Dr. Timothy Moore

The applicant, who pled guilty to manslaughter in 1986, sought a post-conviction disclosure order from the Crown in aid of an application for a Ministerial Review under s. 696.1 of the Criminal Code, claiming he had falsely confessed and was wrongfully convicted.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application for a disclosure order as premature (because the applicant had not exhausted his appeals) and moot (because the Crown had already disclosed all available documents).

However, the court granted declaratory relief, holding that the superior court has jurisdiction under s. 24(1) of the Charter to make post-conviction disclosure orders in aid of a Ministerial Review, and that convicted persons do not need the Crown's consent to communicate with public officials regarding their convictions.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault following a jury trial.

The complainant, a child, testified at trial but became unresponsive during cross-examination and refused to answer defence counsel's questions.

The trial judge declined to declare a mistrial or grant a stay of proceedings, instead admitting the complainant's testimony from the preliminary inquiry and providing a cautionary jury instruction regarding the absence of cross-examination.

The appellant appealed on two grounds: (1) that the trial judge erred in not declaring a mistrial, and (2) that the trial judge erred in excluding expert evidence regarding false subjective memory in children.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion to balance the accused's right to make a full answer and defence with the special needs of a young witness in a sexual abuse case.

During a trial for sexual interference involving a child complainant, the accused brought an application to introduce expert opinion evidence from a cognitive psychologist regarding memory, misinformation effects, and the reliability of children's recollections.

The Crown opposed the admission.

The court applied the Mohan and Abbey framework for expert evidence and concluded that the proposed evidence was unnecessary, as the frailties of memory are within the normal experience of a trier of fact.

Furthermore, the court found the expert's report improperly touched upon the complainant's credibility.

The application to admit the expert evidence was dismissed.

The appellant challenged convictions for sexual and related offences arising from allegations by a child complainant.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in treating the complainant's utterances during a later seizure-like episode as independent corroboration, because they were not admissible for the truth of their contents under the hearsay and prior consistent statement rules.

The court further held that the Crown expert's opinion linking the episode to the alleged assault was inadmissible because it exceeded the expert's qualifications and depended on unproven foundational facts.

As the impugned evidence was central to the credibility assessment, the convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

In a trial for child sexual abuse, both the Crown and the defence brought applications to introduce expert testimony.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence from a clinical psychologist regarding delayed disclosure and the relationship between sexual abuse and non-epileptic seizures.

The defence sought to introduce evidence from a cognitive psychologist on similar topics, as well as the effect of questioning techniques on children.

The court applied the Mohan test and ruled that both experts could testify on delayed disclosure and non-epileptic seizures, as this information was outside the normal experience of the trier of fact.

However, the court excluded the defence expert's proposed testimony on questioning techniques, finding it unnecessary as assessing credibility is within the court's expertise.