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The court dismissed the accused's pre-trial application regarding text message admissibility as premature.
The defendant, charged with sexual assault and related offences, brought a pre-trial application seeking orders that certain text messages and verbal communications with the complainant and her relatives were not "records" under s. 278.1 of the Criminal Code and thus not subject to s. 278.4 or s. 276 admissibility hearings.
The court dismissed the application, clarifying that s. 278.4 hearings are for third-party record production and inapplicable when the defence already possesses the records.
The court found it premature to determine the admissibility of the communications under s. 276 or s. 278.92/278.94 due to numerous unknowns regarding the specific allegations, the content and context of the communications, their relationship to the charged acts, and their relevance to trial issues.
The offender was sentenced to 30 months imprisonment for mortgage fraud and loan sharking.
The offender pleaded guilty to fraud against the Bank of Nova Scotia involving multiple mortgages obtained with false employment and income documentation totalling $1.74 million, charging criminal interest rates to two individuals, and possession of property obtained by crime.
The court imposed a sentence of 30 months imprisonment, consisting of two years for fraud, three months consecutive for each criminal interest rate offence, and one year concurrent for proceeds of crime.
Additionally, fines in lieu of forfeiture totalling $510,488 were imposed.
The corporation was sentenced to fines totalling $325,000.
Informer privilege does not protect Crime Stoppers tips made by an accused to deflect suspicion.
The Crown sought to admit evidence of a Crime Stoppers tip allegedly made by the accused, Keenan Corner, in a second-degree murder trial.
The defence and Crime Stoppers argued informer privilege applied.
The court ruled that informer privilege does not apply when an accused uses the Crime Stoppers system to deflect suspicion from themselves, as such conduct would constitute a criminal offence (public mischief, obstruction of justice) and divert the privilege from its intended purpose.
The court found, on a balance of probabilities, that the Crime Stoppers call was not legitimate and was made by the accused, based on surveillance evidence and significant similarities between the tip and the accused's statements to police.
The evidence was deemed admissible, subject to a final review of its probative versus prejudicial value.
Statements to police partially excluded due to Charter breaches and involuntary inducements during later interviews.
The accused, charged with second-degree murder, brought an application to exclude several statements made to police under sections 7, 8, 9, and 10 of the Charter.
The Crown brought a corresponding application to admit the statements as voluntary.
The court found that the accused's initial statements at the scene and during the first part of his police station interview were voluntary and not obtained in breach of the Charter.
However, the court found that the accused was detained during the second part of the interview, his Charter rights were violated, and the statements were involuntary due to oppressive police conduct and improper inducements.
Consequently, the second part of the interview was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.
Statements made following his subsequent arrest were partially admitted and partially excluded based on voluntariness.
Appeal dismissed; corporations targeted by a fraud scheme fall within the definition of the 'public'.
The appellant appealed his conviction for conspiracy to defraud the public, arguing that the victims were corporations operating 'big box' retail stores and therefore did not constitute the 'public' under s. 380 of the Criminal Code.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the word 'public' can describe a segment of the community targeted by a fraud, and that corporations are not excluded from the concept of the public.
The court found the indictment properly charged a conspiracy to defraud the public and the appellant suffered no prejudice.