L. Crawford

The offender was convicted of second-degree murder by a jury after shooting his friend and drug trafficking partner multiple times with an illegal handgun.

The Crown sought 16 years of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought 10 to 12 years.

The jury recommendations ranged from 20 to 25 years.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the extreme violence, use of an illegal handgun, and post-offence conduct, alongside mitigating factors such as the offender's youth, Aboriginal heritage, expressions of remorse, and pre-trial custody conditions.

The court sentenced the offender to life imprisonment with no parole eligibility for 14 years, along with ancillary weapons, DNA, and non-communication orders.

The accused, charged in a shooting death, sought to introduce expert psychiatric evidence regarding the 'fight or flight' reaction to explain his perception and memory of the events.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the proposed evidence did not meet the necessity test for expert evidence.

The court held that the biological mechanics of a fight or flight response and its effects on perception are within the ordinary experience and common sense of a jury.

Furthermore, the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by the risk of usurping the jury's role and oath-helping.

The accused, charged with second degree murder, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable delay.

The total delay was 44.5 months.

After deducting defence delay and delay caused by exceptional circumstances—including unexpectedly lengthy pre-trial motions and an interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada by Crime Stoppers regarding informer privilege—the net delay fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, brought an application to exclude several statements made to police under sections 7, 8, 9, and 10 of the Charter.

The Crown brought a corresponding application to admit the statements as voluntary.

The court found that the accused's initial statements at the scene and during the first part of his police station interview were voluntary and not obtained in breach of the Charter.

However, the court found that the accused was detained during the second part of the interview, his Charter rights were violated, and the statements were involuntary due to oppressive police conduct and improper inducements.

Consequently, the second part of the interview was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

Statements made following his subsequent arrest were partially admitted and partially excluded based on voluntariness.