Scott Bergman

The Crown applied for an order to retain seized material for an additional year in a complex criminal investigation involving Fortress Real Capital Inc. and related entities.

The investigation, initiated in 2018, concerned allegations of investor fraud through misrepresentation of property values and investment eligibility.

The court granted the application, finding the investigation to be complex due to the large volume of electronic and hard copy material, the need for professional assistance (computer experts, accountants), and significant delays caused by extensive solicitor-client privilege claims over seized documents.

The court emphasized that while asserting privilege is legitimate, it contributed to the complexity and delay, justifying further detention of the material until June 22, 2021.

The defendants brought applications to exclude evidence obtained during a drug trafficking investigation, alleging Charter violations under sections 8 and 24(2).

The Crown charged both defendants with conspiracy to commit robbery and various firearms and drug offences.

The defendants challenged: (1) police observations made in a condominium hallway on February 22, 2016; (2) the search of a residence on June 9, 2016; and (3) the search of a vehicle incident to arrest.

The court rejected all applications, finding that the police conduct was lawful and that the defendants' reasonable expectations of privacy were not violated.

The accused was charged with fraudulently disposing of property contrary to section 198(1)(a) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The Crown alleged that the accused disposed of a BMW X5 that he had financed but failed to pay for, subsequently claiming it went missing from his driveway.

The trial examined whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused disposed of the vehicle.

The court found that while the accused acted fraudulently, the Crown failed to prove that he disposed of the property as opposed to concealing it, and therefore acquitted him of the charge.

The Crown brought an application under section 490(9)(d) of the Criminal Code for forfeiture of USD $32,279.78 and CAD $3,060.50 seized from the respondent's account.

The respondent had been acquitted of all charges, including money laundering.

Both parties agreed the funds were proceeds of crime from an illegal ephedrine exportation scheme.

The court granted the forfeiture order despite acknowledging that TD Bank had violated a Superior Court Restraint Order by withdrawing $35,000 from the account and sending it to Citi Bank, and despite the Crown's minimal efforts to enforce the breach.

The court found that the funds remained proceeds of crime and that Parliament's intention to deprive offenders of criminal proceeds outweighed the equitable considerations arising from TD Bank's breach.

The accused, a lawyer, was charged with multiple counts of money laundering, possession of proceeds of crime, fraud, and conspiracy related to an international ephedrine exportation scheme operated by Afshin Dastani.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of Dastani, who admitted to operating an illegal drug exportation business and claimed he disclosed the illicit nature of his activities to the accused.

The court found Dastani to be an unreliable and discredited witness due to numerous inconsistencies in his evidence and a pattern of deception toward family, friends, legal advisors, and government authorities.

Without credible evidence of the accused's knowledge that funds were proceeds of crime, the court acquitted the accused on all charges.

The accused brought applications to stay charges under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay.

The charges involved possession of property obtained by crime, money laundering, fraud, and drug trafficking offences spanning from January 2009 to June 2012.

The overall delay was 33 months from arrest to trial.

The court conducted a detailed analysis of the delay, attributing it to Crown delay (216 days), defence delay (235 days), inherent delay (457 days), and institutional delay (78 days).

The court found that the Crown and institutional delay combined amounted to just under 10 months, which was not unreasonable given the exceptional complexity of the case, particularly the Lavallee proceedings required to protect solicitor-client privilege following searches of the accused lawyer's office.

The court balanced the delay against society's strong interest in a trial on the merits given the serious allegations of money laundering by a lawyer involving millions of dollars.

The applications were dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial interim release pending appeal under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code after being convicted of sexual interference involving a minor family member and sentenced to nine months’ imprisonment.

The court considered whether the appeal was not frivolous, whether the applicant would surrender into custody, and whether detention was necessary in the public interest.

The applicant raised several grounds of appeal, including an arguable issue regarding whether sexual interference is an included offence under s. 153 of the Criminal Code.

The court found the third ground raised a viable issue on appeal and that the applicant had previously complied with bail conditions and posed no significant public interest risk.

Judicial interim release pending appeal was therefore granted with conditions.

A 19-year-old American citizen was sentenced for his participation in the G-20 riots in Toronto on June 26, 2010.

The accused was convicted of multiple counts of mischief, including damaging police vehicles, retail stores, and financial institutions, as well as wearing a disguise with intent.

The court imposed a sentence of seven months imprisonment (less pre-trial custody) followed by two years probation, with conditions including a ban from Toronto and restitution orders.

The judgment extensively discusses sentencing principles for riot-related offences, balancing deterrence and denunciation against rehabilitation and the accused's youth and remorse.

The applicant, a lawyer charged with money laundering and possession of property obtained by crime, sought to vary or vacate three restraint orders freezing his bank and securities accounts.

He argued the orders were based on information obtained in breach of his s. 8 Charter rights, PIPEDA, and a production order, and that the banks acted as state agents.

The court dismissed the application, finding the accounts were properly restrained as offence-related property or proceeds of crime.

The court held the applicant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the banking information disclosed, the banks acted independently to protect their own interests and not as state agents, and the disclosures complied with PIPEDA.

The court also found the CRA tax information was properly acquired and used.