Kayla Kwinter

The moving parties, a developer and a construction manager, brought a motion under section 44(5) of the Construction Act to reduce the security posted to vacate claims for lien registered by the responding subcontractor.

The moving parties argued the subcontractor was not entitled to cost escalations due to lack of proper notice, a prior promise not to pursue such costs, and an inability to prove quantum.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the moving parties failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that there was no reasonable basis for the lien amounts claimed.

The court held that the adequacy of notice, the binding nature of the promise, and the quantum of the claim all presented genuine issues requiring a trial.

The court approved a proposed settlement and certified the action for settlement purposes under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The class consists of approximately 100 investors in a failed real estate limited partnership project.

The settlement restores the class members’ proportionate interest in the property, now with greater development density and less debt, and is considered generous.

The court found the settlement fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, and approved class counsel’s fees.

The action will continue only as between the defendants for unresolved crossclaims.

The moving party sought leave to appeal the order of McCarthy J. dated October 17, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal in writing.

Costs were awarded to the responding parties in the all-inclusive amount of $3,000.

This motion concerned the proper preservation of construction liens, specifically whether the lien claimants' rights were governed by the "old" 45-day period under the Construction Lien Act or the "new" 60-day period under the Construction Act.

The determination hinged on the interpretation of the Act's transition provisions, which apply if a contract for improvement or a procurement process was commenced by the owner before July 1, 2018.

The court analyzed whether certain corporate entities, which had early involvement in the project but did not hold legal title to the premises before the critical date, qualified as "owners" under the Act.

Applying corporate law principles, the court found that these entities, despite their interest in the project, did not possess a lienable interest in the land and thus were not "owners" for the purpose of triggering the old Act's transition rules.

Consequently, the new 60-day preservation period applied, and the liens were found to be properly preserved.

The non-party contractor's motion for a declaration that the liens had expired was dismissed.

The plaintiff, Gore Mutual Insurance Company, sought a declaration that the defendant, Sovereign General Insurance Company, was required to provide coverage for the theft of a pick-up truck from Orr Motors, based on its garage policy.

Sovereign brought a motion for summary judgment, relying on a policy exclusion for leased vehicles.

The court found that the evidentiary record was insufficient to fully appreciate the case, particularly regarding the lease agreement's commencement and the reason the truck was on the lot at the time of theft.

Consequently, the motion for summary judgment was dismissed, and no costs were awarded due to deficiencies in both parties' evidentiary submissions.

The plaintiffs brought a motion under Rule 39.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking leave to file an affidavit and expert handwriting evidence after cross-examinations, in connection with a pending motion to set aside a default judgment.

The defendants opposed the motion.

The court applied a flexible, contextual approach to Rule 39.02, considering the relevance and responsiveness of the evidence, potential non-compensable prejudice, and the explanation for the delay.

While the evidence was relevant and responsive, the court found that granting leave would cause prejudice to the defendants, necessitate further adjournments, and was inconsistent with the principle of proportionality, especially in a simplified procedure case.

The plaintiffs' motion was dismissed, and the defendants were awarded costs.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action arising from an assault during a soccer game.

Brandon Gomes punched Michael Da Silva during a match, resulting in injury.

The appellants claimed negligence in supervision and breach of the Occupiers Liability Act against the respondents.

The motion judge found no evidence that Gomes' prior conduct was predictive of violent behaviour, that the respondents breached any standard of care, or that the playing field was unsafe.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding the motion judge made no palpable and overriding errors and that the appellants failed to present sufficient evidence to raise genuine issues for trial.

The appellant moved to set aside a single judge's order dismissing his motion to set aside the Registrar's order that had dismissed his appeal for delay in perfecting it.

The appellant had failed to perfect his appeal within the extended timeframe and took no steps to challenge the Registrar's dismissal for eight months.

The Court of Appeal upheld the single judge's decision, finding that the appellant's medical condition did not adequately explain the extensive delays, that the motion appeared motivated by a case conference order requiring payment of outstanding costs, and that the respondents were entitled to rely on the finality of the dismissal order.

The plaintiff brought a motion to compel the defendant to answer nine questions refused during an examination for discovery.

The underlying action involved an accident at a property owned by the defendant.

The court ordered the defendant to answer questions regarding the specific property, limited to the timeframe commencing from the date the defendant acquired ownership.

Questions seeking information about all 160 of the defendant's properties or spanning 20 years were deemed too broad and were not ordered to be answered.

No costs were awarded as success on the motion was divided.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's Statement of Claim for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action or being frivolous and vexatious under Rule 21.01(1)(b) or 21.01(3)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found it plain and obvious that the Statement of Claim did not disclose a reasonable cause of action against either the corporate or personal defendants, as the allegations of discrimination, defamation, fraud, improper discipline, and conversion lacked specific material facts and failed to meet the legal requirements for each tort.

Leave to amend the Statement of Claim was denied, and the claim was struck in its entirety.

The applicant, a lacrosse coach, filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of race, ancestry, and creed after being suspended by the Ontario Lacrosse Association for allowing an unregistered player to try out.

The respondents requested a summary hearing to dismiss the application.

The Tribunal found that the applicant had no reasonable prospect of success, as there was no evidence linking his suspension or the alleged procedural unfairness to his race, ancestry, or creed.

The application was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment granted in favour of the respondent for unpaid structural consulting services.

The motion judge's endorsement merely stated that there was no genuine issue for trial, without providing any factual findings or legal analysis.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge's reasons were so deficient that they did not permit meaningful appellate review.

The court declined to decide the summary judgment motion itself due to unresolved factual disputes and directed the parties to seek an expedited hearing on the merits.

The applicant in a human rights proceeding filed a Request for Tribunal Ordered Inquiry, alleging that potential witnesses had been threatened.

The Tribunal denied the request, noting that such inquiries are not routine and cannot substitute for the usual production process.

The applicant failed to provide particulars of the alleged threats or explain why the inquiry was necessary for a fair adjudication.

Furthermore, the matter was scheduled for a summary hearing where no evidence would be tendered.