Kent Edward Saliwonchyk

The defendant was charged with unauthorized possession of firearms.

He brought a Charter application seeking to exclude the firearms from evidence, alleging a violation of his s. 8 right against unreasonable search or seizure.

The firearms were seized by an OPP officer from the defendant's vehicle after a motor vehicle accident, based on information from fire personnel and public safety concerns regarding the security of the firearms at a tow yard.

The court applied the two-step Waterfield test, finding that the officer acted within his common law and statutory duties to protect life and property and prevent crime, and that the seizure was reasonably necessary in the circumstances.

Therefore, no s. 8 violation occurred.

In the alternative, the court conducted a Grant analysis and concluded that even if there were a breach, the evidence would be admissible due to the reduced expectation of privacy in a damaged vehicle, the minimal intrusiveness of the seizure, and the officer's good faith.

The firearms were admitted into evidence, and the defendant was found guilty.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation of a conveyance and operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The court addressed several Charter claims, including detention, right to counsel (s.10(b)), and right to be informed of the reason for detention (s.10(a)), as well as the admissibility of breath samples and the element of care or control.

The court found the defendant was detained prior to the ASD demand.

While the s.10(b) right to counsel was justifiably delayed due to medical concerns and investigative duties, a brief breach of the s.10(a) right to be informed of the reason for detention occurred.

However, applying the Grant factors, the court declined to exclude the evidence, finding the breach inadvertent, its impact minimal, and the public interest in a trial on the merits high.

The court also found that the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable and that the Crown proved impairment by alcohol and the element of care or control, leading to a finding of guilt on both counts.

The accused pleaded guilty to robbery and possession for the purpose of trafficking arising from a home invasion.

At sentencing, the court conducted an evidentiary hearing to determine whether police used excessive force during the accused's arrest.

The court found that the police used more force than was necessary to effect the arrest, causing serious bodily harm to the accused.

The court reduced the sentence from 7.5 years to 5.5 years (44 months net after pre-sentence custody credit) to account for the excessive use of force, the racialized context of the arrest, and the failure of police to ensure medical attention.

The defendant, charged with second-degree murder, sought to introduce expert psychiatric evidence on the "fight or flight" reaction and the effects of marijuana to support self-defence and provocation.

The court dismissed the application, finding an insufficient evidentiary foundation for the proposed expert testimony to be relevant and necessary to the specific facts of the case.

The court also expressed obiter doubts about the necessity of such evidence, particularly regarding the "fight or flight" response, which is generally within the common experience of a jury.

The defendant was charged with robbery and wearing a disguise with intent to commit an offence following an armed robbery at a pharmacy.

The Crown's case relied primarily on a fingerprint found on a garbage bag left at the scene and surveillance photographs.

The defence argued that the fingerprint only proved contact with the bag at some unspecified time, not participation in the robbery.

The court found that while the defendant's fingerprint was on the bag, the timing of when it was deposited could not be established.

The surveillance photographs, when compared to the defendant's arrest photograph, could only establish that he could not be excluded as a suspect.

The court concluded that guilt was not the only reasonable inference from the circumstantial evidence and acquitted the defendant.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operation of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown's case relied on breath sample readings of 260 and 240 milligrams, approximately three times the legal limit.

The central issue was whether the accused's Charter rights under sections 7 and 9 were breached when police held him for a show cause bail hearing without reasonable grounds, contrary to the presumption of release.

The court found an arbitrary detention breach based on the accused's status as a resident alien with property in Florida, coupled with insufficient police investigation into his Ontario roots.

The breath sample readings were excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was acquitted of the criminal charges but subject to a common law peace bond.

The defendant pleaded guilty to operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 mL of blood.

The Crown sought to rely on three prior pardoned convictions for drinking and driving spanning 1982, 1989, and 1996 in sentencing.

The central issue was whether pardoned convictions, disclosed with ministerial consent, could be considered at sentencing.

The court held that pardoned convictions should not be considered as aggravating factors at sentencing, treating the defendant as a first offender.

The court imposed the minimum fine with a one-year payment period and a 12-month driving prohibition under the Criminal Code, with a concurrent two-year licence suspension under the Highway Traffic Act subject to the Interlock Program.

The Crown sought to admit evidence of a Crime Stoppers tip allegedly made by the accused, Keenan Corner, in a second-degree murder trial.

The defence and Crime Stoppers argued informer privilege applied.

The court ruled that informer privilege does not apply when an accused uses the Crime Stoppers system to deflect suspicion from themselves, as such conduct would constitute a criminal offence (public mischief, obstruction of justice) and divert the privilege from its intended purpose.

The court found, on a balance of probabilities, that the Crime Stoppers call was not legitimate and was made by the accused, based on surveillance evidence and significant similarities between the tip and the accused's statements to police.

The evidence was deemed admissible, subject to a final review of its probative versus prejudicial value.

The defendant was charged with Over 80 mgs. contrary to s.253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

He brought a pre-trial Charter application alleging breaches of ss. 7, 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter, seeking exclusion of breath samples and statements obtained following his detention and arrest.

The Crown sought summary dismissal of the s.8 argument and particulars of the alleged s.7 and s.8 breaches.

The court dismissed both the Crown's application for summary dismissal and its request for particulars, finding that where a warrantless seizure is alleged, the Crown bears the burden of establishing lawful preconditions, and the defendant need not provide detailed particulars beyond putting the Crown on notice of the issue.

The defendant was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by a drug contrary to s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown established that the defendant's profound impairment was caused by drug consumption, not alcohol.

The defendant's breath samples showed no perceptible blood alcohol level.

A Drug Recognition Expert conducted a prescribed evaluation and concluded the defendant was impaired by a central nervous system depressant.

Toxicological analysis of a urine sample confirmed the presence of Lorazepam and Chlorpheniramine, both of which produce effects consistent with the observed impairment.

The court found the Crown proved beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant's impairment was caused by drugs.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle by drug following a traffic stop where police observed signs of impairment.

The defendant brought Charter applications challenging the lawfulness of her arrest, the DRE (Drug Recognition Expert) evaluation, the search of her person, and the admissibility of statements made during the investigation.

The court dismissed all Charter applications, finding no breaches of the defendant's rights under sections 7, 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, no requirement to re-advise of counsel rights before the DRE process, no strip search violation, and that the DRE testing was conducted as soon as reasonably practicable.

The accused was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle with blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 mL of blood.

The defence challenged two police actions: video surveillance of the accused using a toilet in a monitored cell, and the removal and inspection of the accused's underwire bra.

The court found no Charter violation regarding the toilet surveillance due to the poor video resolution and metal plate obstruction.

However, the court found that the removal and inspection of the bra constituted an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of section 8 of the Charter.

Despite this breach, the court declined to grant a stay of proceedings or exclude the breath test evidence, applying the three-part test from R. v. Babos.

The court found the breach did not meet the threshold for a stay and imposed a sentence adjustment as remedy.

The accused was sentenced after being convicted of conveying a terrorist hoax, fabricating evidence, public mischief, and obstructing a peace officer.

The offences arose from a fabricated online discovery purporting to reveal jihadist plans targeting the Pickering Nuclear Generating Station, which triggered an extensive multi‑agency national security investigation.

Forensic computer evidence established that the accused had created and embedded nuclear plant plans within an image of the Quran and falsely reported the discovery.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence due to the seriousness of terrorist hoaxes and the significant investigative resources expended.

A global custodial sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment was imposed for the principal counts, with a concurrent 4‑month sentence for obstruction, followed by two years’ probation and a five‑year weapons prohibition.

The accused was charged with fabricating a terrorist hoax involving the Pickering Nuclear Generating Station, fabricating evidence, public mischief, and obstructing a peace officer.

The Crown alleged that the accused created a false computer file embedding nuclear plant emergency plans within an image of the Quran and falsely claimed it was discovered on a jihadist website.

Forensic computer evidence demonstrated that the materials had been fabricated and placed on the accused’s computer rather than downloaded from the internet.

The court rejected the accused’s explanation, finding the evidence proved the hoax was intentionally created to mislead authorities and trigger a terrorism investigation.

The accused was found guilty on all four counts.