Janelle Mercury Belton

The applicant brought a Charter application alleging breaches of his s. 10(b) right to counsel following his arrest during a dynamic entry.

The court found the police breached the informational component by delaying the reading of rights for 20 minutes despite having control of the scene.

The court also found an implementational breach when police refused the applicant's request for a second consultation with counsel after he expressed dissatisfaction with duty counsel.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the applicant's statements to police.

The appellant, a young Indigenous man, pleaded guilty to four counts of dangerous driving causing death and was convicted after trial of related drug-driving counts under s. 320.14(3) of the Criminal Code for operating a conveyance while his blood THC concentration was eight times the 5 ng/mL legal limit, causing the deaths of four persons during a high-speed police pursuit.

He appealed conviction, arguing the THC limit was arbitrary and overbroad under s. 7 of the Charter, and appealed his 17-year global sentence as demonstrably unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, holding the THC limit is neither arbitrary nor overbroad: it is rationally connected to Parliament's dual objectives of deterrence and enhanced detection, functions as a reasonable proxy analogous to the blood alcohol regime, and the overbreadth threshold was not met by the narrow class of frequent and chronic users who may exceed the limit after impairment subsides.

On sentence, the court found no error in principle and upheld the 17-year term as justified by an exceptional constellation of aggravating factors including four deaths, two separate high-speed police pursuits, a record of 15 prior driving convictions, and a highly elevated degree of subjective fault, offset but not outweighed by Gladue considerations, youth, remorse, and guilty pleas.

The accused was found guilty of human trafficking-related offences following a judge-alone trial.

Prior to sentencing, the accused brought an application for a mistrial and for the trial judge to recuse himself, arguing that the judge's decision to amend count 7 of the indictment created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The judge had amended the charge from 'distributing' to 'transmitting' an intimate image without consent, as the evidence showed the image was sent to only one person (the complainant's mother).

The court dismissed the application, finding that the amendment was legally permissible under s. 601 of the Criminal Code, caused no prejudice to the accused, and would not lead a reasonable and right-minded person to apprehend bias.

Two appellants convicted of first degree murder following a home invasion robbery during which the victim was fatally shot appealed their convictions.

The first appellant, found to be the principal shooter, raised grounds including failure to consider defence of a third party, insufficient findings on forcible confinement, and reliance on inadmissible hearsay for identification.

The Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal, finding no air of reality to the defence, that the evidence supported his participation in forcible confinement as a joint principal, and that the identification evidence was not hearsay.

The second appellant successfully argued that the trial judge applied an objective rather than subjective mens rea standard under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code for party liability for murder.

The Crown conceded the error.

The murder conviction was set aside and a conviction for manslaughter substituted, with a sentence equivalent to 12 years imposed.

The accused was tried on multiple charges including human trafficking, receiving material benefits, advertising sexual services, transmitting child pornography, and distributing intimate images relating to two young female complainants.

The court found that the accused exercised control over the movements of a 15-year-old complainant for the purpose of exploiting her in the sex trade, and that he received the financial benefits of her services.

The accused was found guilty of the human trafficking, child pornography, and intimate image offences, but was acquitted of assault causing bodily harm and breaching a release order.

The accused pleaded guilty to manslaughter after her 15-month-old son drowned when she left him unattended in a bathtub for five to ten minutes.

The Crown sought four years' imprisonment, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court considered the accused's tragic upbringing, systemic racism, and lack of prior record as mitigating factors, but found the vulnerability of the child and the breach of trust required a denunciatory sentence.

The accused was sentenced to three years' imprisonment and ordered to provide a DNA sample.

The Ontario Court of Justice sentenced Marlon Johnson for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, possession of a prohibited firearm knowing possession was unauthorized, and possession of a firearm contrary to a prohibition order.

The court carefully considered the gravity of the offences, the offender’s background including systemic anti-Black racism, and the principles of sentencing such as denunciation, deterrence, restraint, and proportionality.

The court found Mr. Johnson’s moral blameworthiness somewhat diminished due to social context factors but emphasized the serious public safety risks posed by the offences.

The sentence imposed was 35 months and 15 days for the primary offence, 24 months concurrent for the second, and 9 months consecutive for the prohibition breach, totaling 44 months and 15 days custody.

The defendant, Kelvon Clarke, was charged with possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime not exceeding $5,000.

Police executed a search warrant at an apartment, finding controlled substances and cash.

The Crown's case was circumstantial, relying on video evidence showing Clarke entering the building with a distinctive purple bag, which was later found in the apartment containing the bulk of the drugs.

The court found Clarke guilty, concluding that the only reasonable inference based on the totality of the evidence was his knowledge and control of the drugs, either through physical possession, constructive possession, joint possession, or aiding.

The applicants, Jide Animashaun and Marlon Johnson, challenged a search warrant for their cell phones and sought to exclude a firearm and cell phone data under s.24(2) of the Charter.

They argued the initial phone seizure was unlawful, the Information to Obtain (ITO) contained errors, the searches were conducted outside the authorized timeframe, and police conduct subverted the pre-authorization process.

The court found the initial seizure lawful, addressed errors in the ITO through excision and amplification, and determined the phone extractions were not outside the authorized timeframe.

The application was dismissed as no Charter violations were established.

The appellant was convicted of conspiring to import narcotics in association with a criminal organization.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the co-conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule (the Carter analysis) and that the conspiracy conviction was inconsistent with his acquittal on a related trafficking charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instructions were functional and not confusing, and that the disparate verdicts were intelligible given the distinct evidence and theories for each charge.

The applicant brought a Charter application alleging breaches of his ss. 7, 8, 9, and 10(b) rights during the execution of a search warrant at an apartment where he was a found-in.

The police discovered approximately 1.3 kgs of fentanyl in the apartment and smaller quantities of drugs and cash on the applicant.

The applicant alleged police used excessive force by tackling and punching him, and conducted an unreasonable search.

The Crown conceded a s. 10(b) breach due to a 30-minute delay in providing rights to counsel.

The court dismissed the other Charter claims, finding the police use of force and manner of detention were reasonable given the dynamic and potentially volatile situation.

The court declined to stay the proceedings or exclude the evidence under s. 24, concluding the physical evidence was not obtained as a result of the s. 10(b) breach and its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appellant, Elias Gibb, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, raising three grounds: the constitutionality of the Criminal Code's provocation provision (s. 232(2)), the trial judge's failure to provide a free-standing instruction on intoxication's impact on mens rea for murder, and an error in the W.D. instruction for co-accused.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the constitutional challenge based on a companion case.

Regarding intoxication, the court found no error, noting the defence strategically chose to integrate intoxication into the provocation defence rather than seeking a separate instruction.

The court also found that while the W.D. instruction was imperfect in its wording, it did not lead to an unfair verdict when read in context, as the jury was otherwise properly instructed on separate verdicts for each accused.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, J.C., sought bail pending appeal after being convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, and accessing child pornography, and sentenced to 6.5 years' imprisonment.

The court applied the three-part test under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code: whether the appeal is frivolous, whether the applicant will surrender into custody, and whether detention is necessary in the public interest.

While the appeal was deemed not frivolous and the surrender condition met, the court found that the public confidence ground was engaged due to the gravity of the offences and the lengthy sentence.

The applicant's grounds of appeal were assessed as weak, and the enforceability considerations strongly outweighed the reviewability factors.

The application for bail pending appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with two counts of first-degree murder and one count of attempted murder, challenged a judicially authorized wiretap warrant, arguing it violated his s. 8 Charter rights due to alleged material omissions and misrepresentations in the Information to Obtain (ITO).

Specifically, he contended that the ITO failed to disclose his home address and house arrest status, which would have provided an innocent explanation for his mobile phone's location near the crime scenes.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant's address was in fact present in the ITO, albeit not explicitly referenced in the mobile phone section, and that any omission was not deliberate.

The court concluded that even considering the omitted information, the totality of the evidence, particularly the coordinated movement and contact between the applicant's and a co-perpetrator's phones, provided sufficient grounds for the warrant's issuance.

The accused was charged with impaired driving causing death, dangerous driving causing death, and refusing to provide a breath sample after his vehicle plunged into Lake Ontario, resulting in the death of a passenger.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence to prove the accused was driving.

The court accepted the accused's testimony that he and the deceased had switched seats prior to the accident, raising a reasonable doubt as to identity.

The court also found that the accused's symptoms of impairment were equally consistent with hypothermia, and that the breath demand was not unequivocal.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The accused was driving a sports car at speeds up to 163 km/h in an 80 km/h zone on a highway, shortly after passing two motorcycles.

As he approached an intersection with a green light, a vehicle turned left into his path, resulting in a collision that killed three people and injured two others.

The court found the accused guilty of dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm, concluding his excessive speed near an intersection was a marked departure from the standard of care.

However, the court acquitted him of criminal negligence, finding a reasonable doubt that his conduct amounted to a marked and substantial departure showing wanton or reckless disregard.

Following a judge-alone criminal trial subject to a publication ban, the court convicted the accused of sexual assault and sexual touching of his child.

The court admitted the complainant's videotaped police statement under s. 715.1(1) of the Criminal Code, addressed delayed and incremental disclosure principles, and applied the W. (D.) framework to the accused's denials.

The trial judge found the accused's evidence contrived and unbelievable, and found the complainant to be credible, compelling, and reliable despite inconsistencies on collateral details.

The Crown proved both offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed his five-year global sentence for drug and firearm offences, arguing the sentencing judge erred by exceeding the Crown's four-year proposal without notice or reasons.

The Court of Appeal held that a sentencing judge must notify counsel and provide clear reasons when intending to impose a sentence higher than the Crown's proposal, even in the absence of a joint submission.

Finding an error in principle that impacted the sentence, the Court allowed the appeal and substituted a four-year sentence.

The defendant pleaded guilty to criminal harassment of his ex-wife after sending her over one hundred text messages, emails, and voicemails following the withdrawal of a previous criminal harassment charge.

The Crown sought a 60-day intermittent jail sentence, while the defence sought a conditional discharge.

The court emphasized general deterrence and denunciation for intimate partner violence but noted the defendant's lack of prior record and guilty plea.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with two years of probation, a weapons prohibition, and a DNA order.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the shooting death of Keith Brissett.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's jury instructions on four grounds: (1) the instruction on the use of a KGB statement containing hearsay evidence of motive; (2) the provision of Vetrovec warnings regarding two disreputable witnesses despite defence objection; (3) the handling of third party suspect evidence regarding Curtis Murray; and (4) the treatment of eyewitness evidence regarding the shooter's skin colour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the trial judge's instructions were legally sound and fair.