Bonnie J. Wein

The applicants sought equitable relief and rectification of a second mortgage registered against a property.

Due to a Land Titles office error during conversion from the Registry System, the property owner's name was incorrectly recorded on three of four property identification numbers (PINs), leading to the applicants' mortgage being registered against only one PIN.

The Minister of National Revenue (NR), a subsequent lienholder, argued that the applicants should pursue other remedies like suing their lawyer or claiming against the Land Titles Assurance Fund.

The court found a clear common intention for the mortgage to cover the entire property and granted the equitable relief and rectification, allowing the applicants to enforce their mortgage against all four parcels, thereby maintaining their priority over NR's later-registered liens.

The accused was convicted following a jury trial of possession of prohibited or restricted firearms with readily accessible ammunition and careless storage of firearms and ammunition after police discovered three handguns and numerous long guns in a farmhouse used for drug trafficking activity.

The court found the accused had been wilfully blind to the presence of the handguns stored in a safe brought into the home by his stepson and had facilitated the dangerous environment by permitting drug use and trafficking in the residence.

Although the accused did not personally handle the handguns and his long guns were generally stored properly, the court emphasized the serious risks created by the combination of drugs and firearms.

Credit was granted for lengthy pre‑trial house arrest conditions.

A custodial sentence was imposed to meet the objectives of denunciation and deterrence.

The plaintiff brought a solicitor’s negligence action alleging that his former lawyer failed to properly advise him of settlement offers and improperly accepted a settlement without instructions in litigation arising from a mortgage dispute.

The court conducted a credibility assessment regarding whether the plaintiff was present during a court‑brokered settlement discussion and whether the solicitor acted on valid instructions when accepting a later settlement.

The court found that the plaintiff had been present and had rejected the earlier settlement offer despite legal advice to accept it.

The court further found that the solicitor accepted the later settlement based on clear instructions before the plaintiff attempted to withdraw them.

In any event, the plaintiff failed to establish any compensable loss resulting from the alleged negligence.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside an order dismissing its construction lien action for failure to set the action down for trial within the time required under the Construction Lien Act.

The delay resulted from failures by the plaintiff’s in‑house counsel, who had misinformed the plaintiff about the status of the case.

The defendant opposed restoration of the action, arguing prejudice due to the death of a key witness and lack of merit in the plaintiff’s claim.

The court held that dismissal orders may be set aside where a fair trial remains possible and no substantial prejudice arises from delay.

Finding that the dispute would primarily turn on expert evidence and that documentary records could substitute for the deceased witness’s testimony, the court concluded that the defendant would not suffer irreparable prejudice and restored the action.

The plaintiff brought an undefended action seeking damages after her checked luggage went missing during international air travel from Canada to Togo.

She claimed extensive expenses, medical costs, emotional distress, and punitive damages following delays in recovering the baggage.

The court held that liability for lost or delayed baggage in international carriage by air is governed by the Montreal Convention, 1999, incorporated into Canadian law by the Carriage by Air Act, which limits recovery to 1,000 Special Drawing Rights unless additional insurance was purchased.

Claims for pain and suffering, emotional distress, and punitive damages were barred by the Convention.

The court awarded the capped compensation amount for delayed baggage together with reimbursement of an improperly charged airline upgrade fee.

The plaintiff credit card issuer sued to recover outstanding balances on a Home Depot credit card account.

The primary cardholder admitted the underlying purchases but argued that interest should be limited to the statutory rate under the Courts of Justice Act rather than the contractual rate.

The secondary defendant disputed liability, claiming he had not been proven to be a co-applicant or authorized cardholder.

The court found that circumstantial evidence established he was a secondary cardholder and jointly liable.

The court also held that, absent exceptional circumstances, contractual interest rates govern both pre‑ and post‑judgment interest, rejecting the request to apply the lower statutory rate.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking to exclude statements overheard by a border officer while the accused was speaking on a cell phone in an airport baggage area.

The defence argued that admission of the statements would infringe the accused’s privacy rights under ss. 7 and 8 of the Charter.

The court reviewed jurisprudence on expectations of privacy and investigative practices at border crossings.

It held that the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy when speaking on a cell phone in a public airport area where the conversation could be overheard.

The application to exclude the statements was dismissed and the evidence was ruled admissible at trial.

In a matrimonial proceeding involving a lodge business subject to a court‑appointed receivership, the respondent husband moved to remove the receiver, stay payments, and seek contempt findings against the applicant wife.

The wife cross‑applied for transfer of the property into her name and other interim relief including support.

The court held that removal of a receiver requires strong evidence of bad faith or misconduct and found no basis to discharge the receiver despite disputes over expenditures and alleged bias.

The court declined to transfer ownership of the property or make certain enforcement orders but granted modest interim spousal support and ordered financial disclosure.

Several ancillary requests, including contempt findings and other relief, were denied pending trial.

The applicant sought exclusion of drug evidence discovered during a warrantless vehicle search, alleging breaches of ss. 8, 9, and 10 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Police stopped the vehicle after observing evasive driving in a neighbourhood known for drug activity and seeing the driver make movements inside the car.

The court held that the circumstances amounted only to suspicion and did not provide reasonable grounds to arrest or search.

Additional questioning after the applicant requested counsel constituted further Charter breaches.

Applying the s. 24(2) framework, the court excluded the evidence and dismissed the trafficking charge.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding 80 mg, arguing that breath samples were invalid because the breath technician failed to wait 17 minutes after an invalid sample and that the trial judge improperly relied on the statutory presumption of accuracy under s. 258(1)(g) of the Criminal Code when the Crown had also called the technician to testify viva voce.

The appeal court held that the trial judge did not err in accepting the technician’s evidence that a waiting period was unnecessary where the invalid sample resulted from inadequate blowing rather than residual mouth alcohol.

The court further held that the Crown was not barred from relying on the certificate and presumption of accuracy merely because the technician also testified.

In the absence of evidence to the contrary raising doubt about the reliability of the readings, the presumption applied.

The conviction for driving over 80 mg was therefore upheld.

In a criminal trial arising from a shooting at a house party, the complainant initially identified the accused as the shooter but later refused to confirm the identification at trial.

The Crown sought to admit five prior statements made to police, including statements at the scene, at hospital, a hospital photo identification, a later written statement, and a formal photo line-up.

Applying the principled exception to the hearsay rule under R. v. KGB and subsequent jurisprudence, the court found the necessity requirement satisfied because the witness recanted or claimed lack of memory.

The court held that threshold reliability was met, particularly due to the videotaped photo line-up and the opportunity for meaningful cross-examination at trial.

The prior formal statement and photo line-up were admitted as substantive evidence, while earlier statements were admitted to provide contextual background.

The appellant appealed a conviction for common assault and the sentence imposed following a trial in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appellant argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, failed to address inconsistencies between the complainant and a police witness, and inadequately explained the rejection of the appellant’s evidence.

The summary conviction appeal court held that the trial judge properly assessed the evidence and reasonably relied on the independent observations of a police officer who witnessed the incident.

The court found that the trial judge applied the correct standard of proof consistent with the framework in R. v. W.D. and made no error in principle in sentencing.

The appeal from both conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction decision dismissing a charge of assault with a weapon after the trial judge granted a directed verdict at the close of the Crown’s case.

The trial judge applied the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt rather than the proper test for a directed verdict.

Applying the test from U.S.A. v. Shephard, the appeal court held that the correct inquiry was whether there was any evidence upon which a reasonable jury properly instructed could return a verdict of guilty.

The record contained substantial circumstantial evidence identifying the respondent as the assailant, including possession of a knife with the victim’s blood and injuries consistent with the fight.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered before a different justice.

Following a mistrial caused by an unforeseen disruption, the court addressed whether prior evidentiary rulings would apply to the new trial.

The judge held that the earlier rulings would cross-apply, consistent with the governing legislation.

The court noted that the admissibility ruling concerning a bankrupt’s statement might require reconsideration depending on the outcome of the pending Supreme Court of Canada decision in R. v. Nedelcu.

The judge also indicated that the trial judge at the new trial should review the Crown’s proposed questions regarding prior discreditable conduct and post‑offence conduct to ensure the rulings are applied efficiently and do not disrupt the flow of evidence before the jury.

The accused was sentenced following a jury conviction for trafficking nearly three kilograms of cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime exceeding $54,000.

Wiretap evidence demonstrated the accused’s ongoing and significant role in a multi‑kilogram cocaine distribution network, including negotiating price, quantity, and delivery.

Although the accused had no relevant criminal record and presented numerous mitigating personal circumstances, the court emphasized the seriousness of multi‑kilogram cocaine trafficking and the need for general deterrence.

Relying on Ontario appellate authorities establishing higher sentencing ranges for large‑scale cocaine trafficking, the court concluded that a penitentiary term within the 8–10 year range was appropriate.

The self-represented plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment alleging Charter breaches and slander arising from a private peace bond complaint under s. 810 of the Criminal Code.

The defendant effectively brought a cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the action.

The court held that statements made in court proceedings are privileged and cannot ground a slander claim, and that the plaintiff’s Charter claims were legally unfounded because he had appeared by summons and was never detained or imprisoned.

The court further held that legal fees incurred in the prior criminal peace bond proceeding could not be recovered through a separate civil action and that costs should have been addressed by the judge presiding over the original matter.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the action.

Pre‑trial evidentiary ruling in a fraud prosecution concerning whether the Crown could introduce evidence of prior dealings between the accused and a financial brokerage, as well as alleged post‑offence conduct.

The Crown sought to admit background facts relating to the accused’s business relationship with the brokerage, evidence of financial difficulties suggesting motive, and alleged threatening conduct.

The court applied the probative value versus prejudicial effect analysis governing prior discreditable conduct and narrative evidence.

Background evidence concerning the accused’s relationship with the brokerage and events surrounding a promotional dinner attended by the complainant was admitted, as it was relevant to the complainant’s understanding of the accused’s representations.

Evidence of a prior debt, certain customer complaints, and an alleged threat was excluded or restricted due to limited probative value and significant risk of moral prejudice.

In a criminal fraud prosecution, the Crown sought to introduce statements the accused made under oath during an examination in bankruptcy proceedings under s. 161 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The court considered the scope of s. 13 of the Charter and the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. v. Henry governing the use of prior testimony.

The court held that testimony given in a prior proceeding cannot be used by the Crown as part of its case in chief where it constitutes prior testimony protected by s. 13.

However, because the bankruptcy was voluntarily initiated and the statements were not legally compelled, the prior testimony could be used to cross-examine the accused if she chose to testify at trial.

The accused applied to challenge prospective jurors for cause under s. 638(1)(f) of the Criminal Code on the basis of potential lack of language competency in the language of trial.

The defence argued that the right to challenge jurors on language grounds exists independently of an order under s. 530 governing the language of trial and forms part of constitutional language rights.

The court held that juror language competency is primarily a component of the right to a fair trial and that s. 638(1)(f) operates in conjunction with a prior order under s. 530.

In the absence of such an order and without evidentiary foundation demonstrating an air of reality for the concern, the court found that the standard jury vetting process sufficiently ensures linguistic competency.

The application to challenge jurors for cause was therefore denied.

Following the defendant’s successful motion for summary judgment dismissing the action, the defendant sought partial indemnity costs totaling $27,176.08.

The plaintiff argued that each party should bear their own costs, citing the public interest nature of the claim concerning the rights of a disabled employee, her modest means, and proportionality concerns relative to the value of the claim.

The court held that the case did not raise issues of sufficient public policy importance to justify denying costs to the successful party.

However, the court found duplication of effort and excessive billing rates for work that could have been performed by junior counsel.

Costs were therefore reduced and fixed at $13,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST, payable within 12 months without interest.