Christopher M. Giggey

The Applicant sought costs of $5,866.71 following a successful motion and cross-motion.

The court applied Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, considering the parties' overall success, behaviour, and offers to settle.

The Applicant was deemed the more successful party, and the Respondent's failure to accept a severable offer to settle and make his own offer was a significant factor.

Despite the Respondent being self-represented and paying for reunification counselling, the court found the requested costs reasonable and proportionate, ordering the Respondent to pay the full amount sought.

The parties brought cross-motions for temporary orders regarding parenting and child support.

The mother sought retroactive and ongoing contribution for section 7 expenses totaling over $86,000, which included the $29,000 purchase of a horse for the child's anxiety.

The court dismissed the mother's motion for section 7 expenses, finding the horseback riding costs excessive and unreasonable given the parties' incomes.

The court also declined to apportion other valid expenses due to insufficient evidence regarding the self-employed mother's true income.

Parenting issues were deferred pending reunification counselling.

The applicant brought a motion for interim spousal support.

The parties were unmarried but shared a child and had cohabited, meeting the definition of 'spouse' under the Family Law Act.

The court found the applicant established a prima facie case for needs-based support due to a significant income disparity and her role as primary caregiver.

The respondent was ordered to pay interim spousal support of $741 per month, representing the low end of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, along with retroactive arrears.

The respondent mother brought a motion seeking temporary sole custody of the child, Lana.

The applicant father opposed, arguing to maintain the existing parental arrangement where he was the child's primary caregiver.

The court considered the effect of a prior reconciliation on a Nunavut interim custody order, the concept of material change in circumstances, and the child's best interests, emphasizing stability and the status quo.

The court found compelling reasons to re-examine the child's best interests as a temporary measure, noting significant changes in the child's life since moving to Ontario and the mother's guilty pleas to assault charges against the father.

The motion for sole custody was dismissed, and the child remained in the father's primary care, with an increase in the mother's access time.

The defendant brought a motion to transfer the proceeding from Toronto to Cornwall.

The plaintiff, a US-based corporation, had commenced the action for the cost of goods sold in Toronto, where its counsel practiced.

The defendant, based in Cornwall, argued that the events giving rise to the claim occurred in Cornwall and Tennessee, and that Toronto had no connection to the dispute other than the location of the plaintiff's counsel.

The court applied the factors under Rule 13.1.02(2)(b) and found that while the plaintiff's initial choice of venue was reasonable given its expectation of a default judgment, the defendant's proposed venue of Cornwall was significantly better.

The motion to transfer the proceeding to Cornwall was granted.

In a family costs endorsement following an uncontested trial, the applicant sought recovery for both the issuance of the application and later trial-related attendances.

The court applied Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules and emphasized proportionality, fairness, litigant conduct, and the modern purposes of costs awards.

The claim for costs of bringing the application was dismissed because the respondent's probation terms restricting communication affected the usual expectation of out-of-court engagement.

However, the court awarded partial indemnity costs for the fresh affidavit of uncontested trial and the later attendances after finding the respondent unreasonably failed to comply with an earlier order and caused unnecessary expense.

This was a family law costs ruling following a motion concerning temporary parenting arrangements and the return of a child to the mother’s care.

The court held that the mother was the successful party because the essential relief sought was the return of the children to her primary care, while the father’s increased access reflected relief to which she had not objected.

Applying the Family Law Rules framework governing success, reasonableness, and quantum, the court found no unreasonable conduct by the mother and concluded that she was presumptively entitled to costs.

Taking into account the significance and complexity of the issues, the reasonableness of counsel’s bill, and the father’s limited evidence on inability to pay, the court fixed costs at $1,200.00 all inclusive with 60 days to pay.

On a temporary parenting motion, the court determined the best interests of five children in a high-conflict family dispute involving conflicting affidavit evidence and allegations of instability, abuse, and poor parenting on both sides.

Applying the best-interests factors under s. 24 of the Children's Law Reform Act and emphasizing stability, continuity of care, and the importance of keeping siblings together, the court found the least disruptive arrangement was for the children to be in the mother's primary care.

The court also relied on the Children's Aid Society position that it had no concerns with either parent having custody of or access to the children.

The father was granted significant parenting time.