Kristopher Manitius

The accused pleaded guilty to six offences arising from an incident in which he entered a police station with an airsoft gun and fired multiple times at officers and a civilian staff member, striking one officer in the leg.

The accused was motivated by suicidal ideation and intended to provoke police into shooting him.

The court imposed a sentence of one year imprisonment (9 months and 6 days after credit for pre-sentence custody and bail conditions), followed by two years' probation, a DNA order, and a five-year weapons prohibition.

The court balanced significant aggravating factors (planning, danger to public, victim impact) against substantial mitigating factors (mental illness causal link, remorse, rehabilitation progress, no criminal record, and collateral consequences).

This sentencing decision addresses serious domestic violence offences committed by K.B., who pleaded guilty to multiple counts including assault, assault with choking, threatening to damage property, threatening death, and theft.

The offender has a significant prior record for domestic violence offences in Alberta, including sexual assault and assault with a weapon, and had been paroled for over five years before reoffending.

The court carefully balanced aggravating factors such as the severity and multiplicity of offences and prior record, with mitigating factors including guilty pleas, harsh pre-sentence custody conditions, remorse, and community support.

The total sentence imposed was 30 months imprisonment, with credit for 337 days pre-sentence custody and Summers credit, followed by a three-year probation order with strict conditions including no contact with the victim and mandatory counselling.

Samson Ram was charged with assault against his spouse, Tina Ram.

He admitted to applying force but claimed implied consent, arguing the incident was a "consensual fight" initiated by the complainant, and that no bodily harm was caused.

The court examined the common law doctrine of "consensual fight" as established in R. v. Jobidon and R. v. Paice, specifically questioning its applicability and scope in the context of domestic violence.

Considering the unique policy concerns of domestic violence, the court adopted a narrower interpretation, holding that intentional application of force "capable of causing an injury that is more than trivial" vitiates consent in domestic altercations.

The court found that the force used by Mr. Ram, repeatedly slamming his spouse on the floor, was capable of causing more than trivial injury and was intended to cause bodily harm, thus vitiating any implied consent.

Alternatively, the force exceeded the reasonable scope of any implied consent.

Mr. Ram was found guilty of assault.

The offender was found guilty of break and enter and sexual assault after entering an intoxicated and sleeping co-worker's hotel room using a master key.

The Crown sought a sentence of two years less a day, while the defence sought 9 to 12 months.

The court considered the significant breach of trust, the vulnerability of the victim, and the offender's lack of insight, balanced against his pro-social background and the collateral consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court imposed a global sentence of 20 months' imprisonment, followed by three years of probation and ancillary orders.

The accused was charged with break and enter and sexual assault after entering a hotel room where a highly intoxicated co-worker was sleeping following an office party.

The accused, a hotel maintenance manager, used a master key to enter the room.

A hotel employee discovered the accused half-naked on top of the sleeping complainant.

The court rejected the accused's explanation that he was using toilet paper to clean up the complainant's urine.

Applying the W. (D.) framework, the court found the accused guilty of both break and enter and sexual assault, concluding that his actions constituted an intentional application of force in circumstances of a sexual nature without consent.

The Crown applied for the appointment of counsel for a youth who was the subject of a third party records application under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The court considered whether it had jurisdiction to appoint counsel for the youth in third party records proceedings.

The court reviewed relevant case law and concluded that it possessed inherent jurisdiction to control its own process and to appoint counsel for the youth, emphasizing the importance of youth having access to legal representation in proceedings affecting their interests.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle in a manner dangerous to the public causing bodily harm contrary to s.249(3) of the Criminal Code, and failing to stop at the scene of an accident causing bodily harm contrary to s.252(1.2) of the Criminal Code.

The incident occurred in a parking lot where the accused reversed his vehicle and struck the complainant with the left front quarter panel.

The trial judge acquitted the accused on both charges, finding that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knew his vehicle had struck the complainant, and that the accused's driving did not constitute a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person in the circumstances.

The defendant was charged with robbery and wearing a disguise with intent to commit an offence following an armed robbery at a pharmacy.

The Crown's case relied primarily on a fingerprint found on a garbage bag left at the scene and surveillance photographs.

The defence argued that the fingerprint only proved contact with the bag at some unspecified time, not participation in the robbery.

The court found that while the defendant's fingerprint was on the bag, the timing of when it was deposited could not be established.

The surveillance photographs, when compared to the defendant's arrest photograph, could only establish that he could not be excluded as a suspect.

The court concluded that guilt was not the only reasonable inference from the circumstantial evidence and acquitted the defendant.

The defendants were charged with production of marijuana and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking following a search warrant executed at their residence.

The court found that the search warrant could not have been reasonably granted based on the information before the issuing justice.

The affiant's investigation was characterized by lack of diligence, selective presentation of evidence, and unreliable conclusions.

The court determined that the warrant violated section 8 of the Charter and excluded the evidence pursuant to section 24(2) using the three-part test from R. v. Grant.

Both defendants were acquitted.

The accused applied for a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code seeking to vacate a detention order made by a justice of the peace.

The accused argued that the justice erred in finding he had no community ties, misapprehended financial evidence from proposed sureties, and failed to consider a prior Superior Court decision releasing him on related charges in another jurisdiction.

The reviewing judge held that a bail review is a hybrid process involving both review and limited fresh evidence but requires deference to the original decision unless legal or factual error is shown.

Given the strong Crown case, extensive criminal record including breaches of recognizance, lack of credible sureties, and evidence suggesting access to funds and a risk of reoffending, the court found detention justified on both primary and secondary grounds.

The prior bail decision relating to different charges and evidentiary records was not binding.

The Crown sought a stay of proceedings under section 579(1) on the original charges against the defendant.

The Crown's position was that despite a guilty plea entered in October 2012, a Pre-Sentence report with Gladue factors had not been properly prepared by Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto as ordered by the court.

Rather than compel attendance of the report authors, the Crown elected to direct a stay of proceedings given the defendant's particular circumstances and the delay involved.

The court granted the Crown stay, which did not apply to new charges pending in another courtroom.