Nathan Baker

The accused, Zachariah Piva, was charged with sexual assault.

The complainant, LB, alleged non-consensual sexual activity, while the accused maintained it was consensual.

A third witness, KA, provided inconsistent testimony regarding consent.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of all witnesses, applying the R. v. W. (D.) test.

The court found that the Crown did not prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly regarding the complainant's subjective lack of consent, due to inconsistencies in her testimony and the corroborating evidence from the third witness and the accused.

The accused was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

A voir dire was held to determine the admissibility of statements made by the defendant to the investigating officer at the scene.

The defendant argued that his statements were statutorily compelled under section 199 of the Ontario Highway Traffic Act and should be excluded pursuant to the principle against self-incrimination under section 7 of the Charter.

The Crown argued there was no statutory compulsion.

The court found that section 199 had no applicability to the minor accident in question, that the defendant did not provide an accident report, and that the defendant's belief he was compelled to answer questions was unreasonable and not credible.

The Charter application was dismissed and the defendant's statements were admitted.

The accused was charged with operating a vessel while impaired by alcohol and exceeding the legal blood-alcohol limit.

At trial, the accused brought a Charter application challenging the lawfulness of the police boarding of his boat, detention, and search.

The accused argued the boat was his dwelling-house and that police required a warrant under the Feeney principles.

The court found that while the accused had a reduced expectation of privacy on his boat at a public dock in the early afternoon, the officer breached the accused's section 8 rights by failing to announce his presence before boarding.

However, the court found no breach of section 9 rights and, applying the section 24(2) test from R. v. Grant, admitted the breath sample evidence as the breach was inadvertent and minor, the impact on the accused's privacy interests was minimal, and there was a strong societal interest in resolving impaired boating cases on their merits.

The accused, Bradley Sippel, was charged with criminal negligence causing death, dangerous driving causing death, and two counts each of criminal negligence causing bodily harm and dangerous driving causing bodily harm, following a collision that killed one cyclist and injured two others.

The Crown alleged excessive speed and failure to safely pass the cyclists.

The defence claimed a sudden loss of awareness or blackout.

The court rejected the accused's explanations, finding his testimony evasive and fabricated.

The court concluded that the accused's pattern of excessive speeding, failure to slow down in a school zone, and deliberate decision to maintain speed and delay evasive action constituted a marked and substantial departure from the standard of care, demonstrating a wanton and reckless disregard for public safety.

Sippel was found guilty on all counts.

The accused was charged with being a party to the offence of breach of recognizance by abetting the principal accused in breaching a condition requiring him to reside with his surety each and every night.

The court found that the principal accused did breach the recognizance condition by spending nights at a different residence from his surety.

The court further found that the accused, as surety, deliberately misled the bail court by failing to disclose her actual primary residence and intentionally encouraged the breach through her conduct of leaving the principal accused unsupervised at night at the address she had provided to the court.

The accused was convicted.

The defendant was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by a drug contrary to s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown established that the defendant's profound impairment was caused by drug consumption, not alcohol.

The defendant's breath samples showed no perceptible blood alcohol level.

A Drug Recognition Expert conducted a prescribed evaluation and concluded the defendant was impaired by a central nervous system depressant.

Toxicological analysis of a urine sample confirmed the presence of Lorazepam and Chlorpheniramine, both of which produce effects consistent with the observed impairment.

The court found the Crown proved beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant's impairment was caused by drugs.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle by drug following a traffic stop where police observed signs of impairment.

The defendant brought Charter applications challenging the lawfulness of her arrest, the DRE (Drug Recognition Expert) evaluation, the search of her person, and the admissibility of statements made during the investigation.

The court dismissed all Charter applications, finding no breaches of the defendant's rights under sections 7, 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, no requirement to re-advise of counsel rights before the DRE process, no strip search violation, and that the DRE testing was conducted as soon as reasonably practicable.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for impaired care or control of a motor vehicle under s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

He had been found asleep in the driver’s seat of a parked vehicle with the engine running while waiting for a designated driver.

The appeal court held the trial judge misapplied the legal test for care or control by treating the accused’s decision to sleep while waiting as undermining his safety plan.

Applying the principles in R. v. Boudreault and related authorities, the court found there was insufficient evidence of a realistic risk that the accused would set the vehicle in motion or change his intention to drive.

The trial judge’s reasoning improperly criminalized the use of the vehicle for a manifestly innocent purpose.