N.J. Bridge

The accused was charged with first-degree murder after stabbing the victim 34 times in his basement.

The defence conceded the accused killed the victim but argued he was not criminally responsible (NCR) under s. 16 of the Criminal Code due to severe paranoid delusions and schizophrenia.

The court found the accused suffered from a disease of the mind but rejected the NCR defence, concluding the defence failed to prove the delusions caused the killing or rendered the accused incapable of knowing the act was morally wrong.

The court also excluded similar fact evidence of the accused's prior violence against women.

Finding a reasonable doubt on the element of forcible confinement required for first-degree murder, the court convicted the accused of second-degree murder.

The accused, Richard Pereira, charged with first-degree murder, brought a directed verdict application to reduce the charge to second-degree murder.

The court found sufficient evidence for first-degree murder based on forcible confinement under s. 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code, but insufficient evidence for planned and deliberate murder under s. 231(2).

The application was dismissed, and the charge of first-degree murder based on forcible confinement proceeded.

The offender was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder for the brutal stabbing of his estranged wife in her home.

The Crown sought a 20-year parole ineligibility period, while the defence sought 12 to 15 years.

The court considered the extreme brutality of the attack, the domestic context, and the offender's lack of remorse as aggravating factors.

Applying the Shropshire principles, the court set the parole ineligibility period at 17 years, the top end of the usual range for spousal murder.

The accused was tried for first-degree murder after the victim was found with 138 stab wounds.

During the trial, the defence sought to have the trial judge instruct the jury on self-defence and provocation, arguing that the victim may have attacked the accused first with a knife found at the scene.

The trial judge applied the air of reality test and concluded there was no evidential foundation for either defence, noting that the placement of the knife was staged and there was no evidence of the victim initiating an assault or provoking the accused.

The request to include the defences in the jury charge was denied.

The accused was charged with first-degree murder following the stabbing death of his estranged wife.

At the close of the Crown's case, the accused brought an application for a directed verdict, arguing there was insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation to go to the jury.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the accused's prior statements, motive, and post-offence conduct provided sufficient circumstantial evidence upon which a properly instructed jury could reasonably infer that the murder was planned and deliberate.

During a first-degree murder trial, the defence sought to admit a portion of a prior court transcript containing a judge's comments ordering an assessment of the accused's fitness to stand trial.

The defence argued the comments provided context to the accused's prior admissions of guilt.

The court ruled the judge's statements were inadmissible, finding they did not provide context to the accused's statements and that admitting them without the subsequent psychiatric assessment finding the accused fit to stand trial would mislead the jury.

During a murder trial, the Crown sought to admit statements made by the accused during a prior plea inquiry where a guilty plea was ultimately rejected by the court.

The Crown intended to use these statements to cross-examine the accused if the defence of duress was raised.

The court ruled that statements made during a rejected plea inquiry are inextricably linked to the aborted plea and are inadmissible, as admitting them would undermine trial fairness and have a chilling effect on plea negotiations.

The Crown sought a ruling on the admissibility of in-court statements made by the accused, Nelson Tayongtong, on two separate dates (March 11 and March 17, 2015).

The Defence opposed, arguing the statements were made to persons in authority, that the accused lacked an operating mind, or that their admission would lead to an unfair trial by revealing mental health issues.

The court found that the statements were not made to persons in authority, thus the confessions rule did not apply.

Even if it did, the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had an operating mind.

The court also determined that the statements could be redacted to avoid disclosing mental illness to the jury.

Consequently, the in-court statements were ruled admissible.

The accused, Iqbal Singh, was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder, two counts of attempted murder, aggravated assault, and unlawful confinement.

The court entered a judicial stay of proceedings for the aggravated assault and unlawful confinement charges, finding them subsumed by the attempted murder convictions.

The sentencing addressed the first-degree murder and two attempted murders.

The court considered the facts of the offences, the accused's circumstances, and extensive victim impact statements.

A joint submission on sentencing for the attempted murders was accepted, leading to a life sentence for murder and consecutive sentences for attempted murders.

The appellant appealed a conviction for common assault and the sentence imposed following a trial in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appellant argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, failed to address inconsistencies between the complainant and a police witness, and inadequately explained the rejection of the appellant’s evidence.

The summary conviction appeal court held that the trial judge properly assessed the evidence and reasonably relied on the independent observations of a police officer who witnessed the incident.

The court found that the trial judge applied the correct standard of proof consistent with the framework in R. v. W.D. and made no error in principle in sentencing.

The appeal from both conviction and sentence was dismissed.