Irwin Zev Isenstein

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit contrary to section 320.14(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude breath sample evidence, alleging multiple breaches of his rights including: (1) arrest and approved instrument demand without reasonable grounds; (2) delayed notification of the right to counsel; (3) failure to facilitate access to counsel at the roadside and counsel of choice at the station; and (4) video recording of cell toilet use.

The court found one Charter breach—a nine-minute delay in informing the accused of his right to counsel—but admitted the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that exclusion would harm the administration of justice more than admission.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with impaired care and control of an automobile and over 80 while having care and control of an automobile arising from an incident on February 16, 2018.

The Crown alleged the accused was observed driving erratically on Highway 401 during rush hour, leading to a traffic stop where the officer observed signs of impairment including the odour of alcohol, dilated pupils, and bloodshot eyes.

The accused was arrested and provided with Duty Counsel at the station.

The accused subsequently requested to call his own lawyer, which request was denied by the breath technician.

The court found no breach of Charter section 10(b) rights based on the accused's concession that he had no issue with the advice given by Duty Counsel, despite his discomfort speaking with a stranger.

The breath test readings were 152 and 149.

The court found the accused guilty of over 80 but not guilty of impaired driving, finding the indicia of impairment minimal and insufficient to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was sentenced to a $1,000 fine with one year to pay and a one-year driving prohibition.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving over 80 on March 16, 2017.

By January 9, 2019, nearly 22 months later, the trial had not been completed.

The defendant applied to stay the proceedings on the basis that section 11(b) Charter rights (right to trial within a reasonable time) had been violated.

The court found that while the total delay was 21.8 months, after accounting for non-mitigable delay caused by a discrete event (Crown counsel's unavailability on the first trial date), the net delay was approximately 18.8 to 19.8 months, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court found no legitimate defence delay and determined that the Crown failed to adequately mitigate delays caused by the discrete event.

The proceedings were stayed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking to exclude breath test results and physical observations of impairment.

The accused alleged violations of sections 7, 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found that while the officer lacked subjective reasonable grounds to believe the accused was impaired at the time of arrest, objectively reasonable grounds existed.

The court also found no breach of sections 7, 10(a), or 10(b).

Under section 24(2) analysis, the court admitted the breath test evidence, finding that while the Charter violation was serious, the impact on the accused's rights was minimal and society's interest in adjudication on the merits strongly favoured admission.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and care and control of a vehicle while having consumed an illegal amount of alcohol contrary to sections 253(1)(a) and 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused challenged the charges on Charter grounds, alleging violations of sections 7, 8, and 10(b).

The court found that the investigating officer had reasonable and probable grounds to believe the accused was guilty of impaired driving based on observations at the accident scene.

The court convicted the accused of impaired driving under section 253(1)(a) but dismissed the care and control charge under section 253(1)(b) because the second breath sample was taken outside the permissible two-hour period, depriving the Crown of statutory presumptions.

The court rejected all Charter breach allegations.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The accused sought to exclude breath test results pursuant to section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing that the police officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to demand an approved instrument test.

The court found that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds based on the totality of circumstances, including the vehicle's location on the highway shoulder at 3:13 a.m., the accused urinating behind the vehicle, the odour of alcohol, red and watery eyes, and the accused's admission of consuming two beers.

The court also found that the breath tests were conducted as soon as practicable within 65 minutes of the stop.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood on July 20, 2014 in Milton, Ontario.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The accused sought to exclude evidence pursuant to section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds for arrest and the breath demand.

The court found the police had reasonable and probable grounds based on dispatch information regarding erratic driving, observations of the vehicle's conduct, and signs of impairment observed during the traffic stop.

The court also found the breath tests were conducted as soon as practicable.

The accused was convicted on both counts based on evidence of poor driving, observations of impairment indicators, and breath test results showing a blood alcohol concentration of 140 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while his blood alcohol content was over 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown withdrew the impairment count and proceeded on the over 80 charge.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of the arrest, arguing the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds.

The court found that while the officer had subjective grounds for arrest, an objective person in the officer's position would not have concluded reasonable and probable grounds existed based on the totality of circumstances.

The court excluded the Certificate of Analysis as evidence under the Charter exclusion remedy, resulting in acquittal.

The accused was charged with failing to comply with an approved screening device (ASD) demand contrary to section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The accused was stopped for suspicious driving behaviour in the early morning hours.

Officers observed signs of alcohol consumption and administered an ASD demand.

After eight attempts over approximately thirteen minutes, the accused failed to provide a suitable breath sample.

The defence argued the Crown failed to prove the required mens rea of wilful intentional refusal.

The court found the accused intentionally failed to provide a suitable sample, having engaged in a course of conduct designed to avoid police detection of drinking and driving, including using mouthwash to mask the odour of alcohol on his breath.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit and impaired driving contrary to sections 253(a) and (b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown's evidence established that the accused was found in a vehicle stuck in snow in a private driveway with signs of impairment.

The defence conceded that all technical requirements of both charges were met and raised the defence of necessity, arguing the accused drove while impaired to locate and assist an intoxicated co-worker who had left the cabin in cold weather.

The court found no air of reality to the necessity defence, as there was no imminent peril, reasonable alternatives existed (such as walking), and the harm of impaired driving outweighed any speculative harm to the co-worker.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with impaired care and control, operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 7, 8, 9, 10(b), 11(e), and seeking remedies under sections 24(1) and 24(2).

The court found that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest for impaired driving and that the right to counsel was not violated.

However, the court found that the accused's detention for approximately 36 hours was arbitrary and unjustified under section 9 of the Charter.

The court granted a stay of proceedings as the appropriate remedy, finding that the cumulative effect of the detention duration and aggravating circumstances, combined with the absence of any explanation for the detention despite the accused's parents being present and willing to take him home, undermined the integrity of the judicial process.

The accused was charged with impaired operation and drive over 80 milligrams.

The Crown alleged the accused was observed driving erratically in the early morning hours near a bar in Toronto's Entertainment District, exhibiting signs of impairment including bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and poor coordination.

The accused was arrested and provided breath samples showing 133 mgs per 100 millilitres of blood.

The accused testified he had consumed only 3-4 shots of vodka and attributed his appearance and behavior to fatigue and nervousness rather than alcohol impairment.

The court found the officer had reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest and breath demand, the Intoxilyzer was functioning properly, and the Crown proved impairment beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was convicted on both charges.

The accused was charged with impaired operation and driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg.

The accused challenged the reliability of the Intoxilyzer results, arguing the machine had previously registered diagnostic failures, and alleged a breach of section 8 of the Charter on the basis that the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds for the breath demand.

The court rejected both arguments, finding the Intoxilyzer was in proper working order and the officer had sufficient grounds based on the accused's poor driving and physical indicia of impairment.

The accused was found guilty of both offences.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol level above the legal limit.

The trial addressed multiple Charter issues including identification of the vehicle, reasonable grounds for stop and arrest, right to counsel advice, and timing of breath demand and testing.

The court found the vehicle was properly identified, reasonable grounds existed for the stop and arrest, no Charter breaches occurred regarding right to counsel advice despite language difficulties, and the breath demand and testing complied with statutory requirements.

The Crown proved both charges beyond a reasonable doubt based on credible evidence of erratic driving, physical impairment indicators, and breath test results showing blood alcohol concentration well above the legal limit.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction acquittal on a charge of operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit.

The respondent argued the appeal was not properly constituted because the notice of appeal had not been served within the required time.

The court considered whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal where service of the notice of appeal occurred after the prescribed period and the Crown sought retroactive validation of the service.

Applying authorities governing extension of time and service requirements, the court held that service out of time could not be ratified nunc pro tunc and that proper service is a prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction.

As the Crown had not obtained an order extending time prior to service and failed to justify the delay under the applicable factors, the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The accused was charged with impaired driving contrary to section 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mgs. per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The charges arose from a motor vehicle stop on January 17, 2011 in Sioux Lookout, Ontario.

The court found the accused guilty on both charges based on evidence of impaired driving indicators and breath sample analysis showing blood alcohol levels of 129 mgs. and 125 mgs. per 100 millilitres of blood.

The court rejected the accused's explanations for her behaviour and found no Charter breach regarding detention or the taking of breath samples.