Derek Gravesande

The accused, Jordette Wilson, brought an application under section 11(b) of the Charter, alleging a violation of her right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay from charge to trial date was nearly three years, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice.

The court analyzed various periods of delay, attributing some to the COVID-19 pandemic and some to defence actions (failure to retain counsel, counsel availability).

A significant portion of the delay was found to be caused by the Crown's late disclosure of material evidence and misinformation regarding the identity of the arresting officer, which led to a breakdown in the solicitor-client relationship and the need for new counsel.

The court found that the Crown failed to establish a basis to find the excess delay reasonable, concluding that the accused's s.11(b) Charter rights were violated, and granted a stay of proceedings.

This criminal trial concerned a sexual assault charge against Diego Doncel, where the central issue was the credibility and reliability of the complainant, R.W., a cognitively disabled individual.

The court addressed the assessment of evidence from witnesses with cognitive deficits, the use of a communication intermediary, and the admissibility of spontaneous utterances.

Despite finding the complainant truthful, the court identified significant inconsistencies in her testimony, particularly during cross-examination, which could not be resolved due to her cognitive limitations.

The spontaneous utterances to her father were deemed inadmissible hearsay.

Ultimately, the Crown failed to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to an acquittal.

This decision addresses a capacity inquiry under section 16 of the Canada Evidence Act regarding a complainant with a severe mental disability in a sexual assault trial.

The defence challenged the complainant's capacity to testify.

The court found that while the complainant did not understand the nature of an oath or solemn affirmation, she was able to communicate the evidence and was therefore competent to testify on promising to tell the truth.

The ruling emphasizes that deficiencies in perception and recollection are matters of weight for the trier of fact, not competence, provided a basic ability to perceive, remember, and communicate exists.

The accused, Diego Doncel, charged with sexual assault, applied under s. 278.3 of the Criminal Code for production of third-party records relating to the complainant, R.W. The application was opposed by the Crown and complainant.

Following a two-stage Mills regime analysis, the court ordered a specific 2010 psychological assessment report from Surrey Place to be disclosed to the defence, finding it relevant to the complainant's capacity to testify and credibility/reliability.

Disclosure was subject to redactions and a non-disclosure condition.

Other requested records from CAMH and Toronto Western Hospital were deemed not relevant or too dated and were not disclosed.

The accused, Diego Doncel, applied under section 278.3 of the Criminal Code for production of various third-party records relating to the complainant, R.W., in a sexual assault case.

R.W. has a severe mental disability.

The court ordered a narrow subset of records (formal assessments or diagnostic evaluations of R.W.'s cognitive functioning) to be produced for judicial review, finding them likely relevant to R.W.'s testimonial competence and credibility/reliability at trial.

The application for broader medical/therapeutic records and records related to an unrelated prior criminal charge involving R.W. (from police and Crown) was denied, as these did not meet the "likely relevant" threshold or were deemed speculative.

The court also declined to order disclosure of identifying details from the unrelated charge to facilitate public record searches.

The applicant, convicted of sexual assault, sought an order staying his obligation to comply with Christopher's Law (Sex Offender Registry) pending the determination of his appeal.

The Crown opposed, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction to stay provincial legislation.

The court found that Christopher's Law mandates compliance automatically upon conviction, without requiring a court order, and therefore the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to stay this collateral consequence of a conviction, distinguishing it from stays of court-imposed orders.

The application was dismissed.

Following a six-day trial, the defendant was found guilty of sexual assault and sentenced to a conditional sentence of imprisonment.

The defendant, a middle-aged crisis counselling caseworker, had sexually assaulted a vulnerable teenage girl under his care by touching her and making sexualized comments.

The court rejected the defendant's request for an absolute discharge and the Crown's request for 90 days incarceration plus probation.

Instead, the court imposed a 9-month conditional sentence order with strict house arrest conditions for the first six months, followed by 15 months of probation, along with mandatory DNA collection and sex offender registration for 10 years.

The court considered the impact of COVID-19 on institutional conditions in determining to impose a conditional sentence rather than institutional imprisonment.

The defendant, a caseworker at a children's centre, was charged with sexual assault, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual interference against a fourteen or fifteen-year-old female client.

The allegations arose from incidents occurring one to two years prior to reporting.

The trial focused on credibility and reliability of witnesses.

The court found the complainant credible despite numerous discrepancies in peripheral details.

The court acquitted the defendant of invitation to sexual touching regarding the arcade hug incident, finding insufficient evidence of sexual intent.

However, the court convicted the defendant of sexual assault for the car wash incident, where the defendant commented on the complainant's body and placed his hands around her waist for an extended period.

The court acquitted the defendant of sexual interference.

The defendant was charged with refusing to provide a breath sample contrary to section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged that a peace officer made a valid demand for a breath sample at a RIDE check, which the defendant refused.

The court found that the Crown failed to establish a valid demand because the officer did not have reasonable grounds to suspect the defendant had alcohol in her body.

The officer's evidence that he smelled alcohol on the defendant's breath was not credible, particularly given conflicting testimony about when he detected the odour, the defendant's clear denial of drinking, and the early morning hour (6:41 AM on a Sunday).

The court acquitted the defendant.

The accused was charged with sexual assault contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code and sexual exploitation contrary to section 153 of the Criminal Code.

The sexual exploitation charge was withdrawn by the Crown.

The trial involved allegations that the accused, a 51-year-old kitchen preparation cook at Red Lobster, sexually assaulted a 16-17-year-old co-op student on multiple occasions between April and May 2016.

The Crown's case relied primarily on the complainant's testimony regarding four discrete incidents in the dry storage room and other physical contact in the workplace.

The defence challenged the complainant's credibility and reliability, citing significant inconsistencies between her initial statement to the employer, her statements to police, and her trial testimony.

The court found that while the accused may have committed the alleged assaults, the Crown failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt due to material inconsistencies and omissions in the complainant's evidence.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation and refusal to provide a breath sample following a motor vehicle incident on March 17, 2011.

The Crown alleged the defendant drove erratically on Highway 427, struck a curb, and entered a residential driveway.

Police responded to a 911 call, attended the residence, and observed signs of impairment.

The defendant was arrested and taken to the police station where she made numerous attempts to provide breath samples but failed to provide a suitable second sample.

The defendant challenged the police entry into her home and the validity of the breath demand.

The court found no Charter breaches, that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest, that the defendant was impaired, and that she intentionally failed to provide suitable breath samples.