C. Henderson

The Crown sought to admit evidence of the accused's other discreditable conduct, specifically the discovery of a handgun and unique ammunition in his car, in a first-degree murder trial where identity was a key issue.

The court applied the framework for admissibility of similar fact evidence, assessing probative value against prejudicial effect.

The court ruled that the evidence of the unique combination of ammunition found in the accused's car was admissible due to its high probative value in establishing identity, outweighing its prejudicial effect.

However, the evidence of the firearm itself was deemed inadmissible due to low probative value and higher prejudicial risk, unless the accused denied association with the ammunition.

The plaintiff, Mizen Holdings Corporation, initiated a subrogated action against the City of Toronto and Ontario Excavac Inc. (OE) for water losses during condominium construction, alleging negligence.

The City and OE issued third-party claims for contribution and indemnity against Mizen's contractors: YYZed Project Management, Otomic Contractors Ltd., and Shor-Cais Foundation Contractors (the "third parties").

The third parties moved for summary dismissal of these claims, arguing Mizen had no right to sue them due to contractual waivers, covenants to insure, and the anti-subrogation rule, which would, under the Giffels principle, bar the defendants' claims.

The court dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues for trial regarding the scope of the covenant to insure and concluding that the contractual waivers had not crystallized at the time of the losses.

The anti-subrogation rule was also found not to apply to uninsured losses or to prevent the defendants' claims in these circumstances, particularly where waivers were post-tort conduct.

The defendant, S.L., was found guilty of possessing child pornography.

Prior to sentencing, S.L. challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence for the offence.

The parties jointly submitted a conditional sentence of 10 months imprisonment.

The court found the mandatory minimum sentence violated s. 12 of the Charter, relying on R. v. John.

Considering the extreme nature of the child pornography, the defendant's first-offender status, low risk of re-offending, and severe medical condition (terminal cancer), the court acceded to the joint submission, imposing a 10-month conditional sentence with strict conditions, including house arrest, curfew, internet prohibitions, and ancillary orders like DNA submission and Sex Offender Registration.

The defendant, Regina Dos Santos, was charged with impaired driving, driving with an excess blood alcohol concentration (BAC), and two Highway Traffic Act offences.

The trial included a Charter application challenging the lawfulness of her arrest and the admissibility of breath test results.

The court found that while the police had reasonable grounds for arrest, the defendant's s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was violated due to the police's failure to address her obvious language difficulties, leading to the exclusion of the breath test evidence.

Consequently, the defendant was acquitted of the excess BAC charge.

However, based on circumstantial evidence, including her poor driving, vehicle damage, admission of alcohol consumption, and statements, the court found her guilty of impaired driving.

The remaining provincial offence was left for further submissions.

The Crown brought an application to terminate the evidence of a key witness at a preliminary hearing after the witness became medically unable to continue cross-examination due to post-traumatic stress disorder and related psychiatric conditions.

The witness had testified in chief and partially under cross-examination before experiencing chest pains and distress.

The Crown sought to rest its case based on a medical letter from the witness's treating psychiatrist recommending against further testimony.

The defence opposed the application, arguing that the right to cross-examine is fundamental to full answer and defence.

The court granted the Crown's application, finding that while the right to cross-examine is not absolute, the medical evidence was compelling, the witness had testified partially, other evidence was available, and the prejudice to the defence at the preliminary hearing stage was limited.

The accused, Iqbal Singh, was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder, two counts of attempted murder, aggravated assault, and unlawful confinement.

The court entered a judicial stay of proceedings for the aggravated assault and unlawful confinement charges, finding them subsumed by the attempted murder convictions.

The sentencing addressed the first-degree murder and two attempted murders.

The court considered the facts of the offences, the accused's circumstances, and extensive victim impact statements.

A joint submission on sentencing for the attempted murders was accepted, leading to a life sentence for murder and consecutive sentences for attempted murders.

During a trial for kidnapping and robbery, the Crown led cell tower evidence to establish the identity of the accused.

In closing addresses, defense counsel suggested there was a 40 percent error rate regarding the general rule that cell phones connect to the closest tower.

The Crown objected.

The trial judge ruled that because the witnesses did not adopt the proposition of a 40 percent error rate during cross-examination, there was no evidence to support the suggestion.

A corrective instruction was provided to the jury in the final charge.

The accused was charged in connection with a bank robbery where clothing discarded by the fleeing robber contained DNA matching the accused as a major contributor.

The Crown’s case relied entirely on forensic DNA evidence linking the accused to a baseball cap and sweatshirt recovered at the scene.

The court accepted that the DNA established the accused had contact with the items at some point but found it could not establish when or how the DNA was deposited.

Given the presence of multiple contributors and the inability to exclude that others wore the clothing during the robbery, the evidence did not eliminate reasonable alternative inferences.

The court held that DNA evidence alone, without additional corroborating evidence linking the accused to the offence, could not satisfy the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Crown applied for mandamus with certiorari in aid to quash a preliminary inquiry decision discharging the accused on robbery-related charges arising from a tractor‑trailer robbery.

The Crown argued the preliminary inquiry judge failed to consider admissible similar fact evidence from other robberies when determining whether there was sufficient evidence to commit the accused to trial.

The court held that the failure to consider the whole of the evidence, including potentially admissible similar fact evidence, constituted a jurisdictional error.

After analyzing the similarities between several robberies and the linkage evidence, the court concluded the similar fact evidence was admissible and that a properly instructed jury could reasonably infer the accused were parties to the July 2 robbery.

The discharges were quashed and the matter was returned to the preliminary inquiry justice with directions to commit the accused to trial.

The Crown brought an application for mandamus with certiorari in aid to seek the committal of the respondents on charges relating to a tractor trailer robbery.

The preliminary inquiry judge had discharged the respondents, finding insufficient evidence to commit them to trial.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the preliminary inquiry judge committed a jurisdictional error by failing to consider the whole of the evidence, specifically the similar fact evidence linking the respondents to other similar robberies.

The court concluded that the similar fact evidence, combined with cell phone location evidence, provided sufficient evidence upon which a properly instructed jury could reasonably conclude the respondents were parties to the robbery.

The application was granted and the matter was directed back to the preliminary justice to commit the respondents.