David M. Stone

The accused was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle after consuming alcohol in excess of the legal limit on December 1, 2013.

The Crown sought to prove the blood alcohol content through hospital records and expert evidence.

The court admitted the hospital records as business records under section 30 of the Canada Evidence Act and found the blood alcohol analysis reliable and admissible.

However, the Crown failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the driver of the vehicle involved in the collision.

The accused was acquitted on the basis of identity despite the blood alcohol content being well over the legal limit.

The Crown applied to adduce evidence under s. 540(7) of the Criminal Code at a preliminary inquiry for a second degree murder charge.

The Crown sought to introduce various evidence including photographs, statements from ambulance attendants, victim statements to her lawyer and mother, video and audio recordings, cell phone records and text messages, forensic reports, and pathology reports.

The defence opposed admission of the victim's statements to her lawyer and mother.

The court admitted most of the Crown's proposed evidence, finding it credible and trustworthy under the s. 540(7) threshold.

The court also admitted the victim's statements to her mother and lawyer, finding they met the threshold test and that the witnesses had sufficient reliability despite potential credibility issues.

The applicant brought a Charter application alleging an infringement of his right to trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1).

The applicant was charged with impaired driving offences in July 2012, with the trial initially scheduled for May 30, 2013, and subsequently adjourned to October 4, 2013.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the total delay of approximately 14 months and 19 days exceeded Morin guidelines, the defence counsel's actions in seeking the adjournment on May 30, 2013, were the primary cause of the delay.

The court found that the defence failed to take reasonable steps to prepare despite having full disclosure and that the adjournment appeared to be a tactical decision to establish a s. 11(b) application rather than a genuine necessity.