ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
GREGORY D. MONTEATH
Before Justice P. Tetley
Heard on August 8, September 26, 29, October 24, November 14, December 15, 17 & 19, 2025, January 8, 9 & 19, 2026, May 21 & 22, 2026
Reasons for Judgment released on July 31, 2026
W. Beatty counsel for the Crown
J. Greenspan & L. Crawford counsel for the accused Gregory Monteath
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
I. The Criminal Allegations
[1] The accused, Gregory Monteath, is charged with the offences of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm to Diane Laliberte-Rainville, contrary to section 320.13(2) of the Criminal Code of Canada and with failing to stop his motor vehicle, provide his name and address, and offer assistance, either knowing, or being reckless, as to whether the automobile he was operating had been involved in an accident that resulted in bodily harm to Diane Laliberte-Rainville, s.320.16(2) of the Criminal Code.
[2] A charge of public mischief, based on an allegation that the accused had offered a false narrative of the circumstances of the accident to Provincial Constable Nichoal Hawkins, contrary to s. 140(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, was previously withdrawn by the Crown.
II. Background
[3] The charges arise from a motor vehicle collision that occurred on June 20, 2023, shortly after 7:10am. By all accounts, the day was clear and sunny. The roadway, Hwy 11 north of Sundridge, approaching Hill Valley Road, Strong Township, was dry, straight and in good repair. Traffic was relatively light. Hwy 11, at that location, featured two northbound lanes and two southbound lanes separated by a grassy 22 meter wide median.
[4] At approximately 7am, Diane Laliberte-Rainville, a registered nurse, (RN) and Director of Residential Seniors, at a long-term residence for retired members of a religious order in North Bay, was getting ready to leave for work from her home in Sundridge. Given the favourable weather conditions, she decided to ride her 2013 Harley Davidson Tri Glide Ultra Classic three wheeled motorcycle, or “trike”, rather than drive her pickup truck. It was a decision that would have unexpected, profound, and life changing implications, fifteen minutes later.
[5] As the motorcycle made its way from Hwy 124 onto Hwy 11 northbound, a pickup truck, driven by the accused, was also being driven northbound on Hwy 11, north of Hwy 124. Gregory Monteath was enroute to a business meeting in New Liskeard in his capacity as a Project Manager with Maintenance Repair Services, a firm that provides maintenance services to grocery stores and other retail outlets.
[6] Mr. Monteath had been awake from about 3:30 a.m. He had left his home in East Gwillimbury at approximately 4:30 a.m. He drove north on Highway 400 through Barrie and then continued his journey northbound on Hwy 11. In his trial testimony, Mr. Monteath described the day as being sunny and clear. He recalled wearing sunglasses as he approached the area where his truck would collide with Ms. Laliberte-Rainville’s motorcycle.
[7] Mr. Monteath had the radio on in his vehicle. Music was playing. He has two cell phones in his truck; his own and a work phone. Each phone had its own stand. The phone stands were mounted on the dashboard of the 2022 Chevrolet Silverado 4 door pickup truck Mr. Monteath was operating. Mr. Monteath acknowledged both receiving and sending messages throughout the drive. He described the work phone as featuring “hands free” technology. He had to touch the personal cell phone to facilitate communication on that device. Mr. Monteath resisted the Crown’s suggestion that the phones and/or the radio might have been a source of distraction at the time of the collision.
[8] Mr. Monteath believed that he was travelling at between 120 to 130 km per hour prior to the collision. The evidentiary record is concluded to establish that he was operating his truck at approximately 156 kilometres per hour based on data received from the Air Bag Control Module (ACM) or Sensing Diagnostic Module (SDM) as the technology is known in Chevrolet motor products. This rate of speed exceeded the posted 110 kilometres per hour speed limit by 46 kilometres an hour.
[9] Post collision examination of the Silverado pickup did not reveal any mechanical defects that might have been contributing factors in the collision. The accelerator, brakes and steering were all found to be in good working order. Similarly, post collision examination of the Harley did not identify any mechanical concerns that may have played a role in the collision. See Collision Reconstruction Report Appendix “C”, Vehicle Examination Notes and Appendix “D”, Photo Brief, (pgs. 195 – 283) for details of the vehicle examination.
[10] In his October 11, 2023, Reconstructionist Collision Report, Provincial Constable John Gallagher of the Traffic Incident Management and Enforcement (T.I.M.E) team reviewed data generated by the pickup’s Event Data Recorder, an internal component of the vehicle’s ACM. That data, as detailed in the Crash Data Retrieval Report (CDR), for the Chevrolet, provided detailed information regarding various aspects of the vehicle’s operation, (including speed, acceleration and braking) for the 8 second period immediately preceding the collision. At page 36 of the report a summary of data reveals the following:
(i) The cruise control feature in the pickup was not activated at the time of the collision;
(ii) The accelerator pedal of the vehicle was depressed between 19-30%, (the percentage varied) from 8 seconds before the collision to 1 second before the collision, except for 0% at 2.5 seconds pre collision;
(iii) The accelerator depression changed to 0% immediately before the collision, (-0.5 seconds) and at the time of the collision (0.0).
(iv) The CDR confirms that no brake pressure was applied during most of the 8 second period prior to the collision (from -8.0 seconds to -0.5 seconds), with a 7% change in position and 567 kilopascals of pressure being recorded at 0.0 seconds, (the time of the collision between the pickup and the motorcycle).
(v) Supplementary Collision Reconstruction data was reviewed by Collision Reconstructionist, Provincial Constable Mark Bimson, and filed as exhibit 10 at trial. This data was received from the ACM in the pickup truck. One aspect of the ACM data relates to the positioning of the steering of the vehicle. The related Steering Wheel Angle data discloses whether the steering wheel had been turned within an 8 second period immediately prior to the collision. The reviewed data revealed that the pickup was essentially operated without appreciable turning, reflecting any form of evasive action, during the referenced time frame to the point of impact.
(vi) As previously noted, the CDR Report confirmed the Chevrolet Silverado to be travelling at speeds, during the time frame 8 seconds before the collision to the time of the collision, that varied between 156 kilometres per hour to 158 kilometres an hour.
(vii) The CDR data also confirmed that Mr. Monteath was wearing his seatbelt at the time of the collision, (pg. 18), that the airbags in the truck did not deploy, (pg. 17-18), that the truck tires were the size recommended by the manufacturer and largely undamaged (except for a section of tread on the front left tire worn down from contact with the front bumper, pg. 20). The post-collision examination of the Chevrolet Silverado did not reveal anything that was assessed as being a contributing factor to the collision, (pg. 21).
[11] Further information relating to the operation of the truck was received from a device installed in the vehicle, as a fleet management tool, by the accused’s employer. The data from the device was monitored by an Edmonton based firm, Titan GPS. Mr. Liam Cusack, Vice President of Operations at Titan GPS, reviewed the resulting “Start Stop” Location Report related to the vehicle operated by the accused on June 20, 2023. The data confirmed movement of the truck starting shortly after 4 a.m., when the vehicle departed Mr. Monteath’s residence. Utilizing GPS satellite technology, the location of the vehicle was able to be ascertained, at given points in time, as it made its way north to the collision scene. The resulting report disclosed, among other items of information, the overall use of the vehicle, locations where the vehicle had stopped for more than 2 minutes or was idling, precise positioning, location of the vehicle at specific points in time, and the maximum speed of travel.
[12] While acknowledging he was not a professional engineer, a software designer, or a participant in the production of the GPS device, Mr. Cusack was aware of the information the device generated and the company’s large client base. He referenced, as an example, the fact the City of Edmonton relies on the technology to monitor the activities and whereabouts of the City’s fleet of 800 snowplows. The “Stop Start Report” was referenced as accurately reflecting the position of the pickup truck at specific points in time by utilizing the triangulated signals from at least 3 satellites to plot the vehicles exact position. The device and related software, employing data from the Global Positioning System (GPS), was reported to also be capable of generating accurate information relating to any “heading” changes or changes in direction of travel, the exact location of the vehicle at a specific point in time, based on latitudinal and longitudinal plotting, and vehicle speed, based on consideration of the time and distance travelled between known locations.
[13] Mr. Cusack testified that the technology involved was like that employed by Google Maps. The device and the data it generates allows for the continuous monitoring of a vehicle’s speed. Additional diagnostics and maintenance related data may also be received from the vehicle through the “on board diagnostic port” of the installed device. The frequency of the reporting of the speed of operation of the truck was referenced as being governed by the programming of the device, with a report being generated every 60 seconds in relation to the truck operated by the accused. Mr. Cusack stated that the speed data is based on a sampling of the vehicle’s position as determined several times a second.
[14] The resulting “Stop Start Report” referenced the Chevrolet Silverado as having recorded a maximum speed of 158 kilometres per hour between 7:06:07 a.m. and 7:15:07 a.m. on June 20, 2023. Under cross-examination, Mr. Cusack acknowledged certain enumerated errors in the report (see 7:05:35 a.m., as an example, where the status of the vehicle is referenced as “stopped” but the “Valid, Realtime” speed of the vehicle, at that time, per the Asset Detail Report for the truck operated by Mr. Monteath, has the vehicle being operated at 138 kilometres an hour). Mr. Cusack attributed this obvious conflict as being an “error” arising from the data generated by the vehicle itself.
III. The Collision
[15] Diane Laliberte-Rainville testified that she had no recollection of the collision itself. She could not recall any of the circumstances when the collision took place, including the rate of speed at which the motorcycle was travelling. Mrs. Laliberte-Rainville variously estimated her “likely” rate of speed, based on her established driving habits, to be between 90-105 kilometres per hour, as referenced in her trial account and previous police statement. She stated “my habit is to stay on the right (in the curb lane) at 90 (to) 100. Over that, I’m not comfortable at all driving my motorcycle higher than that”, pg. 18 transcript of Diane Laliberte-Rainville’s testimony, December 17, 2025.
[16] Mrs. Laliberte-Rainville had limited or no memory of the events of June 28, 2023, due to the grievous, life threatening injures, she sustained in the collision. In the aftermath of the collision, she was transported to the nearest hospital in North Bay and then air lifted to the Trauma Centre at Health Sciences North in Sudbury. Mrs. Laliberte-Rainville’s own account of events details an extensive array of traumatic injuries arising from the collision of the pickup and the Harley Davidson motorcycle during which Mrs. Laliberte-Rainville was thrown from her bike.
[17] The injuries were initially assessed as including an intracranial hemorrhage, a “brain bleed”, a brief VT arrest (VT= ventricular tachycardia, a condition where the heart beats dangerously fast, with “arrest” referring to a brief period of time when the heart stops pumping blood), a T8 vertebral fracture, numerous additional bone fractures, (left hand, right foot, metatarsal (one of five long bones in the middle of the foot connecting the ankle to the toes), a “degloving injury” to her right hand, right knee ligament damage and left bimalleolar ankle fracture, (relating to the malleolus, the bony bumps on either side of the ankle joint).
[18] A subsequent progress note, by Doctor Joel-Amir Moktar of Health Sciences North, references Mr. Laliberte-Rainville as experiencing “a dense paralysis” and “paresthesia”, (commonly known as ‘pins and needles’) of her right hand and arm. The “degloved” right hand is noted to require a skin graft, with what is assessed as “a fairly poor prognosis for long term function of that hand”.
[19] Mrs. Laliberte-Rainville detailed her injuries as including the aforementioned “brain bleed” or intercranial hemorrhage; a dislocated right shoulder; a torn rotator cuff; a dislocated right elbow and wrist; fractured ribs; a fracture of the tip of her femur; a left ankle and foot fracture; fractures to all of her toes and feet and fractures to several cervical, thoracic and lumbar vertebrae.
[20] The injuries to her right arm and hand have left Mrs. Laliberte-Rainville with an irreparable disabling impairment. She also continues to be impacted in her movement because of the injuries to her spine and encounters instability while walking due to the injuries to her legs.
[21] Mr. Monteath was not injured in the collision. The pickup truck he was driving sustained contact damage to the front end with most of the damage being in the centre and toward the driver’s side of the front of the truck. The front bumper was folded downward and to the rear near the license plate. There were scuff marks on the right tow hook. The front grille was broken and missing a section from the centre to the left headlight. The front edge of the hood was folded under slightly. There was a dent on the topside of the hood just left of centre. White transfer marks were observed on the bumper and above the right tow hook. The left tow hook was scraped with white transfer marks located above. There was no observable damage on the left side of the vehicle, (see Reconstructionist Collision Report, pg. 15.)
[22] The Harley Davidson sustained heavy damage as outlined and depicted in the Collision Report at pages 22-24. The lower cargo area and fenders were bent towards the left. The trunk door was broken, the right fender was cracked and raised upwards from the right rear tire, the right-side taillight was broken and there was damage to the headlight, front fender, and engine guard. The front tire rim was bent on the left side, and the right-side rear tire also had a bent rim.
[23] Robert Gasson, a 62-year-old, self-employed, sales agent, involved in the giftware and souvenir business, testified that he was on his way to a sales call in Temagami on June 20, 2023. He was travelling northbound on Highway 11 when he observed a pickup truck approaching quickly from behind in the curb or inside lane. By virtue of the fact he travels extensively for business, Mr. Gasson testified that he maintains a high degree of vigilance, or awareness, when driving.
[24] Mr. Gasson characterized the observed pickup to be being driven erratically and to be “weaving/wavering a wee bit” within the lane of travel. The truck passed Mr. Gasson’s vehicle and then returned to the curb lane directly in front of Mr. Gasson’s automobile, after straddling the two northbound lanes for a period of several seconds. The truck was observed to travel over onto the shoulder of the road and “then erratically back”. Mr. Gasson initially testified that he then saw the truck strike a motorcycle that was also travelling in the curb lane. The collision caused the motorcycle to careen across the passing lane of northbound Hwy 11, traverse the centre median and both southbound lanes of Highway 11, before it contacted a rock wall on the west side of the southbound lanes.
[25] On witnessing the collision, Mr. Gasson advised that he stopped his vehicle to render aid to the motorcyclist who had been thrown from the motorcycle and who’s body was laying on the edge of the northbound passing lane, some distance ahead of the point of impact. Other motorists also stopped to assist. At 7:13:21, Mr. Gasson placed a 911 call to the OPP emergency number. He estimated that call had been placed within three minutes of the observed collision.
[26] Mr. Gasson recalled that it was a “nice day” with favourable weather conditions. He felt “confident” that what he had observed was a “rear end strike” of the motorcycle by the pickup truck. By the time he pulled over to assist, the pickup truck had left the scene and was out of sight because of a slight rise in the roadway to the north.
[27] Of later significance, Mr. Gasson did not observe any deer or any other form of wildlife on the roadway. He subsequently recounted being within four or five car lengths of the pickup “when I recognized the impact”. He assumed the pickup had contacted the rear of the motorcycle by the way “…that motorcycle came off and careened down through…”
[28] In the initial 911 call to the police dispatcher, Mr. Gasson conceded that he had reported that he thought the truck had “cut” the motorcycle off. He acknowledged, under cross-examination, that he was uncertain in his recollection of events, because he didn’t know what had happened. This uncertainty was further reflected in a second 911 call when Mr. Gasson advised that “there was a pickup truck that followed and I think it ran right up behind her and now the pickup truck took off and was gone. It passed me.”
[29] Mr. Gasson also acknowledged speaking to another witness at the scene, who happened to be an off-duty police officer. He recalled telling the officer that the truck was driving erratically, had approached the motorcycle “pretty quick”, and words to the effect that the motorcycle lost control when the truck passed by.
[30] Mr. Gasson also spoke to Provincial Constable Nichoal Hawkins in furtherance of the police investigation and preparation of the Reconstructionist Collision Report. He acknowledged advising Officer Hawkins that he had observed the motorcyclist in the left lane. A truck was behind the motorcycle. The pickup was reported to have been observed to be straddling the middle lane before it passed the motorcycle on the right, contacting the motorcycle in the process.
[31] On being confronted by the fact the motorcycle in issue was a three wheeled vehicle with a full-sized trunk, Mr. Gasson advised that he did not notice the motorcycle until the time of the collision, then he saw the bike moving off the roadway toward the centre median.
[32] On re-examination, Mr. Gasson, reflecting on the content of his statement to Officer Hawkins, stated that “… it sounded like the truck came from the inside, and then that’s when impact happened, and as I say, it was so quick.” Mr. Gasson reiterated that the truck came back from the inside lane, almost to the shoulder of the road and then swerved back to “the middle lane, pre impact.” This manoeuvre positioned the pickup “betwixt” the two northbound lanes.
[33] Constable Bimson estimated the Harley to be travelling at 111 km per hour at the point of impact based on the application of several referenced scientific principles and acknowledged underlying assumptions. The exact speed of the Harley at the time of the collision cannot be determined with precision.
IV. Post Impact
[34] Mr. Monteath testified that he believed he may have struck an animal. He acknowledged being aware of an “impact” at the front of his vehicle. He continued to drive as he believed “nothing” had happened to his vehicle and no other vehicles had been involved. He advised that he hadn’t seen “anything” in front of his vehicle prior to the point of impact and observed no other vehicles. He acknowledged, under cross-examination, that there was a noise at the time of impact but insisted that he “…didn’t see anything before driving on after the collision.” He continued to drive northbound as there was no evident compromise to the truck’s operability.
[35] Mr. Monteath did not recall having activated the brakes of the truck pre impact. After quickly scanning his mirrors to see if anything was left behind, Mr. Monteath proceeded north from the collision scene, briefly stopping to inspect the front of the truck before exiting Highway 11 at the Lindsay’s Hill Road exit. At that point, he ascertained that there was observable damage to the front of the truck on the driver’s side. The front grille was broken and the bumper significantly indented in the area of the front licence plate. He admitted under cross-examination that there was no blood, fur, mucous, or any other biological matter on his vehicle that might offer confirmatory support for his belief that his truck had struck an animal.
[36] “Shaken up” by the collision and shocked by the unexpected nature of what had happened, Mr. Monteath testified that he exited the highway after having pulled over briefly on Highway 11 to “gather” himself. After checking the damage to his vehicle on exiting the highway, Mr. Monteath variously attempted to speak to his immediate supervisor, Justin Lalonde, the insurer of the truck, and the O.P.P. Communications Centre in North Bay.
[37] The call to the O.P.P. was placed at 7:31:11 a.m. Mr. Monteath did not identify himself and the call taker, Elisha Townshend, a civilian member of the O.P.P. did not ask for any identifying information. Mr. Monteath told Ms. Townshend that he believed that he had “hit an animal”. On being Informed by Mr. Monteath that a person had not been injured, no hazard to others remained on the roadway, no other vehicle had been involved and the damage to his vehicle was estimated to be less than $2000, Ms. Townshend advised that as the incident involved a “non- reportable accident” it would not require police involvement and the preparation of an accident report.
[38] Mr. Monteath testified that his rationale for leaving the highway was that he was “scared” and “wanted to get onto a safer place.” This prompted a reported internet inquiry regarding an alternative route home via secondary roads. In due course the pickup truck became inoperable in the vicinity of Old Forestry Road near Spirit Point Wilderness Lodge (Monk Lake Road in Trout Creek, South River, Ontario) as Mr. Monteith endeavored to return home. At 12:13 PM Mr. Monteith would be placed under arrest, in relation to the referenced charges, following inspection of his vehicle by Ontario Provincial Police Sergeant Jordan Lacroix of the Almaguin Highlands Detachment.
V. The Crown’s Position
[39] On behalf of the Crown, Mr. Beatty submits that proof of both offences has been established. The excessive speed of the accused's pickup truck; the fact it was accelerating to the point of impact, the limited braking and lack of evasive action prior to the rear end impact with the motorcycle, are factors that are contended to offer proof of the dangerous operation offence. The confirmed injuries, sustained by Mrs. Laliberte- Rainville in the collision, are relied on to establish that bodily harm to another resulted from the accident.
[40] The combination of excessive speed, erratic lane movements, and acceleration, combined with an evident lack of awareness, or failure to keep a proper lookout, are submitted to constitute driving that is a marked departure of what might be expected of a reasonable, prudent driver, in like circumstances. In the absence of some unexpected, intervening event, the rear end collision here is viewed as having occurred due to the dangerous way the accused was operating the pickup truck.
[41] The accused is submitted to have known of the fact his pickup had struck a motorcycle. Given the location of the motorcycle directly in front of the truck at the point of impact and the fact the motorcycle was propelled across the centre median, the Crown submits It would be impossible for Mr. Monteith not to know that he had struck another vehicle. The sound of the crash and the absence of any evidence that might be consistent with a strike of an animal, are all factors that are viewed as undermining the accused’s trial testimony. The fact that the accused intentionally drove away from the scene without stopping, with knowledge of the fact his pickup truck collided with another motor vehicle and then endeavored to make his way home by means of secondary roads to avoid detection or apprehension, are factors that are contended to support a finding of guilt in relation to the fail to stop offence, s.320.16(2).
VI. The Position of the Defence
[42] While acknowledging the seriousness of the consequences of the collision, Ms. Greenspan submits proof of the offence of dangerous driving causing bodily harm falls short. Reliance is placed on the contended viability of Mr. Monteath's account of events and his plausible assertion that he did not observe a motorcycle and truly believed he had hit an animal. Reference is made to the application of the principles of law in the leading legal authorities cited, including R. v. Hundal, 1993 CanLII 120 (SCC), [1993], S.C.R. 867, 1 S.C.R. (4th) 169, 79 C.C.C. (3d) 97; R. v. Beatty, [2008] 1 S.C.R.; R. v. Roy, 2012 SCC 26, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 60, 93 C.R (6th) 1, 281 C.C.C. (3d) 433.
[43] In relation to the fail to remain count, Ms. Greenspan references the prosecution's obligation to prove the fact that the accused knew he had struck the motorbike and then knowingly left the scene to avoid criminal and/or civil liability. The accused's decision to leave the highway to return home by alternative secondary roads is submitted to be reasonable when viewed in context. The conduct is asserted to be consistent with the accused's testimony that he had been rattled in the collision and left the highway to secure a more tranquil or pastoral route home following the disconcerting highway encounter.
[44] Ms. Greenspan also submits that the evidentiary record is insufficient to substantiate the offences charged on consideration of the application of the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Limitations relating to the unknown pre-impact rate of speed and positioning of the motorcycle; environmental factors, (glare from the facing sun, the shadow cast by the nearby rock outcropping); reliability concerns relating to the Titan GPS data and the information derived from the pickup truck’s Airbag Control Module (ACM) or (SDM) and Event Data Recorder; and Mr. Monteath's plausible account of events, are all factors that are submitted as undermining the prosecution's case.
[45] In summary, the defence submits that the trial testimony offered by Mr. Monteith is believable and consistent with the defence position that the accused was unaware that he had struck another motor vehicle or caused injury to another motorist. The accused's actions, post-impact, are contended to be reflective of the belief that he was not required to formally report the collision or remain at the scene. Finally, the explanation offered by Mr. Monteith for leaving the highway, in a furtherance of an intention to take an alternate route home, is submitted as being both reasonable and understandable in the circumstances.
VII. Applicable Legal Proceedings – Fundamental Considerations
[46] Every individual charged with a criminal offence is presumed to be innocent. The presumption of innocence is only displaced when the Crown establishes proof of the offence(s) alleged on the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof of each of the essential elements of an offence(s) must be proven to this standard.
The Burden of Proof
[47] The Crown bears the burden of proving the alleged offence(s) in a criminal trial. That onus does not shift during the trial. An accused in a criminal trial is under no obligation to prove anything or present any evidence.
The Standard of Proof
[48] For a finding of guilt to be made, the Crown must establish proof of the offence(s) alleged on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, as noted. That standard of proof has been defined by Justice Iacobucci in R v. Starr, [200] 2 S.C.R. 144 as being much closer to “proof to the point of ‘near certainty’” than the balance of probabilities or “more likely than not” standard that applies in a civil case.
[49] In R v. Lifchus 1997 CanLII 319 (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C. R. 320, a “reasonable doubt” is defined as an uncertainty that is predicated on reason and common sense. It is not an imaginary, speculative, or frivolous doubt, and is not to be based, or arise, from sympathy, prejudice, or bias.
[50] A reasonable doubt is to be logically derived from the evidentiary record at trial or the absence of evidence. In the event the trier of fact determines that the accused is likely or probably guilty, an acquittal must follow.
Assessing the Evidence
[51] As discussed by R.A. Blair, J.A. in R. v. B. D. [2011] O.V. No 198; 2011 ONCA 51; 226 C.R.R. (2d) 92; 273 O.A.C.241; 266 C.C.C. (3d) 197; at paras. 96-114, The standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not to be applied “piecemeal” to individual items or categories of evidence. Where conflicting evidence is presented, that relates to a central issue or element in the case, a credibility finding will be required to be made in relation to that conflicting evidence.
[52] In R. v. W. (D), 1991 CanLII 93 (SCC), [1991] 1 SCR 742, Cory, J. provides an oft repeated jury instruction with respect to reasonable doubt in cases where credibility is an important consideration and an accused testifies.
27 In a case where credibility is important, the trial judge must instruct the jury that the rule of reasonable doubt applies to that issue. The trial judge should instruct the jury that they need not firmly believe or disbelieve any witness or set of witnesses. Specifically, the trial judge is required to instruct the jury that they must acquit the accused in two situations. First, if they believe the accused. Second, if they do not believe the accused's evidence but still have a reasonable doubt as to his guilt after considering the accused's evidence in the context of the evidence as a whole. See R. v. Challice (1979), 1979 CanLII 2969 (ON CA), 45 C.C.C. (2d) 546 (Ont. C.A.), approved in R. v. Morin, supra, at p. 357.
28 Ideally, appropriate instructions on the issue of credibility should be given, not only during the main charge, but on any recharge. A trial judge might well [page758] instruct the jury on the question of credibility along these lines:
First, if you believe the evidence of the accused, obviously you must acquit.
Second, if you do not believe the testimony of the accused but you are left in reasonable doubt by it, you must acquit.
Third, even if you are not left in doubt by the evidence of the accused, you must ask yourself whether, on the basis of the evidence which you do accept, you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by that evidence of the guilt of the accused.
If that formula were followed, the oft repeated error which appears in the recharge in this case would be avoided. The requirement that the Crown prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt is fundamental in our system of criminal law. Every effort should be made to avoid mistakes in charging the jury on this basic principle.
[53] In R. v. Challice 1979 CanLII 2969 (ON CA), [1979] 45 C.C.C. (2d) 546, The Ontario Court of Appeal considered a circumstance where the testimony of numerous defence witnesses and the accused conflicted with the account offered by several crown witnesses. At para 45, Mordan J. A. references the appropriate instruction to be given to a jury when confronted by conflicting evidence:
45 Understandably, a jury have to give careful consideration to issues of credibility when deliberating upon their verdict, and with respect to various pieces of evidence they may have differing views: total acceptance, total rejection or something in between. An effective and desirable way of recognizing this necessary part of the process, and putting it to the jury in a way that accurately comports with their duty respecting the burden and standard of proof, is to instruct the jury that it is not necessary for them to believe the defence evidence on a vital issue - but that it is sufficient if it, viewed in the context of all the evidence, leaves them in a state of reasonable doubt as to the accused's guilt. (See Regina v. Lobell, [1957] 1 Q.B. 547 at p. 551 per Lord Goddard, C.J.). The failure to use such language is not fatal if the charge, read as a whole, makes it clear that the jury could not have been under any misapprehension as to the correct burden and standard of proof to apply…
[54] In R. v. Morin, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 345, the foregoing passage from Challice was cited with approval by the Supreme Court of Canada as applying where issues of credibility arise between “the evidence for the prosecution and the defence.” See also R v. Parrington 1985 CanLII 3610 (ON CA), [1985] 20 C.C.C. (3d) 184 (Ont. C.A.); and R v. Chan [1989), 1989 ABCA 284, 100 A.R. 133 (C.A.)
[55] Where conflicting evidence arises from an accused’s testimony, Blair J.A., summarizes the directions from the reviewed authorities, at paragraph 114 of “R v. B.D”., as follows:
114 What I take from a review of all of these authorities is that the principles underlying W.(D.) are not confined merely to cases where an accused testifies and his or her evidence conflicts with that of Crown witnesses. They have a broader sweep. Where, on a vital issue, there are credibility findings to be made between conflicting evidence called by the defence or arising out of evidence favourable to the defence in the Crown's case, the trial judge must relate the concept of reasonable doubt to those credibility findings. The trial judge must do so in a way that makes it clear to the jurors that it is not necessary for them to believe the defence evidence on that vital issue; rather, it is sufficient if - viewed in the context of all of the evidence - the conflicting evidence leaves them in a state of reasonable doubt as to the accused's guilt: Challice. In that event, they must acquit.
VIII. Essential Elements of the Offence of Dangerous Driving Causing Bodily Harm s.320.13(2)
[56] To establish proof of the offence of dangerous driving the Crown must prove the driving behavior in issue constitutes a “marked departure” from the standard of care of a responsible, prudent driver, in like circumstances.
[57] In Beatty, at para. 43, The Court reiterates that it is the manner of the accused’s driving and not the consequence of the driving conduct that must be considered. When the accused explains the driving behaviour, the judge must be satisfied that a reasonable person in similar circumstances would have been aware of the risk and the danger involved in the accused's conduct and not driven in like manner.
[58] The consequences of the manner of operation do not prove that the driving constitutes a marked departure from what a reasonable, prudent driver, would do in like circumstances, Beatty, at para 46. The consequences of the driving can however, assist in deciding whether the driving behaviour constitutes a marked departure from what a reasonable, prudent driver, would do in a similar situation.
[59] The Crown is not required to establish specific intent or recklessness on the part of the accused. An assessment of all the evidence, including evidence of the actual state of mind of the accused, is to be undertaken to assess whether the driving conduct amounts to a marked departure from the standard of care that a reasonable person could be expected to display in a similar situation.
[60] In Hundal, the issue of the mental element of the offence is reviewed. The trier of fact must assess the mental element of the offence objectively in the context of all the events surrounding the incident. Liability under (what was then) s. 249 is based on negligence. The judge or jury must consider whether, when viewed objectively, the accused exercised the appropriate standard of care and not whether the accused objectively intended the consequences of his actions.
[61] The test of whether a reasonable person would have been aware of the risks inherent in the conduct must be applied flexibly with consideration of the context of the events surrounding the incident.
[62] In Roy, the Supreme Court of Canada reiterated that the “actus reus” or essential active element of the offence of dangerous driving is driving in a manner that is dangerous to the public in all the circumstances. The focus is on the risks created by the driving and not the consequences. The mental element of the offence or “mens rea” requires proof, as previously discussed, of a marked departure from the standard of care that a reasonable driver would observe in similar circumstances.
[63] The assessment of mens rea or fault, generally entails the drawing of interferences from all the circumstances and the fact the accused drove in a manner that is assessed to constitute a marked departure from what might be expected of a reasonable, prudent driver in a similar situation. Proof of the actus reus, without more, does not support a reasonable inference that the required fault element, or mens rea, has been established.
[64] In summary, as discussed in Beatty, the actus reus of the offence of dangerous driving requires the establishment of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused drove in a manner dangerous to the public, when viewed objectively, given the nature, condition and use of the roadway where the vehicle was being operated and the amount of traffic that was, or might reasonably be expected to be, at that place.
[65] The mens rea of the offence is to be considered by determining whether the driving conduct constitutes a marked departure from the standard of care that a reasonable driver would have exhibited in the circumstances. In other words, would a reasonable person in the accused’s position have been aware of the risk created by the conduct. Intentionally creating a danger will always constitutes a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonably prudent driver. The demonstrated lack of care must be subjectively determined to be serious enough to warrant punishment. Objectively, it must be determined that a reasonable person in the accused’s position would have been aware of the risk and done something to avoid it.
[66] In R. v. Blackburn 2004 CanLII 28908 (ON CA), [2004], 186 C.C.C. (3d) 51 (Ont. C.A.) the court reiterates that the “marked departure” test and “risk awareness” are not too distinct parts of the offence of dangerous driving. The driving conduct must be considered from the perspective of a reasonable person in a similar circumstance and whether that individual would have been aware of the risk and the danger inherent in the accused's conduct.
IX. Excessive Speed
[67] In R. v. Richards 2003 CanLII 48437 (ON CA), [2003] O.J. no 1042, 169 O.A.C. 339, 174 C.C.C. 3(d) 154, 35 M.V.R. (4th) 25, 2003 CarswellOnt 948, 57 W.C.B. (2d) 29, 2003 CanLII 48437, the Ontario Court of Appeal recognized that evidence of excessive speed in itself, under certain circumstances, can constitute the offence of dangerous driving. The decision followed the Court's earlier consideration of the issue in R. v. Pezzo 1972 CanLII 1389 (ON CA), [1972], 9 C.C.C. (2d) 530. The principle has been confirmed in a number of subsequent decisions following Pezzo, including R. v. M (M.K.) (1998), 35 M.V.R. (3d) 315 in which the Ontario Court of Appeal noted at para 319:
The trial judge concluded that in the circumstances the appellant's excessive speed amounted to dangerous driving. The evidence at trial supported that conclusion. Depending on the context in which it occurred, excessive speed can amount to a marked departure from the standard of care of a prudent driver.
[68] In R. v. M. (M.K.), the appellant was determined to have been driving at an excessive rate of speed in a built-up area of Mississauga. Prior to a collision, the appellant had been engaging in what was categorized as “horse play” and observed to be driving aggressively along with her co-accused who was driving another vehicle. In view of the context in which it occurred, the appellants excessive driving speed amounted to dangerous driving, see para 4. R v. M. (M.K.).
[69] In R v. Quesnel, 1996 CanLII 2360 (BC CA), [1996] B.C.J. No. 1137, 76 B.C.A.C. 318, 20 M.V.R. (3d) 46, 31 W.C.B. (2d) 81, The British Columbia Court of Appeal considered a circumstance when the appellant lost control of his motor vehicle on an S curve while traveling at a rate of speed of 114 kilometers an hour in an 80 kilometer zone. Loss of control of the appellant’s motor vehicle resulted in the car weaving into the opposite lane and back before it finally came to a stop while facing in the wrong direction. At paragraph 8 of the decision, the court noted the following:
8 While evidence of speed by itself will not necessarily lead to a finding of dangerous driving, it may well do where as here the surrounding circumstances add a component to that speed that brings the driving up to the criminal level of dangerous driving. Here those surrounding circumstances are the fact that this vehicle was not one owned and ordinarily driven by the appellant, the speedometer was not working at the time, it was a very black evening with no artificial lighting whatever, and the appellant was unfamiliar with the highway itself.
[70] In the absence of compelling surrounding circumstances, evidence of excessive speed alone may not necessarily lead to a conviction for dangerous driving. For example, in R. v. Morton, 2017 ONSC 3032, a summary conviction appeal decision. Gray, J. affirmed the trial judge's acquittal of the appellant. The not guilty verdict was concluded to have been warranted based on consideration of the totality of the evidence presented at trial. Justice Gray noted at paragraph 36 of his review that the trial judge considered the fact that no traffic had been interfered with by the appellant's operation of his car at high rates of speed; that traffic was light; the road surface was safe and dry; there was no impediment to visibility; and, there was no evidence of other vehicular traffic on the appellant's route prior to the point of the collision of his vehicle with a guard rail.
[71] The determination of the appeal in Morton, followed consideration of Pezzo, M.K.M. and Richards, see paragraphs 28 to 35. The review of these cases led Wray J to conclude as follows:
35 It is clear from these cases, in my view, that it is necessary to take into account the surrounding circumstances in order to determine whether excessive speed necessarily gives use a conviction for dangerous driving.
[72] In R. V. Higgins, [2018] O.J. No 3011, 2018 ONCA 451, 34 M.V.R (7th) 35, 152 W.C.B (2d) 62, 2018 CarswellOnt 22640, the Ontario Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of A.J. O'Mara J, see R. v. Higgins, 2017 ONSC 1822, in circumstances where the respondent was found not guilty of the offences of dangerous driving causing bodily harm; criminal negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle while causing bodily harm and, impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm.
[73] The circumstances of the driving in issue included a blood alcohol concentration reading of between 63-93 mg of alcohol /100ml of blood; speeding in excess of 47 kilometers an hour over the posted speed limit in the immediate vicinity of a “truck entrance ahead” sign; a collision with a tractor trailer fully engaged in a turn across a poorly lit intersection; accelerating to the point of the collision; and, the absence of braking or any other form of avoidance behavior.
[74] While the driving was concluded to be “objectively dangerous” by the trial judge, a reasonable doubt was concluded to exist in relation to the issue of whether “a reasonable person in the accused position would have been aware, at that time and place, of the risk created by his conduct.” See paragraphs 51-61 of the trial decision for the analysis employed in reaching this determination.
[75] On review, the Ontario Court of Appeal concluded the trial judge had made no reversible errors in concluding that there was “…no evidence in the circumstances of any deliberate intention on the part of the accused to create a danger for the driver.” See paragraph 58 of the trial decision. The accused, while “negligent in speeding and not paying attention”, was not concluded to have driven in a manner that constituted “a marked departure of care of a prudent person such that he would be aware of the danger created by the speed at which he traveled at that time and place.” At paragraph 59, the trial judge was noted to conclude: “I am not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that a reasonable person in the accused's position would have been aware at that time and place of the risk created by his conduct.”
[76] On consideration of the Crown’s submission that the trial judge had erred in his analysis of the mens rea component of the offence of dangerous driving causing bodily harm, (see paragraphs 4 to 11 of the trial judgment), by relying on the respondents lack of a deliberate intention to create a danger to other drivers, and failed to take into account all of the relevant circumstances related to the manner of the respondent’s driving and the factual context in what the driving had occurred, the Court of Appeal concluded as follows at paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Court of Appeal’s judgment:
3 The trial judge correctly applied the well-established test set out in Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence in relation to the offence of dangerous driving causing bodily harm. As one step of the analysis that he was required to undertake, the trial judge properly considered whether the respondent had a deliberate intention to cause danger to other drivers: see R. v. Beatty, 2008 SCC 5, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 49, at para. 51. Having found that he did not, the trial judge went on to consider the modified objective test set out in the authorities and concluded that he was not satisfied that there was "a marked departure from the standard of care of a prudent person" (para. 58) in all of the circumstances. This analysis was reinforced when the trial judge turned to consider criminal negligence causing bodily harm when he said in para. 60, "without having found a marked departure of the standard of a reasonably prudent person in all of the circumstances, there is no evidence of a wanton and reckless disregard constituting a marked and substantial departure from that of a reasonable driver".
4 The trial judge's reasons when read as a whole demonstrate that he reviewed and engaged with all of the relevant circumstances concerning the manner of the respondent's driving, including the respondent's excessive rate of speed and inattention, his consumption of alcohol, and the lighting conditions at the time of the incident.
[77] The significance of a contextual analysis in cases involving speed arises in R v. Yogeswaran, [2021] O.J. No. 1038|2021 ONSC 1242|480 C.R.R. (2d) 226|173 W.C.B. (2d) 423|80 M.V.R. (7th) 39|2021 CarswellOnt 2695, a decision of J. Stribopoulos, J., of the Superior Court of Justice. The driving in issue entailed prior speeding (117 kilometers per hour in a 70 kilometer per hour zone), acceleration; passing on the right in an intersection at a high rate of speed; and, a collision with another vehicle causing it to spin around off the roadway, injuring both the other vehicle's driver and front passenger.
[78] On review of the applicable legal considerations, (para’s 125-132 and 202-203), and analysis of the circumstances of the driving in issue, (para’s 174 to 179), including the location and driving conditions; the speed that the accused was operating his vehicle at prior to the collision; and, the nature of the driving prior to the collision, the trial judge concluded that the Crown had established both the actus reus and mens rea of the offence of dangerous driving beyond a reasonable doubt, (paragraph 205-251). The Crown was also concluded to have established that the dangerous driving was a significant contributing cause of the bodily harm sustained by the occupants of the vehicle involved in the collision with the accused automobile.
[79] Consideration of the circumstances of the manner of operation, the combination of excessive speed, driving maneuvers, (changing of lanes and passing on the right), location, and traffic conditions, were concluded to establish the actus reus of dangerous driving. Mens rea was inferred from the “deliberate and extraordinarily aggressive manner” that Mr. Yogeswaran had operated his vehicle, leading Justice Stribopoulos to conclude the accused’s driving represented a marked departure from the standard of care that a reasonably prudent driver would observe in the same circumstances. The accused’s dangerous driving was also concluded to be a “significant contributing cause” of the bodily harm sustained by the two individuals injured in the collision. See paragraphs 218-230 where the issue of causation and reasonably foreseeable risk is discussed.
[80] Contextual analysis also played a significant role in the determination of the trial outcome in another case from the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, R. v. Hilaire, 2018 ONSC 6224, a decision of Aitken, J., a case involving consideration of charges of dangerous driving causing death, failing to stop, and, obstruction of a peace officer in the lawful execution of his duty.
[81] In concluding the Crown had failed to establish proof of the offence of dangerous driving causing death, Atkin, J referenced consideration of the good condition of the road, the “unremarkable” weather and the very light traffic conditions that prevailed at the time of the fatal collision between the accused's pickup truck and a cyclist who was riding his bicycle on the shoulder of the road. Mr. St. Hilaire was concluded to have been travelling at 30 kilometers per hour over the posted 50 kilometer per hour speed limit at the time of the collision, to have “nodded off to sleep”, and to have drifted onto the paved shoulder of the road within a few seconds of impact with the cyclist.
[82] In addressing the “actus reus” of the offence at paragraph 89 of the decision, Justice Atkin reached the following conclusion:
89 Having considered all of these factors, I am left with a reasonable doubt as to whether Mr. St. Hilaire's driving on the stretch of Leitrim Road leading up to the collision site reached the level of negligence, namely driving "in a manner dangerous to the public", required to prove the actus reus of the offence under s. 249(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. I reject the argument advanced by Crown counsel that driving on the paved shoulder of a road, regardless of how brief the period and regardless of any other circumstances, automatically satisfies the actus reus requirements for dangerous driving. In my view, this is a borderline case and, under our system of justice, doubts of this sort are resolved in favour of the accused. But even if I had found that the actus reus of the offence had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, I am also left in reasonable doubt as to whether the mens rea requirement for a conviction of dangerous driving has been made out in the circumstances of this case.
[83] The “mens rea” analysis, paragraphs 90-123, included consideration of the lighting conditions; vegetation; weather; the dark clothing worn by the cyclist; the lack of rear-facing reflectors on the bicycle and the absence of any evidence that the accused knowingly or consciously drove on the shoulder of the roadway, “putting any cyclists or pedestrian who may have been on the shoulder at the time at mortal risk,” (para. 97). The evidence at trial was concluded to have established that Mr. St. Hilaire had fallen asleep shortly before his vehicle struck the cyclist. A reasonable doubt was concluded to exist as to what was categorized as a “brief period of lapsed attention”, “possibly only a few seconds” was sufficient to find liability for dangerous driving, (para. 123). The driving conduct was held not to constitute a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable person in similar circumstances.
X. Constituent Elements of the Offence of Failure to Stop
[84] Failure to stop after an accident, under s.320.16, is a specific intent offence. Proof of this charge requires the Crown to establish the following essential elements of the offence on the basis of proof beyond reasonable doubt:
(i) that the accused had the care, charge or control of the motor vehicle;
(ii) that the vehicle was included in an accident;
(iii) that the accused knew that the vehicle was involved in an accident;
(iv) that the accused failed to stop and identify himself after the accident; and,
(v) that the accused intended to escape civil or criminal liability for the accident.
[85] The initial mens rea requirement here is that the accused knew that his truck had struck Mrs. Laliberte-Rainville’s motorcycle. Secondly, Mr. Monteath, imbued with this knowledge, must be proven to have failed to stop in order to escape civil and or criminal liability. The analysis requires a two-step determination. The Crown must establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knew he had hit another vehicle, or a person, in order for the trier of fact to consider if he had the intent to escape civil or criminal liability when he left the scene.
[86] Knowledge of the collision must be established to be contemporaneous with the event itself. See R. v. Slessor, 1969 CanLII 248 (ON CA), [1970] 1 OR 664, [1970] 1 OR 664, at para. 9. The Crown can establish knowledge by presenting evidence that confirms, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Monteath suspected his truck had struck a person, knew that he should have made further inquiries in order to ascertain whether or not that person had sustained bodily harm, or been killed, and deliberately refrained from doing so because he did not want to find out the truth as to what had actually happened. R. v. St. Hilaire, para 126.
[87] The British Columbia Court of Appeal in R v. Kooner, 2023 BCCA 8, 2003 CarswellBC 47, considered issues of knowledge and the concept of willful blindness in a situation involving a collision of significant force in which the accused drove away from the scene of the accident without stopping, as follows:
39 The judge's conclusion regarding Mr. Kooner's knowledge was succinct. He found at paras. 38-39:
38It would have been clear to Mr. Kooner that he had been involved in a serious motor vehicle accident. Mr. Multani described hearing the sound of the accident and observing dust and smoke. The vehicle driven by Ms. Baah flipped over onto its roof. The vehicle driven by Mr. Wong was damaged in the accident. There was extensive damage to the front of Mr. Kooner's vehicle.
39I am satisfied that Mr. Kooner's actions of driving away from the scene of the accident, parking on 96 Avenue and fleeing into the wooded area is consistent with his knowledge of the accident. It would have been clear that the drivers of the other vehicles suffered bodily injury due to the extent of the accident.
40Mr. Kooner argues that, in using the language "it would have been clear" at paras. 38 and 39, the judge applied a "must have known" test, which wrongly applied objective knowledge rather than finding that Mr. Kooner, subjectively, had actual knowledge.
41I disagree. The judge did not have the benefit of testimony from Mr. Kooner so he had to draw conclusions about what he actually knew based on the whole of the evidence as to the nature of the accident and Mr. Kooner's conduct. The fair reading of the judge's reasons shows that the phrase "would have been clear" was used by the judge to indicate that he was drawing an inference when concluding that Mr. Kooner had actual knowledge.
42Trial reasons should be read generously, as a whole, with the presumption that the judge knows the law: R. v. Gerrard, 2022 SCC 13at para. 2; R. v. G.F., 2021 SCC 20at paras. 69, 74.
43In my view, the judge's choice of words "it would have been clear", read in the context of the reasons as a whole, indicate that the judge decided that Mr. Kooner's actual knowledge of bodily harm was based on the circumstantial evidence of the force of the accident as well as Mr. Kooner's choice to flee.
44Driving his own vehicle aggressively, Mr. Kooner hit a vehicle that was travelling down the same road. The impact had great force, as proven by the extensive damage to his own vehicle (made clear by photographs in evidence) and by the fact that it propelled Mr. Wong's vehicle into oncoming traffic, colliding with another vehicle. A driver who hits another vehicle with significant force knows that he has done so. The judge's finding that Mr. Kooner had this knowledge did not need amplification.
45Actual knowledge was also consistent with wilful blindness in these circumstances. The judge was aware of the principles by which actual knowledge can be found based on wilful blindness, noting in his discussions with counsel during submissions that this Court had discussed it in a recent hit-and-run case, the case of R. v. Edwards, 2020 BCCA 253.
46As explained in Edwards, an accused can be found to have the requisite actual knowledge to establish mens rea where the circumstances make the accused aware of a need to make some inquiry, but the accused fails to make the inquiry because the accused does not wish to know the truth: at para. 74. In Edwards, Willcock J.A. held:
67The test is stated nicely in R. v. Farmer, 2014 ONCA 823 by Sharpe J.A. (at para. 26): the accused must have "shut his eyes because he knew or strongly suspected that looking would fix him with knowledge" or because he became "aware of the need for some inquiry [yet] decline[d] to make the inquiry because he [did] not wish to know the truth".
68In R. v. Morrison, 2019 SCC 15, Moldaver J. for the majority described the heightened level of suspicion as follows:
98Wilful blindness exists where an accused's "suspicion is aroused to the point where he or she sees the need for further inquiries, but deliberately chooses not to make those inquiries": R. v. Briscoe, ... at para. 21 (emphasis in original). Wilful blindness has been characterized as "deliberate ignorance" because it connotes "an actual process of suppressing a suspicion": D. Stuart, Canadian Criminal Law: A Treatise (7th ed. 2014), at p. 261. "A court can properly find wilful blindness only where it can almost be said that the defendant actually knew": Briscoe, at para. 23, citing G. Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part (2nd ed. 1961), at p. 159. This Court has repeatedly held that if an accused is found to be wilfully blind, that state of mind may substitute for actual knowledge: Sansregret v. The Queen, ... at pp. 584-85; Briscoe, at para. 21. Indeed, it is "equivalent to knowledge": Briscoe, at para. 23, citing Williams, at p. 159. [Emphasis in original.]
69The hit-and-run cases referred to by counsel suggest a suspicion sufficient to cause the accused to believe he should make further enquiries before leaving the scene of a collision meets the "heightened suspicion" test.
47 This was not a case of a driver hitting a parked vehicle, not knowing that there was someone inside the vehicle. Nor was it a case where there was a minor bump between cars moving slowly, such as when navigating around a parking lot.
48 For purposes of considering the appellant's best argument on this ground of appeal, I will presume that Mr. Kooner may not have seen the vehicle he hit collide with another vehicle, causing the second vehicle to flip over. Nevertheless, the noise and smoke of the collision, Mr. Kooner's decision to keep driving away despite knowing he hit the first vehicle as it was moving and having had no sign that the vehicle had safely stopped, and Mr. Kooner's decision to flee, all support the conclusion that Mr. Kooner was wilfully blind to all the indications that he caused a serious accident in which people were injured.
[88] Willful blindness as, it relates to the mental state required to be established in this subsection, is also discussed in R. v. Baker, [2006] OJ No 2329, 81 OR (3d) 276, 211 OAC 285, 209 CCC (3d) 508, 31 MVR (5th) 177, 70 WCB (2d) 244, 2006 CarswellOnt 3544, 2006 CanLII 19332, [2006] OJ No 2329. In Baker, the use of the words “good reason to believe” were suggested as being alternatively appropriate when instructing a jury on the concept of willful blindness and the issue of reasonable inferences relating to an accused’s state of awareness. Expressed differently, did the accused have a good reason to believe that the motor vehicle he was driving had been in an accident in which someone was injured or required assistance.
XI. Bodily Harm
[89] Bodily harm means any hurt or injury to a person that interferes with the health or comfort of the person and is more than merely transient or trifling in nature. In Kooner, at para 51, The court concluded that it was open to the trial judge to infer that the collision had occasioned bodily harm to the individual in the car the accused had hit.
51 In conclusion, even if only his vehicle's impact with Mr. Wong's vehicle is considered and Mr. Kooner is presumed not to have seen the consequential collision with the vehicle driven by Ms. Baah, in my view, it was open to the judge to infer that Mr. Kooner knew that the other person in the car he directly hit suffered some injury and discomfort that met the test of bodily harm within the definition of the Criminal Code. At a minimum, the force of the collision made it obvious to Mr. Kooner that he should stop and make inquiry, and he did not do so because he did not want to know the truth. On the facts as found by the judge, Mr. Kooner can be deemed to have actual knowledge.
XII. Leaving the Scene
[90] As discussed in R v. White, 1998 CanLII 789 (SCC), [1998] 2 S.C.R. 72 at para 21, “Like any piece of circumstantial evidence, an act of flight or concealment may be subject to competing interpretations and must be weighed by the jury in the light of all the evidence, to determine whether it is consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any other rational conclusion.” See also R. v. White, [2011] 1 SCR 433, 2011 SCC 13, [2011] 1 RCS 433, [2011] SCJ No 13, [2011] ACS no 13, [2011] 1 SCR 433 at paragraphs 22 and 137.
[91] The law of circumstantial evidence is explored in detail by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v. Villaroman [2016] 1 SCR 1000, 2016 SCC 33, [2016] 1 RCS 1000, [2016] SCJ No 33, [2016] ACS no 33, [2016] 1 SCR 1000. At paragraph 30, the Court directs that inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence, and/or the absence of evidence, must be assessed logically with reference to human experience and the employment of common sense. See Kooner, para 9 and 10).
[92] The trier of fact is required to consider whether there are reasonable inferences, other than guilt, when assessing circumstantial evidence. The evidence is to be viewed logically with the benefit of human experience. In other words, is the circumstantial evidence under consideration capable of supporting an inference other than the guilt of the accused. To justify a finding of criminal culpability, the circumstantial evidence, once considered with the benefit of human experience, must be concluded to exclude any other reasonable alternative conclusion. See Villaroman, paragraphs 35 - 41.
[93] In R. v. Rafaeh, [2024] OJ No 499, 2024 ONSC 755, 96 CR (7th) 154, 2024 CarswellOnt 1213, 2024 WCB 171, 435 CCC (3d) 39, [2024] OJ No 499, a decision of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Peterson J. addressed the issue of the onus of proof where an accused asserts a “reasonable excuse” for failing to stop after being involved in a motor vehicle collision, as mandated by s.320.16(1).
[94] Justice Petersen concluded that the accused had an evidentiary burden to establish an air of reality in relation to the asserted excuse with the Crown bearing the “ultimate persuasive burden” of disproving the existence of a reasonable excuse on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The rationale for that determination is set out in detail at paragraphs 9-66 of the Refaeh ruling.
XIII. Evidentiary Rulings
[95] Several evidentiary rulings were required during the trial proceedings. The rulings were provided orally subject to a stated intention at the time to subsequently issue more fulsome written reasons. The evidentiary issues included admissibility considerations. Another ruling addressed the authorization allowing Constable Bimson to offer opinion evidence as a Collision Reconstructionist following a “Mohan” voir dire, (See R. v. Mohan, [1994] 2 SCR 9, [1994] 2 RCS 9, [1994] SCJ No 36, [1994] ACS no 36, 1994 CanLII 80, [1994] 2 SCR 9). In light of the prosecution’s withdrawal of the public mischief charge and the analysis and determinations that follow. I conclude further elaboration of the rationale for the evidentiary rulings is no longer required.
XIV. Analysis
Mr. Monteath’s Account of Events
[96] As noted previously, Mr. Monteath asserts that he did not observe the three wheeled motorcycle being operated by Mrs. Laliberte-Rainville either before, during, or after, the time of impact. During his trial testimony, Mr. Monteath recalled traveling approximately 130 kilometers per hour on Hwy. 11 at the time a collision, with what he suspected was an animal, occurred. The airbags of his pickup truck did not deploy during the collision and Mr. Monteath continued to proceed northbound on the highway without any other vehicles recalled as being directly ahead of his truck at that point in time. He initially did not believe that anything had happened to his vehicle. After travelling a short distance, Mr. Monteath pulled over to “gather himself”. He reported that he did not initially check the state of the front of his vehicle after looking around to see if he could see anything. Thereafter, he pulled off the highway, at a level crossing, after concluding that he should check what, if anything, had happened to his truck. He was at this point that he discovered damage to both the bumper and the grill of the Chevrolet Silverado pickup that he was driving.
[97] Mr. Monteath testified that he left the highway and sought an alternate route home following an Internet search because “I was scared and wanted to get onto a safer place.” After speaking to Maintenance Repair Services Manager, Justin Lalonde, his immediate supervisor, Mr. Monteath was directed to report the incident to the police and call the company's insurer. In response to this direction, Mr. Monteath called the non-emergency number of the Ontario Provincial Police in North Bay. There he spoke to a police dispatcher and was advised that the collision was a non-reportable event based on the information provided by Mr. Monteath that the incident entailed an animal, no other individuals or other vehicles were involved, no impediment was present on the roadway and the extent of damage to Mr. Monteath’s motor vehicle was believed to be below the reportable threshold of $2000.
[98] Mr. Monteith was advised by Mr. Lalonde to return his work vehicle to his workplace. Mr. Monteith testified that he was in the process of heading home when his truck broke down. At this point the vehicle was on Forestry Road in the vicinity of the community of Trout Creek, approximately 23.6 kilometers northeast of the collision site or 31.4 kilometers away via known roadways. The breakdown location was in the opposite direction of both the accused's home in East Gwillimbury and his workplace which was then located in Brampton according to testimony offered by Mr. Lalonde.
[99] Under cross-examination, Mr. Monteath acknowledged that he was wearing sunglasses at the time of the collision and that his vision was not affected by the sun. A corrected computation of the path of the sun from June 20, 2023, at 7:14 a.m., was received in evidence at the trial, as exhibit 14, as the original Reconstructionist Collision Report (page11) erroneously contained a Sun Path Report that pertained to an unrelated investigation.
[100] Mr. Monteath believed that he had been traveling at between 120 to 130 kilometers per hour. As noted, a speed of 156 kilometers per hour was confirmed by data from his vehicles Air Bag Module and a rate of speed of 158km per hour disclosed by the Titan GPS data. The collision came as “a complete surprise” as he had not observed a vehicle of any description, or a bear or a deer, to be in his path of travel. Mr. Monteath denied being distracted by either his work cell phone or the cell phone he used for making personal calls. He acknowledged the road was straight and dry and the weather was clear. Traffic conditions were recalled as being “light” and Mr. Monteath agreed that there were no observed distractions of any kind on the roadway as he proceeded north on Hwy. 11, prior to the point of impact.
[101] Mr. Monteath confirmed that the vehicle he was driving was in good working order. He did not recall braking prior to the collision despite data from the vehicle's Airbag Control Module confirming a modest application of the brakes. He did not stop following the collision. Mr. Monteath variously testified that “I didn't see anything and I didn't stop. When it happened I thought it was an animal and I didn't see anything.” Under cross examination, Mr. Monteith confirmed that he had not seen the Harley Davidson motorcycle prior to impact. He resisted the suggestion that he had failed to keep a proper lookout. Mr. Monteath testified that he had not seen anything “but the cars I was passing” despite the clear conditions and the straight stretch of highway where the collision occurred.
[102] The Start Stop report for Mr. Monteath’s vehicle reveals the vehicle stopped at 7:15:07 to 7:15:51 and then again at 7:22:23 to 7:22:36. Mr. Monteath testified that during the initial stop he remained in his truck and did not check for any damage that might have resulted from the collision. He conceded that he made no attempt to look for the animal that he believed he had struck; did not contact emergency services; and, did not report that the collision may have involved another motorist. He acknowledged that the damage to the front of his vehicle had been caused by the collision.
[103] The second stop was recalled as having taken place at the Lindsay’s Hill Road exit. At this time, Mr. Monteith testified that he observed the damage to the front end of the pickup for the first time. The accused conceded that there were no confirmatory indications of his vehicle having struck an animal, such as blood, fur, sinew, or mucus. When asked why he decided not to simply turn around and head southbound on Hwy. 11 to facilitate the stated intention to return home, Mr. Monteath denied that he was actively engaged in trying to intentionally avoid the scene of the collision. Mr. Monteath testified that he entered his home address and sought GPS assistance “to get home as soon as possible” by an alternative route.
[104] The circumstances leading to the June 20, 2023, collision of the Chevrolet Silverado pickup truck, operated by Gregory Monteath, with the Harley Davidson Ultra Glide, three wheeled motorcycle, or “trike”, operated by Diane Laliberte-Rainville, have been reviewed in detail previously in these Reasons for Judgment.
[105] In considering the entirety of the trial record, the testimony of all the witnesses has been reviewed, the cited case law has been read and summarized and the submissions of council noted. The evidence called by the prosecution has been comprehensively presented and thoroughly reviewed and challenged by the defence.
[106] The account of events offered by Gregory Monteath has been considered within the R. v. W.(D.) framework, as required when an accused testifies in a matter where credibility is a significant issue in the determination of a criminal prosecution. If Mr. Monteith's testimony is believed he is entitled to be acquitted on both of the remaining offences with which he has been charged. Even if his testimony is not believed but is concluded to raise a reasonable doubt as to his guilt, on consideration of the entirety of the trial record, he is entitled to be found not guilty of the offences charged. It is only when the Crown establishes proof of the offences alleged, on the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, on consideration of all the evidence presented at trial, including the evidence offered by the accused, that a finding of guilt may be made. That finding requires that the Crown prove all the essential elements of the offences in issue. A finding of criminal culpability, in a case like this, where credibility is in issue and the accused has testified, requires the expressed rejection of the accused trial testimony and a determination that the testimony does not give rise to a reasonable doubt on consideration of all the evidence.
[107] As the applicable legal considerations are considered in detail previously, I do not intend to review them further here, other than in summary fashion. In a criminal trial the accused is presumed to be innocent. The onus of proof is on the Crown to establish proof of the offence(s) alleged on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden of proof remains with the prosecution from the beginning of the trial until the conclusion of the case. The onus of proof is met when the Crown establishes proof of all the constituent, or essential elements of the offence(s) alleged, on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, on consideration of the totality of the evidence presented, including that offered by the accused.
XV. The s.320.13(2) Offence of Dangerous Driving Causing Bodily Harm
[108] As referenced in the leading Supreme Court of Canada authorities Beatty, Hundal and Roy, proof of this offence requires that the Crown establish that the driving behaviour in issue constitutes a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable, prudent driver, in like circumstances.
[109] At issue is the matter of operation and not the consequences of the driving behaviour, as detailed more fully earlier in this judgement. As discussed in Roy, the focus of the inquiry is on the risks created by the driving and not the consequences. Fault, or the mental element of the offence, is generally determined based on a consideration of the circumstances in which the driving behavior took place and a finding that, when viewed objectively, the manner of operation is concluded to constitute a marked departure from what might be expected of a reasonable, prudent driver, in a similar situation. The objective assessment of the driving in issue requires consideration of factors such as the nature, condition and use of the roadway, where the driving occurred, and the amount of traffic that was present at the time, or might reasonably have been anticipated, or expected.
[110] The trier of fact is required to determine if a reasonable person in the position of the accused would have been aware of the risks and danger created by the driving conduct and done something to avoid placing the lives or safety of others in jeopardy.
[111] As discussed previously, excessive speed alone can constitute the offence of dangerous driving depending on the context in which it occurred. Richards, Pezzo, M. (M.K.) and Quesnel, are cases where excessive speed was the primary factor giving rise to a conviction for dangerous driving. Morton, Higgins, Yogeswaran, and Hilaire, reference the importance of consideration being given to all the surrounding circumstances in determining whether excessive speed gives rise to the offence of dangerous driving.
[112] Section 172(1), and Ontario Regulation 455/07, of the Highway Traffic Act R.S.O. 2024, c, 21, address circumstances where speed exceeds the posted limit by 50 kilometers per hour or more. Such an infraction is dealt with under the Provincial Offences Act, as a non-criminal offence referred to as “stunt driving”. Not all incidents involving excessive speed, even grossly excessive speed, constitute the criminal offence of dangerous driving as many are dealt with alternatively as speeding infractions. The fact this specific speed related sanction is routinely employed in high speed situations, serves to underline the importance of a contextual circumstantial analysis when excessive speed is the primary consideration in an alleged incident of dangerous driving.
XVI. Failing to Stop s. 140(1)(b)
[113] Proof of this offence requires that the Crown initially prove that the accused was operating a motor vehicle that was involved in a collision, or accident, and was aware (knew) that the vehicle he was operating had been so involved. The Crown is also required to establish that the accused failed to stop to identify himself, by providing his name and address and offering assistance.
[114] The related case law directs that a two-step analysis take place with the Crown required, in this case, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knew his vehicle had been in an accident that resulted in bodily harm to Diane Laliberte-Rainville and that he left the scene with the intention of escaping civil or criminal liability. Knowledge of the collision must be established to be contemporaneous with the event itself. See Slessor 1969 CanLII 248 (ON CA), [1970] 1 OR 664, [1970] 1 OR 664, at paragraph 9.
[115] An accused cannot refrain from making reasonable inquiries as to whether a person has sustained bodily harm in circumstances where he suspects his vehicle has struck another person. Issues of knowledge and the concept of willful blindness are discussed in detail by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in R v. Kooner 2023 BCCA 8, 2003 CarswellBC 47, and R v. Edwards, 2020 BCCA 253, and by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v. Morrison, 2019 SCC 15. Willful blindness, or “deliberate ignorance”, arises in circumstances where an accused’s suspicion is aroused to the point, he becomes aware of the need to make further inquiries but willfully, or deliberately, chooses not to make any further queries.
[116] The test to be applied in such circumstances is succinctly enunciated by Sharpe J.A., at para 26 of the Ontario Court of Appeal decision R. v. Farmer, as follows:
…the respondent "shut his eyes because he knew or strongly suspected that looking would fix him with knowledge" or became "aware of the need for some inquiry [yet] decline[d] to make the inquiry because he [did] not wish to know the truth."
[117] As noted by the Supreme Court of Canada in White and Villaroman, the act of flight from the scene must be determined to be consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any other rational explanation. The trier of fact is required to consider whether there are any reasonable determinations, other than guilt, when assessing inferences arising from circumstantial evidence. The onus remains on the Crown to establish proof of the offence when the accused asserts a “reasonable excuse” for failing to stop, See Rafaeh.
XVII. Factual Findings
[118] Bodily Harm: The trial record leaves no uncertainty as to the extent of the grievous, life altering injuries, sustained by Diane Laliberte-Rainville because of the collision involving the Chevrolet Silverado pickup truck operated by Gregory Monteath on the morning of June 20, 2023. The injuries constitute bodily harm as that term is defined or understood in law.
[119] Operation: The trial record also confirms that Gregory Monteath was operating the Chevrolet Silverado pickup truck at the time of the collision of that vehicle with the Ultra Glide, 3 wheeled motorcycle, driven by Diane Laliberte-Rainville. The related debris field, damage to the respective vehicles, the subsequent investigation and the findings referenced in Provincial Constable John Gallagher's comprehensive Reconstructionist Collision Report, establish the truck driven by Mr. Monteath collided with the Harley. The subsequent police investigation, conducted by members of the Almaguin Highlands detachment of the O.P.P., places the accused in care and control of the vehicle. The accused’s own trial testimony confirms his acknowledged operation of the pickup at the relevant time.
[120] Provincial Constable Gallagher's conclusions are detailed at page 42 of his report. The conclusions are based on a detailed assessment of the accident scene and the respective vehicles involved. In summary terms, the findings confirm that weather, visibility, road conditions, or any mechanical or operational deficiencies in either vehicle, were non-factors in the collision.
[121] The report reveals the road, at the collision scene, to be relatively flat and dry, the surface of the road was paved. The northbound lanes of Hwy. 11 were found to be in good condition in the immediate vicinity of the collision, with the collision investigation leading to the conclusion that the Chevrolet “had a lane to pass the Harley Davidson”.
[122] The speed of the pickup truck was concluded be “a factor” in the collision, with the analysis of the data from the vehicle’s Airbag Control Module revealing a rate of speed, at the point of impact, of approximately 156 kilometers per hour, or 96.9 miles per hour.
XVIII. Other Contributing Factors Disclosed by the Evidence
[123] As previously reviewed, the trial record is concluded to establish that the accused failed to keep a proper lookout, was distracted, or was simply not paying attention, immediately prior to the collision. This conclusion is confirmed by the data secured from Mr. Monteath’s company vehicle. That data establishes that the pickup truck collided with the Harley without any appreciable prior braking, or efforts to avoid contact. Mr. Gasson's trial testimony, while compromised by inconsistency, is concluded to confirm that the accused was engaged in passing other vehicles prior to the point of impact. Mr. Monteath was also observed to have operated the pickup truck at high speed, and in an aggressive manner leading up to the point of impact, and to have engaged in no evident avoidance maneuvering prior to impact. The observed drifting within the lane of travel, recalled by Mr. Gasson, is concluded to be consistent with what might reasonably be expected at such high speed.
[124] The reliability of certain of the observations of Mr. Gasson, are concluded to be reflected in the data secured by the O.P.P. from the truck’s Air Bag Control Module and Event Data Recorder and the data generated by the technology and software employed by Titan GPS. On review and analysis, this data confirms that a very negligible or limited amount of braking, deceleration, or manipulation or turning of the steering wheel of the pickup, took place before the time of impact.
XIX. The Purported Animal Strike
[125] Apart from the account of events offered by Gregory Monteath, there is no evidentiary support for the asserted belief that the truck struck an animal and not another motor vehicle. There was no supportive or confirmatory evidence of an “animal strike” found at the scene. Given the speed involved, the evident force of impact, and the significant damage occasioned to Mr. Monteath’s truck, it would be reasonable to assume some evidence of the strike would be present at the scene and/or left on Mr. Monteath's vehicle.
[126] The absence of any signs of an animal strike must also be considered within the context of the evidence that was left behind at the collision scene and the fact that the evidence supports the factual determination that the approximately 5000 pound truck, operated by Mr. Monteath, struck the rear of the roughly 1200 pound motorcycle operated by Diane Laliberte-Rainville. It would not be unreasonable to conclude that the magnitude, or force of impact of the collision, and the sound it would generate, would have alerted Mr. Monteath to the fact that he had struck another vehicle and not a wild animal.
XX. Mr. Monteath’s State of Awareness
[127] Mr. Monteath’s purported lack of awareness of the fact his truck had struck another motor vehicle is concluded to be undermined by several other facts, including his own trial testimony. The damage to his own vehicle was significant. The force of impact resulted in the front bumper of the pickup, in the immediate vicinity of the license plate, to be noticeably and significantly, indented. The driver side of the vehicle grill was heavily damaged with additional damage readily observable to the driver's side front of the vehicle.
[128] Had Mr. Monteath checked his surroundings in a timely fashion following the collision, as he purported to do, it is difficult to imagine that he would not also have seen the prone body of Diane Laliberte-Rainville in the vicinity of the shoulder of the northbound passing lane. Even a cursory review of the extensive damage, thereafter, should have removed any doubt about an alleged animal strike.
[129] Of greater significance, is the fact that the uncontradicted testimony of Constable Bimson provides factual support for the prosecution's contention that the force of impact would have slowed the truck and immediately propelled the motorcycle ahead of the pickup and within the line of sight of the pickup’s operator. The size differential between the two vehicles is also concluded to undermine the lack of awareness claimed by Mr. Monteith. The rear trunk of the motorcycle approximates the height of the hood of the pickup. The Harley is 41” tall at that point. The Harley rear wheelbase extends more than 4 feet in width. The 2013 Harley Davidson Tri-Glide Ultra Classic Mrs. Laliberte-Rainville was driving was over 8 and a half feet in length. Given the dimensions of the three-wheeled motorcycle, and the fact the point of impact was directly in front of the pickup, on the driver's side, it is concluded that the accused could not have reasonably conflated, or confused, the Harley for a wild animal.
[130] Based on this analysis, I conclude that the accused's belief and subsequent assertion of the suspected involvement of an animal strike involving a wild animal in the collision, to be false, self-serving, unsupported by the evidence, and unworthy of belief.
[131] The trial record is concluded to establish that Gregory Monteath, either knew, or was willfully or intentionally blind, to the fact his pickup truck had struck the Harley.
XXI. Fail to Stop
[132] I also do not accept the account of events, as recounted in Mr. Monteath's trial testimony, as to the rationale for leaving the highway as a consequence of having been “shaken up” in the collision, or the assertion that secondary roads were employed in an effort to facilitate his way back to his home, or workplace.
[133] It may well be that the impact occasioned both emotional and physical distress, although the accused was not physically injured in the collision. Mr. Monteath’s own actions are concluded to be inconsistent with what might reasonably be expected if he was actually endeavouring to make his way home, secure in the belief that he had collided with some form of large wildlife. In due course, his motor vehicle would become disabled, some considerable distance north of the collision scene, in the opposite direction to where he purported to be heading, as detailed elsewhere in these Reasons.
[134] I am not left in a state of reasonable doubt by Mr. Monteath's explanation for failing to stop at the scene of the collision. I conclude he was aware of the fact his truck had collided with another motor vehicle and that someone had been injured as a consequence. I also find the referenced justification for failing to remain, and the reported rationale for the subsequent intentional abandonment of the most direct route back to the GTA, to be concocted and false.
[135] The evidence supports the conclusion that the post-collision decisions of the accused were motivated by a determined, concerted, and continuing effort to avoid civil or criminal responsibility for a collision that he knew he had caused, a collision resulting in serious injury to another motorist. Those efforts were only thwarted by the fact Mr. Monteath’s vehicle became inoperable. On consideration of the forementioned findings, I conclude the only available inference to be drawn from Mr. Monteath's post-collision conduct, is that his actions in failing to stop reflect the implementation of an intentional evasion initiative. The subsequent employment of an alternative route home, by use of secondary roads, is determined to have been initiated to distance himself from the accident scene in furtherance of a planned effort to attempt to avoid apprehension and accountability for the collision.
XXII. Conclusion
[136] Based on the foregoing, as detailed elsewhere in this judgement, I conclude the Crown has established proof of both the offences alleged, on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
[137] When considered in context, I conclude Gregory Monteath was driving the pickup truck in an inherently dangerous manner prior to the point of impact with the Harley, given the nature, condition and use of the roadway when the driving occurred. The technology generated by the pickup truck itself, acted as a compelling silent witness in this case.
[138] Given the time of day and time of year, it might reasonably be expected that other vehicles would be present on the roadway as commuters made their way to work, or travelers heading to other northbound locations serviced by Hwy. 11, the main throughfare for both north and southbound traffic in the area, utilized the roadway. The excessive speed of operation, observed aggressive driving, including passing, lane changes, and uncertainty in the control of the vehicle prior to impact, are all factors that inform this determination.
[139] The failure to engage in any form of purposeful avoidance maneuvering, and the negligible application of the brake’s pre-impact, are concluded to reflect the degree of intentional negligence, that s.320.13(2) was enacted to address.
[140] When the circumstances of the driving are considered in context, and objectively viewed, I conclude the Crown has proven the accused’s driving constitutes a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable, prudent driver, in like circumstances, on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
[141] What is viewed as egregiously, excessive speed, given where and when it occurred, the aggressive nature of the driving, and the apparent lack of awareness, or loss of concentration, are factors that are concluded to have compromised Gregory Monteath's ability to either brake or take other appropriate evasive action, until it was too late. This circumstance is not determined to have resulted from a brief period of momentary inattention. The resulting collision could have been avoided, as the Collision Report reflects, as the accused had an open northbound lane available to him. Speed and the other factors mentioned are concluded to have conspired to prevent that option from being exercised.
[142] Based on the previously detailed analysis, the Crown is also concluded to have established proof of the fail to stop charge, contrary to s.320.16(2), based on the fact Mr. Monteath intentionally left the scene, imbued with the knowledge that his truck had been involved in a significant collision with the Harley that resulted in bodily harm to Diane Laliberte-Rainville and failed to stop, identify himself and render assistance as required by statute. Alternatively, Gregory Monteath is concluded to have been willfully or intentionally blind to the fact a collision had occurred resulting in bodily injury to another motorist.
[143] Accordingly, Gregory Monteath shall be found guilty of both offences with which he has been charged.
Released: July 31, 2026
Signed: Justice P. D. Tetley