David Andrew Connally

The Crown brought an application to have the offender declared a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate period of custody following convictions for sexual assault with a weapon, robbery, and forcible confinement.

The offender had a lengthy criminal record and substantial mental health issues, including schizophrenia and substance abuse, which contributed to his offending when unmedicated.

The court found that while the predicate offences were serious personal injury offences and the offender showed a pattern of repetitive and aggressive behaviour, the Crown failed to establish that his behaviour was intractable or that he posed a tremendous future risk, given his remarkable improvement when properly medicated in a forensic psychiatric facility.

The dangerous offender application was dismissed.

Instead, the court designated the offender as a long-term offender, finding a reasonable possibility of eventual control of his risk in the community.

The offender was sentenced to a further 90 days in custody to allow for the formulation of a correctional release plan, followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order.

The Crown brought a dangerous offender application following the offender's conviction for robbery.

Both parties agreed the offender should be designated a dangerous offender and receive a fixed-term sentence followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order, but disputed the length of the fixed term.

The court designated the offender a dangerous offender, finding he posed a future threat due to a pattern of repetitive and persistent aggressive behaviour.

The court imposed a further fixed-term sentence of three years, after crediting four years for pre-sentence custody, followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order.

The applicant, George Flowers, sought a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging breaches of his section 11(b) right to a trial and sentencing within a reasonable time.

The charges involved aggravated sexual assault.

The application was based on three grounds: unreasonable pre-verdict delay, unreasonable post-verdict delay exceeding the presumptive ceiling set by R. v. Charley, and unreasonable post-verdict delay even if below the ceiling.

The court found that the net pre-verdict delay was below the Jordan ceiling and the applicant failed to demonstrate unreasonable delay.

For post-verdict delay, the court accepted that dangerous offender proceedings under Part XXIV of the Criminal Code constituted exceptional circumstances, and the net post-verdict delay, after accounting for these circumstances, did not exceed the Charley ceiling.

Consequently, the application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

Trial on two counts of historical indecent assault arising from allegations by two complainants involving abuse by an adult in positions of trust during scouting and hockey activities.

The court admitted count-to-count similar fact evidence, finding substantial connectedness in the surrounding circumstances, no evidence of collusion, and no material prejudice in a judge-alone trial.

Applying the distinction between credibility and reliability, the court found both complainants credible and their accounts reliable despite the age of the allegations, delayed disclosure, and the fact that parts of the incidents began while they were asleep or unconscious.

The court held the Crown proved both counts beyond a reasonable doubt.

The applicant, charged with child pornography offences, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable trial delay.

The total delay from the swearing of the information to the anticipated end of trial was over 39 months.

The court applied the Jordan framework and deducted 5 months and 21 days of defence delay, as well as a 10-day discrete event, resulting in a net delay of 33 months and 5 days, which exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The court rejected the Crown's arguments that the case was particularly complex or that transitional exceptional circumstances justified the delay.

The application was granted and the charges were stayed.

The accused was charged with possessing and making available child pornography.

The central issue at trial was the admissibility of evidence seized from his BlackBerry cell phone without a warrant, specifically whether exigent circumstances justified the warrantless seizure under s. 8 of the Charter.

Police seized the phone after identifying the accused at a Tim Hortons, concerned about potential evidence destruction.

A search warrant was subsequently obtained to examine the phone, which revealed incriminating evidence on an attached memory card.

The court found that exigent circumstances existed, making the warrantless seizure reasonable and not a violation of s. 8 of the Charter.

Alternatively, even if a s. 8 violation occurred, the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, given the seriousness of the offense, the good faith of the police, and the minimal impact on privacy interests due to a subsequent warrant.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The accused pleaded guilty to multiple counts of possession of Schedule I substances for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

Police seized significant quantities of methamphetamine, cocaine, MDMA, GHB, and ketamine on two occasions, including while the accused was on bail.

The court considered the seriousness of commercial drug trafficking and the aggravating factor of reoffending while on bail against substantial mitigating factors including rehabilitation, addiction treatment, employment, and community support.

While the defence sought a conditional sentence, the court held that denunciation and general deterrence required a penitentiary sentence.

A global sentence of five years’ imprisonment was imposed before credit, reduced to three years and five days after credit for pre‑trial custody and strict bail conditions.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings alleging a breach of the right to trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The charges, including attempted murder, were laid in 2002 but the accused was not arrested until 2009 while residing in South Korea, resulting in approximately 11 years of delay before trial.

The court held that the Crown failed to take reasonable steps to bring the accused to trial despite knowing his whereabouts and having extradition options available.

Most of the delay was attributable to Crown inaction rather than inherent requirements or actions of the accused.

Given the exceptional delay and resulting prejudice to liberty, security, and fair trial interests, the court concluded that the accused’s s. 11(b) rights were violated.