Wesley Douglas Beatty

The accused was charged with sexually touching a child on three or four occasions when she was approximately 11 years old.

The Crown alleged that the accused touched the complainant's breasts, buttocks, and vagina under her clothing while she was intoxicated at a firepit and subsequently in the basement and bedroom of the family home.

The accused denied all allegations.

The trial judge found both witnesses credible but identified significant implausibilities in the complainant's evidence, including that she would not be wearing underwear at age 11 and that each alleged incident would follow an identical pattern.

Finding these implausibilities created a reasonable doubt, the court acquitted the accused on both charges.

The accused was charged with sexual interference contrary to section 151 of the Criminal Code for allegedly touching a child under the age of 14 for a sexual purpose during a family gathering at a cottage on Wasauksing First Nation territory in July 2008.

The complainant, now an adult, testified that the accused entered the bedroom where she was sleeping and sexually assaulted her.

The defence presented evidence suggesting the accused was at a campfire with other family members and did not have the opportunity to commit the alleged offence.

The court found that while the complainant's evidence could not be wholly rejected, the Crown failed to meet the high burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt when considering the totality of the evidence, including significant inconsistencies between witnesses and credibility concerns.

The accused was acquitted.

Mitchel Yearley brought an application for certiorari to quash his committal to stand trial on one count of aggravated assault, arguing that the preliminary hearing judge exceeded jurisdiction due to insufficient evidence on identity and denied natural justice by not allowing submissions on committal.

The court found that the preliminary hearing judge committed jurisdictional error by failing to provide sufficient reasons for committal and that the in-dock identification alone was insufficient evidence for committal.

The application was granted, and the committal order was quashed.

The accused was charged with failing or refusing to supply a breath sample contrary to section 254(2) of the Criminal Code following a motor vehicle stop on June 3, 2016.

The Crown alleged the accused willfully failed to provide a suitable breath sample after more than 20 attempts over three breath sequences.

The defence raised three issues: whether the Crown proved willful failure beyond a reasonable doubt, whether the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to make the breath demand, and the consequences of two breath demands.

The court found the Crown proved each element of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt and convicted the accused.

The accused was charged with operation of a motor vehicle with over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood following a motor vehicle collision in Magnetawan, Ontario on April 25, 2016.

The Crown's evidence established the collision, the accused's impairment, and breath test results of 137 mg and 146 mg respectively.

However, the Crown conceded that the first breath sample was taken outside the two-hour statutory window required by the Criminal Code.

Without expert toxicology evidence to perform retrograde extrapolation, the court found the Crown had not proven all elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings alleging a breach of the right to trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The charges, including attempted murder, were laid in 2002 but the accused was not arrested until 2009 while residing in South Korea, resulting in approximately 11 years of delay before trial.

The court held that the Crown failed to take reasonable steps to bring the accused to trial despite knowing his whereabouts and having extradition options available.

Most of the delay was attributable to Crown inaction rather than inherent requirements or actions of the accused.

Given the exceptional delay and resulting prejudice to liberty, security, and fair trial interests, the court concluded that the accused’s s. 11(b) rights were violated.

The Crown brought a summary conviction appeal from a trial decision finding a breach of the accused’s right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter and excluding breath sample evidence.

The trial judge had concluded that police failed to take reasonable steps to facilitate contact with the accused’s preferred lawyer before administering breath tests.

The appellate judge found that the officer had taken reasonable steps, including attempting to contact the lawyer and arranging for duty counsel while awaiting a callback.

The accused agreed to speak with whichever lawyer returned the call first and did not diligently pursue counsel of choice.

The appeal court concluded there was no s. 10(b) breach and further held that, even if a breach had occurred, the evidence would have been admissible under s. 24(2) applying the framework in Grant.

The accused was charged with sexually assaulting a 16-year-old complainant on March 2-3, 2012.

The trial examined whether the accused engaged in non-consensual sexual contact with the complainant who was severely intoxicated.

The Crown presented evidence from the complainant, her friend, and a witness who observed the accused touching the complainant inappropriately while she was unconscious on the kitchen floor.

The court found that the accused engaged in sexual contact with the complainant both in the kitchen and later in his bedroom, when she was incapable of consenting due to extreme intoxication.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault.

A young person charged with six counts of sexual abuse against two male cousins applied for severance of the counts.

The accused sought to have three counts tried separately from the remaining three counts.

The court considered the criteria established in R v. Last, including general prejudice, legal and factual nexus, complexity, and other factors.

The court found that a legal and factual nexus existed between the counts based on the age of the victims, their relationship to the accused, location, timeframe, and similarity of alleged acts.

The court rejected the severance application, finding that trying all counts together would be in the interests of justice and would not expose the accused to undue prejudice.

Sentencing decision following convictions for impaired operation causing death and driving while disqualified after a snowmobile collision that resulted in the death of a teenage passenger.

The offender had consumed alcohol, operated the vehicle while prohibited, and lost control on a rural roadway, striking a tree.

The court considered victim impact statements, the offender’s criminal record involving prior alcohol-related driving offences, and a presentence report outlining personal circumstances and alcohol misuse.

While the offender had complied with strict bail conditions for several years and had family responsibilities, the court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence in cases of impaired driving causing death.

A penitentiary sentence was imposed together with a lengthy driving prohibition and a DNA order.

In a pretrial motion in a prosecution for attempted murder, the Crown sought to admit several pieces of correspondence involving the accused and officials of a school board where he had been employed as a teacher.

The Crown argued the documents demonstrated animus and motive toward the alleged victim, a school board director.

The defence argued the letters constituted discreditable conduct evidence whose prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value.

The court reviewed the governing principles for admissibility of discreditable conduct evidence, including the balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect and the relevance of motive evidence.

The court concluded the letters were admissible because they were relevant to the accused’s state of mind and motive, and their probative value outweighed any prejudicial impact.

The accused brought a pre‑trial motion seeking exclusion of physical evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, arguing it was obtained through searches authorized by a defective general warrant.

The court found the information to obtain the warrant contained irrelevant discreditable conduct, misleading and incomplete information, and unsupported assertions about the accused’s presence near the crime scene, resulting in a breach of s. 8 of the Charter.

Because the CDSA warrant was based on information gathered through execution of the invalid general warrant, it also violated the accused’s s. 8 rights.

Applying the framework from R. v. Grant, the court held that although the Charter breach was serious and intruded upon residential privacy, the police conduct was not deliberate and the evidence was reliable and important to the prosecution.

Balancing these factors, the court declined to exclude the evidence.

The accused was charged with impaired operation causing death, operating with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg, and operating a motor vehicle while disqualified following a fatal snowmobile collision.

The principal issue at trial was whether the accused or the deceased passenger was driving the snowmobile immediately prior to the collision.

After a lengthy trial involving competing collision reconstruction experts, the court found the physical evidence, injury patterns, and scene analysis supported the Crown’s theory that the accused was driving and that the passenger had been ejected prior to the snowmobile striking a tree.

The court concluded the accused’s blood alcohol concentration was between 120 and 168 mg/100 mL and that his impaired operation was at least a contributing cause of the death.

The defence theories regarding collision mechanics, evidentiary deficiencies, and alleged investigative failures did not raise a reasonable doubt.