Richard Connolly

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle in a manner dangerous to the public causing bodily harm contrary to s.249(3) of the Criminal Code, and failing to stop at the scene of an accident causing bodily harm contrary to s.252(1.2) of the Criminal Code.

The incident occurred in a parking lot where the accused reversed his vehicle and struck the complainant with the left front quarter panel.

The trial judge acquitted the accused on both charges, finding that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knew his vehicle had struck the complainant, and that the accused's driving did not constitute a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person in the circumstances.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and exceeding 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood following a traffic stop on Highway 401.

The defence challenged the reasonableness of the officer's grounds for demanding breath samples, the admissibility of observations made during the roadside investigation, and whether the breath tests were conducted as soon as practicable.

The court found that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds based on the totality of circumstances including poor driving, inability to focus, slow movements, and admission of alcohol consumption.

The court rejected the Charter violation argument, found the roadside observations admissible for proving impairment, and determined the tests were conducted as soon as practicable.

The accused was convicted on both charges.

The accused was charged with having care and control of a motor vehicle while his blood alcohol content exceeded 80 mgs of alcohol in 100 mls of blood contrary to s.253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused's vehicle had run out of gas on the roadway, and he was found seated in the driver's seat waiting for a tow truck to bring him fuel.

Police conducted a roadside investigation, obtained a failed approved screening device test, and subsequently obtained two breath samples exceeding the legal limit.

The accused challenged the lawfulness of the investigation and arrest on Charter grounds and argued that the Crown had failed to prove care and control.

The court rejected all Charter challenges and found that the Crown had proven de facto care and control beyond a reasonable doubt, alternatively relying on the presumption in s.258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The accused was convicted.

The defendant was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit (over 80) contrary to the Criminal Code.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of the approved screening device (ASD) test result, arguing that the demand for the breath sample was not made "forthwith" as required by law, thereby violating his Charter rights.

The Crown established that the defendant was stopped at 11:11 PM, the ASD demand was made at 11:12 PM, and the device was presented at 11:18 PM—a six-minute delay.

The court found no realistic opportunity for the defendant to consult with counsel within this timeframe and determined that the police complied with the statutory requirements.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed and the defendant was found guilty.

The applicant brought a Charter application alleging an infringement of his right to trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1).

The applicant was charged with impaired driving offences in July 2012, with the trial initially scheduled for May 30, 2013, and subsequently adjourned to October 4, 2013.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the total delay of approximately 14 months and 19 days exceeded Morin guidelines, the defence counsel's actions in seeking the adjournment on May 30, 2013, were the primary cause of the delay.

The court found that the defence failed to take reasonable steps to prepare despite having full disclosure and that the adjournment appeared to be a tactical decision to establish a s. 11(b) application rather than a genuine necessity.