Danielle Guido

The accused was charged with possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

He brought a Charter application alleging excessive force during his arrest, failure to promptly advise him of the reasons for his arrest, unlawful search of his satchel, and failure to record the arrest.

The court dismissed the Charter application, finding the police officers' evidence credible that the accused resisted arrest, justifying the force used and the delay in advising him of the reasons.

The search of the satchel was deemed a lawful search incident to arrest.

On the trial of the charge, the court rejected the accused's testimony, finding he was in possession of the satchel containing 94.98 grams of fentanyl.

Relying on expert evidence, the court concluded the fentanyl was possessed for the purpose of trafficking and found the accused guilty.

The accused was sentenced for extortion, pointing a firearm, and using a firearm.

After applying enhanced credit for 140 days of pre-sentence custody, the court imposed a sentence of two years less a day, followed by one year of probation.

The court also imposed a lifetime weapons prohibition under s. 109 of the Criminal Code, a DNA order, and waived the victim surcharge.

The accused, D.B., was charged with multiple counts of sexual assault, robbery, and other offenses involving two complainants, L.G. and E.H., on a single indictment.

D.B. applied to sever the charges relating to L.G. from those relating to E.H. and also sought to admit evidence under s. 276 of the Criminal Code regarding L.G.'s past willing sexual services for drug debts.

The court granted the severance application, finding insufficient factual nexus between the incidents and a significant risk of propensity reasoning by the jury.

It also determined that the Crown's similar fact evidence application was unlikely to succeed.

The s. 276 application was dismissed, as the proposed evidence was deemed inadmissible under s. 276(1) and (2) of the Criminal Code, serving no purpose other than to support an inference of past consent, which is prohibited.

The defendant was convicted after trial of agreeing with a person to commit sexual interference with a child under 16 years of age via telecommunication, contrary to s.172.2(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proceeded by summary conviction.

The defendant was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment minus 48 days pre-sentence custody credit, resulting in approximately 10.4 months imprisonment, followed by a 2-year probation order.

The court rejected the defendant's constitutional challenges to the mandatory minimum penalty of 6 months imprisonment, finding that a fit and proportionate sentence materially exceeded the minimum and rendered the constitutional issues moot.

The applicant sought to stay proceedings for the offence of making an arrangement with a person to commit a sexual offence under section 172.2(2) of the Criminal Code, alleging entrapment by a police officer.

The applicant argued that the officer randomly tested his virtue without reasonable suspicion and alternatively that the officer induced him to commit the offence by exploiting his vulnerable state.

The court dismissed the application, finding that reasonable suspicion developed during the investigation through legitimate investigative steps, that the officer was engaged in a bona fide inquiry targeting a known hub for online sexual predators, and that there was no inducement or pressure applied to the applicant.

The accused was charged with making an arrangement with a person to commit sexual interference with a child under 16 years of age contrary to section 172.2(2) of the Criminal Code.

The accused posted an advertisement on Craigslist seeking a sexual encounter and communicated with an undercover police officer posing as a woman named Sara Kristoff.

The accused arranged to meet the officer and engage in sexual activity with both the officer and her purported 3-year-old daughter.

The accused's defence was that he was engaged in role play and fantasy and never intended to actually commit the offence.

The court rejected the accused's evidence as patently incredible and found him guilty based on the explicit communications demonstrating his clear intention to arrange a sexual encounter with the child.

Michael Casey was charged with aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and possession of a weapon.

The central issue at trial was the identification of the assailant.

The victim, Michael Greer, identified Casey, but his testimony was found to be unreliable due to significant intoxication during the incident, memory issues, inconsistent descriptions of the assailant over time, and attempts to avoid testifying or recant his statement for monetary gain.

The court highlighted the inherent frailties of identification evidence, particularly in-dock identification, and found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Casey was the perpetrator.

Casey was acquitted on all counts.

The Attorney General of Canada, on behalf of the United States, sought an order for the committal for extradition of Jhoan Manuel Ciprian-Guzman for the Canadian offence of possession of child pornography.

Guzman opposed the application and brought a cross-application for a stay of proceedings, arguing that the anticipated prison conditions in Florida would violate his Charter rights.

The court found that the test for committal was met and dismissed Guzman's cross-application, holding that the extradition judge's jurisdiction to consider Charter issues is limited to the fairness and integrity of the committal hearing itself, not the potential future treatment or punishment in the requesting state, which falls under the Minister of Justice's purview.