Julian R. Nawrocki

The applicant, Marmak Holdings Inc., brought a motion to compel an independent accountant (Baker Tilly Vaughan/KPMG) to produce its complete working file and underlying information related to a report prepared as part of a litigation settlement.

The report determined financial obligations between joint venture parties.

The court interpreted the original consent order, which granted access to "any and all information provided to" the accountant, and considered professional accounting standards.

The court dismissed the request for the complete file and working papers, finding them to be the accountant's work product.

However, it ordered the production of specific financial information akin to client property, such as starting trial balances, adjusting entries, accounts receivable/payable lists, and a schedule of rental income, as well as information supporting a market adjustment made in the report.

The court also ordered the parties to pay the accountant's outstanding invoice and fixed costs for the motion.

The moving parties, a corporate tenant and its principal, sought to consolidate a landlord's action against the principal (as indemnifier) into the tenant's existing action against the landlord, to be asserted by way of counterclaim.

The court dismissed the motion for consolidation, finding that the Rules of Civil Procedure do not permit a counterclaim against only a non-party without also claiming against the plaintiff.

However, the court granted the alternative relief, which the responding party had previously agreed to, ordering that the two actions be tried together or one after another, with shared discovery evidence.

The plaintiff withdrew its motion for an interlocutory injunction regarding the alleged misappropriation of confidential information by former employees.

The defendants sought costs of the abandoned motion on a substantial indemnity scale under Rule 37.09(3).

The court exercised its discretion to order costs in the cause, finding that the plaintiff acted reasonably in pursuing the injunction initially and that the work done on the motion would be useful at trial.

The defendants brought a motion under Rules 21 and 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike out the plaintiffs' Amended Statement of Claim, arguing it failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action and lacked sufficient detail.

The plaintiffs' claim alleged breach of contract, oppression, breach of good faith, misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment arising from a joint venture departure agreement and an alleged sham termination of a management contract.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the claims were pleaded with sufficient particularity and it was not plain and obvious that they would fail.

The parties in multiple related actions jointly consented to have their actions case managed by a case management Master under Rule 77.05 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court, satisfied that the criteria under Rule 77.05(4) were met, referred the matter to Master McAfee for assignment of a case management master.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding an enforceable buy/sell agreement for shares at a pre-determined price of $500,000.

The appellants also appealed the dismissal of claims for oppression, wrongful dismissal, and an outstanding shareholder loan.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's findings, noting the decision was fact-driven and supported by evidence.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants failed to appear for the hearing of their appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal as abandoned and awarded costs to the respondent in the fixed amount of $4,000.

The appellant challenged summary judgment holding him personally liable on a countermanded cheque issued in payment of part of an account for professional services.

The court held that the cheque notation identifying a principal and using the word "per" indicated a representative signature rather than a personal one.

It further held that the trade-name liability provision did not apply because the appellant did not sign in the trade name, but as agent for the identified principal.

The appeal was allowed, the summary judgment motion was dismissed, and the cross-appeal on costs was dismissed without costs.