Cecilia Fearon-Forbes

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, despite the delay being below the Jordan ceiling.

The application judge erred by assessing the reasonableness of the delay against a hypothetical scenario where judicial vacancies were filled, rather than the actual systemic circumstances.

The Court of Appeal clarified that the constitutional yardstick for below-ceiling delays is not an ideal state but the real-world conditions, and that delays due to judicial vacancies, while concerning, are not per se "unreasonable" under s. 11(b) if the overall delay remains presumptively reasonable.

The appeal was granted, the stay set aside, and a new trial ordered.

This sentencing decision addresses whether "Duncan credit" for harsh pre-trial custody conditions can reduce a sentence below a mandatory minimum, specifically for robbery with a firearm.

The court found that the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in *R. v. Hilbach* undermined the rationale for applying Duncan credit to reduce mandatory minimum sentences.

The court distinguished Duncan credit as a mitigating factor from "Summers credit" (statutory pre-sentence custody credit), concluding that mitigating factors cannot reduce a sentence below a constitutional mandatory minimum.

The defendant was sentenced to the mandatory minimum of 5 years imprisonment for robbery with a firearm, with credit for pre-trial custody.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for sexual assault and his sentence of a nine-month conditional sentence followed by 15 months of probation.

The offences involved a 14 or 15-year-old former counselling client.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility, applying the principles in W.(D.), and finding the conduct amounted to sexual assault.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility findings reasonable and his application of the law correct.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was not demonstrably unfit and a discharge was contrary to the public interest.

The applicant, convicted of sexual assault, sought an order staying his obligation to comply with Christopher's Law (Sex Offender Registry) pending the determination of his appeal.

The Crown opposed, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction to stay provincial legislation.

The court found that Christopher's Law mandates compliance automatically upon conviction, without requiring a court order, and therefore the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to stay this collateral consequence of a conviction, distinguishing it from stays of court-imposed orders.

The application was dismissed.

Following a six-day trial, the defendant was found guilty of sexual assault and sentenced to a conditional sentence of imprisonment.

The defendant, a middle-aged crisis counselling caseworker, had sexually assaulted a vulnerable teenage girl under his care by touching her and making sexualized comments.

The court rejected the defendant's request for an absolute discharge and the Crown's request for 90 days incarceration plus probation.

Instead, the court imposed a 9-month conditional sentence order with strict house arrest conditions for the first six months, followed by 15 months of probation, along with mandatory DNA collection and sex offender registration for 10 years.

The court considered the impact of COVID-19 on institutional conditions in determining to impose a conditional sentence rather than institutional imprisonment.

The defendant, a caseworker at a children's centre, was charged with sexual assault, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual interference against a fourteen or fifteen-year-old female client.

The allegations arose from incidents occurring one to two years prior to reporting.

The trial focused on credibility and reliability of witnesses.

The court found the complainant credible despite numerous discrepancies in peripheral details.

The court acquitted the defendant of invitation to sexual touching regarding the arcade hug incident, finding insufficient evidence of sexual intent.

However, the court convicted the defendant of sexual assault for the car wash incident, where the defendant commented on the complainant's body and placed his hands around her waist for an extended period.

The court acquitted the defendant of sexual interference.

The applicant, charged with aggravated assault, brought a Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings based on alleged breaches of her section 8 and 10 rights.

The court found that a police officer conducted an unreasonable strip search in the field without a caution, violating section 8.

The court also found a section 10(b) breach when a portion of the applicant's telephone call with duty counsel was inadvertently recorded.

However, the court dismissed the remaining Charter claims, including the allegation that videotaping the applicant using the toilet in a holding cell violated section 8.

The court declined to order a stay of proceedings, instead excluding utterances made during the search and the recorded portions of the call with counsel under section 24(2).

The accused was charged with sexual assault contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code and sexual exploitation contrary to section 153 of the Criminal Code.

The sexual exploitation charge was withdrawn by the Crown.

The trial involved allegations that the accused, a 51-year-old kitchen preparation cook at Red Lobster, sexually assaulted a 16-17-year-old co-op student on multiple occasions between April and May 2016.

The Crown's case relied primarily on the complainant's testimony regarding four discrete incidents in the dry storage room and other physical contact in the workplace.

The defence challenged the complainant's credibility and reliability, citing significant inconsistencies between her initial statement to the employer, her statements to police, and her trial testimony.

The court found that while the accused may have committed the alleged assaults, the Crown failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt due to material inconsistencies and omissions in the complainant's evidence.

The Crown sought to introduce an affidavit from a Program Support Officer of Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada as evidence in a trial for an alleged violation of section 52(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

The defendant objected to the admissibility of the affidavit on hearsay grounds and for lack of proper notice under section 28 of the Canada Evidence Act.

The court found that while the affidavit itself was admissible under section 26(2) of the Canada Evidence Act, certain portions containing copies of government records (exhibits A through D) were inadmissible due to failure to comply with section 28 notice requirements.

The applicant moved for an extension of time to appeal his convictions for mischief and theft, arguing his guilty pleas were uninformed because his lawyer failed to advise him of the immigration consequences.

The applicant, a permanent resident, faced a mandatory deportation order under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act due to the mischief conviction.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, finding the applicant had an arguable case that his plea was not informed and that his delay in appealing was reasonably explained by his recent schizophrenia diagnosis and the delayed receipt of the deportation notice.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding that his debt to the respondent survived his discharge from bankruptcy due to a breach of trust.

The trial judge found the appellant engaged in reprehensible conduct, including filing false declarations that subcontractors had been paid, with the intent to deceive.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the appellant failed to account for project expenses and that his conduct exhibited a significant element of dishonesty, satisfying the requirements of s. 178.1(d) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The appeal was dismissed.