Deryk Aubrey Gravesande

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, despite the delay being below the Jordan ceiling.

The application judge erred by assessing the reasonableness of the delay against a hypothetical scenario where judicial vacancies were filled, rather than the actual systemic circumstances.

The Court of Appeal clarified that the constitutional yardstick for below-ceiling delays is not an ideal state but the real-world conditions, and that delays due to judicial vacancies, while concerning, are not per se "unreasonable" under s. 11(b) if the overall delay remains presumptively reasonable.

The appeal was granted, the stay set aside, and a new trial ordered.

Jeremie Naidoo, a court clerk, was charged with two counts of attempting to obstruct justice and one count of breach of trust by a public official after allegedly asking a colleague not to enter his impaired driving charges into the court's tracking system.

The court found that while the actus reus for obstructing justice was established, there was reasonable doubt regarding the mens rea for both charges, particularly concerning his intent to use his public office for personal benefit or to wilfully obstruct justice, given his open discussions with a Crown Attorney.

Consequently, Naidoo was found not guilty on all counts.

Following a mistrial caused by an unforeseen disruption, the court addressed whether prior evidentiary rulings would apply to the new trial.

The judge held that the earlier rulings would cross-apply, consistent with the governing legislation.

The court noted that the admissibility ruling concerning a bankrupt’s statement might require reconsideration depending on the outcome of the pending Supreme Court of Canada decision in R. v. Nedelcu.

The judge also indicated that the trial judge at the new trial should review the Crown’s proposed questions regarding prior discreditable conduct and post‑offence conduct to ensure the rulings are applied efficiently and do not disrupt the flow of evidence before the jury.

Pre‑trial evidentiary ruling in a fraud prosecution concerning whether the Crown could introduce evidence of prior dealings between the accused and a financial brokerage, as well as alleged post‑offence conduct.

The Crown sought to admit background facts relating to the accused’s business relationship with the brokerage, evidence of financial difficulties suggesting motive, and alleged threatening conduct.

The court applied the probative value versus prejudicial effect analysis governing prior discreditable conduct and narrative evidence.

Background evidence concerning the accused’s relationship with the brokerage and events surrounding a promotional dinner attended by the complainant was admitted, as it was relevant to the complainant’s understanding of the accused’s representations.

Evidence of a prior debt, certain customer complaints, and an alleged threat was excluded or restricted due to limited probative value and significant risk of moral prejudice.