Robert G. Tanner

Following a successful summary judgment motion for wrongful dismissal where the plaintiff was awarded $149,662.50 in damages, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The plaintiff sought full indemnity costs or, alternatively, partial indemnity to the date of a Rule 49 offer and substantial indemnity thereafter.

The court rejected full indemnity costs as the defendant's conduct in the litigation was not reprehensible.

Applying the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, the court awarded the plaintiff costs on a blended scale totalling $38,156.25 inclusive of disbursements and HST, noting the plaintiff's efficient use of a single senior lawyer compared to the defendant's heavily staffed file.

The plaintiff withdrew its motion for an interlocutory injunction regarding the alleged misappropriation of confidential information by former employees.

The defendants sought costs of the abandoned motion on a substantial indemnity scale under Rule 37.09(3).

The court exercised its discretion to order costs in the cause, finding that the plaintiff acted reasonably in pursuing the injunction initially and that the work done on the motion would be useful at trial.

The Toronto Islands Community Trust Corporation sought declaratory relief, an injunction, and fines against Peter McLaughlin and Steven Whitfield regarding the transfer of an Island home.

McLaughlin, aged 90, adopted Whitfield, aged 58, and then purported to transfer a half-interest in his home to Whitfield, relying on an exception in the Toronto Islands Residential Community Stewardship Act, 1993, which permits transfers to a "child" (including adopted child).

The Trust argued this circumvented the Act's purpose of restricting transfers.

The court, applying a purposive approach to statutory interpretation, found that given the genuine, long-standing familial relationship between McLaughlin and Whitfield, the transfer did not violate the spirit or purpose of the Act.

The court dismissed the Trust's application for declaratory relief, injunction, and fines, but awarded costs to the Trust for a previous motion and full indemnity costs to the respondents for the main application.

On appeal from a Superior Court order, the Court of Appeal addressed competing costs claims arising from a legal fee assessment and subsequent application.

The appellants sought to set aside costs awards totalling $56,535.29 granted to the respondent, arguing that the appellants' $10,000 costs award on the successful appeal disposed of all costs in the proceedings.

The respondent maintained entitlement to both awards based on her substantial success in reducing the appellants' original account from $187,044.40 to $100,000.

The Court of Appeal found the respondent achieved substantial success warranting appropriate costs awards, but modified the amounts to reflect the nature and extent of success at each stage.

An appeal from a Superior Court order that set aside an Assessment Officer's Report and Certificate reducing a solicitor's account from $149,635.52 to $26,375.00.

The solicitor had billed for services related to a $14 million real estate transaction without maintaining proper time dockets or obtaining client authorization before withdrawing fees from the client's trust account.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge erred in finding bias against the Assessment Officer and in failing to apply the proper quantum meruit analysis.

The Court reassessed the account at $100,000, holding that while the solicitor's record-keeping deficiencies warranted a significant reduction, the application judge's mechanical hourly rate calculation failed to account for the complexity, importance, and successful outcome of the transaction.

The applicant sought to oppose the confirmation of an Assessment Officer's report regarding a solicitor's bill for a real estate transaction.

The court found that the Assessment Officer's conduct, including drawing adverse inferences from the applicant's non-attendance (an elderly client represented by counsel) and unduly limiting cross-examination, amounted to a denial of natural justice.

The court set aside the Assessment Officer's report, dismissed the respondent's cross-appeal, and substituted its own assessment of the solicitor's fees based on a quantum meruit analysis, significantly reducing the original bill and ordering a refund with pre-judgment interest and costs.

The defendant brought a motion to remove the plaintiffs' counsel, Robert Tanner and Tanner & Guiney, on the grounds of a disqualifying conflict of interest.

The defendant argued that Mr. Tanner would likely be an important witness at trial and had a direct interest in the litigation, as the current action alleged professional negligence against the defendant in an underlying action where Tanner subsequently acted for the plaintiffs.

The court considered the balancing of maintaining high standards of the legal profession, the integrity of the justice system, and the litigant's right to counsel of choice.

The Master found that Tanner's role as an advocate could not be reconciled with his role as a witness, given the material facts he would need to testify about regarding his actions in the underlying action and the allegations of his own potential negligence.

The motion was granted, and Tanner was removed as counsel.

The defendant brought a motion to transfer the proceeding from Toronto to Cornwall.

The plaintiff, a US-based corporation, had commenced the action for the cost of goods sold in Toronto, where its counsel practiced.

The defendant, based in Cornwall, argued that the events giving rise to the claim occurred in Cornwall and Tennessee, and that Toronto had no connection to the dispute other than the location of the plaintiff's counsel.

The court applied the factors under Rule 13.1.02(2)(b) and found that while the plaintiff's initial choice of venue was reasonable given its expectation of a default judgment, the defendant's proposed venue of Cornwall was significantly better.

The motion to transfer the proceeding to Cornwall was granted.

The plaintiff corporations moved to restore an action to the trial list after it had been struck by a judge several years earlier.

The defendants opposed the motion, arguing that the delay in restoring the action was excessive and unexplained.

The court held that the proper framework under Rule 48.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is guided by Rule 1.04(1), emphasizing the just and expeditious determination of cases on their merits.

The court concluded the action was ready for trial and that the limited period of delay following removal of prior counsel had been adequately explained.

The action was therefore restored to the trial list.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Master dismissing its appeal from the trustee in bankruptcy's notice of disallowance.

The trustee had disallowed the appellant's claim against the bankrupt on the grounds of an offsetting claim owed by the appellant to the bankrupt.

The appellant argued the debt had been written off and released.

The Superior Court of Justice applied the palpable and overriding error standard of review and found that the Master reasonably concluded the debt had not been legally released, despite any accounting write-offs.

The appeal was dismissed.