arguable defense on the merits of fraud or mistake.

The court emphasized the high standard of proof required for allegations of fraud and noted that the Father's prejudice was self-inflicted due to his own non-compliance.

The applicant brought a motion to change a final order regarding child support and section 7 expenses for his three children.

Key issues included the applicant's income, whether an adult child (Ivana) remained a child of the marriage for support purposes while pursuing a second degree, and the calculation of support and arrears for another adult child (Jelena) and a minor child (Luka).

The court found no material change in circumstances to impute a higher income to the applicant beyond a conceded increase.

It ruled that support for Ivana ceased upon completion of her first degree, rejecting the respondent's claim for medical school expenses.

Support for Jelena was suspended for 2012 due to her employment but continued for 2013 despite part-time studies due to a mental health condition, payable directly to her after age 22 until age 23.

The court clarified the interpretation of section 7 expenses for post-secondary education and hockey, largely upholding the original consent order's framework.

Arrears were calculated based on these findings.