Court File and Parties
Court File No.: CRIM J(P) 374/23 Date: 2024-04-12 Superior Court of Justice – Ontario
Re: R. v. Tylan Singh
Before: Fowler Byrne J.
Counsel: P. Maund and C. Henderson, for the Crown/Applicant J. Zita and R. Wahl, for the Accused/Respondent
Heard: March 26, 2024
RULING ON ADMISSIBILITY OF OTHER DISCREDITABLE CONDUCT
[1] Mr. Singh stands charged with one count of first-degree murder. He is scheduled to proceed to trial, before a judge and jury, commencing on June 10, 2024. A key issue at trial will be the identity of the shooter.
[2] The Crown wishes to lead evidence of other discreditable conduct of Mr. Singh at this trial. In particular, they wish to admit the following evidence:
a. 10 weeks following the murder, pursuant to a valid search warrant, a handgun was located in a secret compartment below the radio in the centre dash area, in a car that was owned by Mr. Singh;
b. This handgun was a 9 mm Sig Sauer and had Mr. Singh’s DNA on it;
c. This was not the murder weapon;
d. This handgun was fully loaded with 15 rounds of 9 mm calibre ammunition, with one round in the chamber, ready to fire;
e. The ammunition retrieved from this handgun, plus one located under the front passenger floor mat, consisted of three different types of bullets: Hornady 9mm Luger, Hornady 9mm Luger +P 20, and F.C. 9mm Luger.
[3] The Crown will be leading evidence at trial that this certain combination of ammunition is unique and is very similar to the ammunition retrieved at the site of the murder. The Crown argues that the proposed evidence, along with the other circumstantial evidence they intend to lead, is highly probative and that it outweighs any prejudicial effect on Mr. Singh. The Crown further submits that if there is any prejudical effect, it can be addressed though a mid-trial and final instruction to the jury.
[4] Mr. Singh argues that the proposed evidence has little evidentiary value and the prejudical effect of this evidence, if admitted, is high. He further argues that the prejudice would be irreparable and could not be remedied through an instruction to the jury.
[5] After hearing this application, but before I released my decision, the Court of Appeal released R. v. Amin, 2024 ONCA 237. I invited counsel to make written submissions with respect to this case. Both the Crown and defence counsel did so, and I have considered those submissions prior to making this decision.
I. Facts
[6] On March 1, 2022 at approximately 2:40 p.m., Jahleel McKoy was outside his residence at 45 Torada Court, Brampton, when he was approached by a lone gunman who shot him multiple times in the head and chest, killing him.
[7] At the scene, police collected two rounds of unfired ammunition, both 9 mm in caliber: one was copper-tipped with chrome casing (Hornady 9mm Luger), the other was blue-tipped polymer with brass casing (F.C. 9mm Luger).
[8] The police also recovered numerous cartridge casings from fired ammunition, all of which were stamped with one of three specific manufacturer designations: (a) Hornady 9mm Luger (consistent with the recovered whole cartridge with the copper-tipped projectile and chrome casing); (b) Hornady 9mm Luger +P 20; and (c) F.C. 9mm Luger (consistent with the recovered whole cartridge with the blue-tipped polymer projectile and brass casing).
[9] During Mr. McKoy’s autopsy, the pathologist extracted multiple projectile fragments, including ones that appear copper in colour, and others that appear blue in colour.
[10] Peel Regional Police obtained residential CCTV footage from neighboring residences showing what occurred after the murder. The video captures a single individual running towards the deceased’s residence, the sound of multiple shots being fired in quick succession, screams, a single individual running from the residence, the sound of a vehicle starting, and a white Nissan NV5 van with the words “Intelcom Express” written on the side being driven away.
[11] Subsequent surveillance footage from various sources after the shooting enabled the police to follow the route of the van throughout the area. Ultimately the police discovered the van abandoned at approximately 2:57 p.m. that day.
[12] There were two eyewitnesses that day. The first reported seeing a man run to the Intelcom Express van and get in the driver’s seat. Neither witness saw anyone else running to, or in, the van. The descriptions given by the eyewitnesses shared some commonalities, including that the man they saw was a Black man or had dark skin, and that he was skinny. This description is generally consistent with Mr. Singh’s physical appearance at the time. The eyewitnesses gave other descriptions as well, but the Crown and Mr. Singh disagree whether they match Mr. Singh.
[13] Peel Police also gathered surveillance evidence going backwards from the shooting in the hopes of identifying the shooter. The salient parts of the footage show that the van started that day across the street from 33 Poppy Bloom Avenue, Brampton, roughly 10 km from Torada Court, before it headed towards the murder scene. Surveillance also showed a solitary person (who is believed to be the suspect) emerging from an address on Bison Run Road, at about 11:04 a.m., walking to the van, and commencing the drive to the murder scene. Police ultimately determined that the suspect emerged from 28 Bison Run Road. Police then determined that Mr. Singh resided at 28 Bison Run Road with his parents.
[14] Review of the CCTV footage from one day prior captured the arrival of the van in the area. It was driven into the neighbourhood in tandem with a black sedan. On the way, there was an incident captured on video in which the two vehicles appear to have made contact, with the front left corner of the van striking the right side of the sedan. After the van was parked, the van’s driver walked out of the neighbourhood.
[15] Mr. Singh is the registered owner of a black BMW sedan. On March 15, 2022, police observed Mr. Singh driving a black BMW sedan and parking it in the garage at 28 Bison Run Road. The police observed damage to both the recovered Intelcom van and to Mr. Singh’s black sedan that correspond with the collision caught on video, as well as what appears to be white paint transferred from the van to the BMW. On March 21, police surveilled Mr. Singh as he drove his BMW sedan to the residence of his friend where they both examined and appeared to conduct repairs on the right-side damage to Mr. Singh’s BMW.
[16] The Police also were able to ascertain that there were no outgoing texts or phone calls from Mr. Singh’s cell phone between 9:01 a.m. and 4:47 p.m. on the day of the murder. At 4:47 p.m., police surveillance showed two unidentifiable people get out of a dark SUV and stand in the driveway of Mr. Singh’s home. As soon as one of the people entered Mr. Singh’s garage, Mr. Singh’s phone registers its first outgoing activity in hours.
[17] On the authority of a search warrant, Mr. Singh’s black BMW sedan was searched in or around May 11, 2022. In a secret compartment below the radio in center of the dash area, police discovered a 9mm Sig Sauer firearm. Singh’s DNA was found on the handgun. The firearm was fully loaded with 15 rounds of 9mm calibre ammunition. One round was chambered – ready to fire. Testing conducted on the firearm at the Centre of Forensic Sciences determined that this firearm was not the firearm used to kill Mr. McKoy.
[18] The ammunition located in Mr. Singh’s BMW were a combination of various makes. The bullets recovered from Mr. Singh’s BMW – all but one being loaded in the 9 mm handgun – matched those recovered at the scene of the murder: copper-tipped with chrome casing, and blue-tipped with brass casing. The recovered bullets also consisted of the same distinctive mix of three manufacturer types: Hornady 9mm Luger, Hornady 9mm Luger +P 20, and F.C. 9mm Luger.
[19] Mr. Singh was arrested on May 26, 2023 and charged with Mr. McKoy’s murder.
[20] Constable MacLeod of the Peel Regional Police is responsible for examining firearms and ammunition recovered by the Peel Police in criminal investigations. He is expected to provide evidence that the combination of ammunition found in Mr. Singh’s gun some 10 weeks later is consistent with the ammunition found at the murder scene and recovered from Mr. McKoy’s body. He is expected to testify that one of the types of ammunition is rarer than the other two. It is for this reason that the Crown wishes to advance this discreditable evidence at trial. They argue that it assists the court in identifying the shooter, who they allege is Mr. Singh.
[21] Mr. Singh takes issue with the probative value of the surveillance evidence. He indicates that some of the surveillance video footage is not clear. Some of the descriptions given by the eyewitnesses do not match Mr. Singh. Looking at all the circumstantial evidence together, Mr. Singh asserts that the firearm and ammunition discovered on May 11, 2022 has little probative value, is highly prejudicial, and should be excluded.
II. Law
[22] The Court of Appeal for Ontario recently confirmed that evidence that an accused has committed bad acts other than the offence charged is dangerous. Its admission without proper safeguards risks wrongful convictions. It triggers the danger of moral prejudice, which is the human tendency to judge people based on their character and convict the accused because they believe them to be a bad person. This evidence also poses a danger of reasoning prejudice because it risks confusing the trier of fact and distracting from the facts underlying the actual charge against the accused: R. v. Handy, 2002 SCC 56, at paras. 39-40, 100, 139-141; R. v. Amin, 2024 ONCA 237, at para. 27.
[23] As a result, evidence of other discreditable conduct is presumptively inadmissible unless the Crown can show that it is relevant to an issue other than the accused’s general propensity to commit bad acts, and that its probative value in relation to that issue outweighs the risk of moral and reasoning prejudice: R. v. B.(C.R.), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 717, at pp. 731-732, 735; Handy, at para. 60; Amin, at para. 28.
[24] Both the Crown and Mr. Singh agree that the evidence of the ammunition found with the firearm in Mr. Singh’s car is the type of evidence to which this rule refers. Accordingly, it must be determined whether the probative value of this evidence outweighs it prejudical impact. The Crown bears the onus of showing this, on the balance of probabilities: R. v. J.W., 2022 ONCA 306, at para. 19; Amin, at para. 28.
[25] In order to determine this question, I am guided by the methodology set out by Lauwers J.A. in J.W., at paras. 20-36.
A. The issue
[26] First, I must define the specific issue for which the evidence is asserted to be relevant.
B. Probative Value
[27] Second, I must assess the probative value of that evidence. There must be a connectedness and similarity between the expected evidence with respect to the offence itself and the discreditable conduct evidence which the Crown wishes to lead. The similarities can be circumstantial. The degree of similarity between the discreditable conduct and the facts of the charged crime determines the probative value of this evidence. A greater degree of similarity makes it unlikely that the similarities are a coincidence: Handy, at paras. 41-48, 76; Amin, at para. 29.
[28] In particular, when the Crown seeks to use this type of evidence to prove an accused’s identity as the perpetrator, the evidence is only admissible to provide identity if it has such a high degree of similarity to the charged crime that it negates the possibility of coincidence. In determining whether the acts are similar enough to admit, the focus should first be on the acts themselves and not on evidence of the accused’s involvement in those acts: R. v. Perrier, 2004 SCC 56, at para. 21.
[29] Under the identity rule, the accused’s other bad conduct evidence is only admissible to prove the accused’s identity as the perpetrator if the Crown is able to show, on a balance of probabilities, the crime charged, and the similar act were likely committed by the same person. That can be done if the other evidence discloses a unique trademark or signature, or it has a number of significant similarities with the crime before the court that cumulatively precludes a coincidence: Amin, at paras. 3, 28-30; Perrier, at paras. 19-20.
[30] The presence of a few generic or commonplace similarities between a single bad act different from the charged crime does not establish enough significant similarities to preclude coincidence: Amin, at para. 51; R. v. McDonald, 2017 ONCA 568, at para. 104.
[31] There must be a logical nexus or connection between the evidence of similar acts, or the other discreditable conduct, and the offence that the evidence is offered to prove: J.W., at paras. 23-25.
[32] The similarity between the acts must be determined on a case-by-case basis after considering all relevant factors. Such factors include, but are not limited to, proximity in time and place, number of occurrences of the similar acts and similarities in detail and circumstances. Once the trial judge has determined that the crime charged and the similar act were likely committed by the same person, the judge must then consider whether there is evidence linking the accused to the similar act. A link between the accused and the similar act is a precondition to admissibility: see Handy, at para. 82; Perrier, at paras. 22-23.
C. Prejudical Effect
[33] Thirdly, I must assess the prejudical effect of the discreditable conduct evidence. This prejudice can be in two forms: moral prejudice or reasoning prejudice. Moral prejudice identifies the risk of convicting the accused because of the belief that he is a bad person, rather than based on the proof that he committed the offence. This can cause the trier of fact to be distracted by revulsion or condemnation of the other events. Reasoning prejudice is the risk that the trier of fact will be distracted from the proper focus of the charge by spending too much time at trial on the discreditable conduct, causing a trial within a trial. I must also consider the presence of any factors that might reduce the impact of prejudice in the specific circumstances of this case.
D. Weighing of Factors
[34] Finally, I must weigh the probative value of the discreditable conduct evidence against the prejudicial effect. The more probative the evidence, the more likely the interests of justice will require that it be admitted because of society’s interest in getting to the truth. I must, though, take the dangers of propensity reasoning seriously.
III. Analysis
A. Issue Identified
[35] Both the Crown and Mr. Singh agree that one of the key issues in this case is the identity of the shooter of Mr. McKoy. The Crown argues that the discreditable conduct evidence goes to that issue. Accordingly, the Crown must show that the discreditable conduct evidence can advance or refute this issue for the trier of fact.
B. Probative Value
[36] Given that the Crown wishes to introduce this evidence to assist with the identity of the perpetrator, its relevance is dependant on the degree of similarity of the other conduct and the crime before the court.
[37] With respect to the firearm later found in Mr. Singh’s car, all parties agree that his was not the murder weapon. Other than being a 9mm firearm, and the murder weapon probably being a 9mm firearm, it has no other similar characteristics to the crime before the court. There is nothing unique or signature in its make up that would in any way connect it to the murder.
[38] What is unique with respect to this firearm, though, is what is found inside. The ammunition located in the firearm itself, and the one round on the floor of Mr. Singh’s car found on May 11, 2022, are significantly similar to those used in the crime before the court.
[39] I have reached this conclusion for the following reasons. First, a review of the ammunition retrieved from the murder scene and those retrieved in May 2022 show them to be the exact same brand, and more importantly, the same combination of brands.
[40] Secondly, I have considered the report of Constable Jeremy MacLeod, who is an Examiner of Firearms with the Peel Regional Police. In the course of his duties, PC MacLeod examines firearms, ammunition and prohibited devices seized by the Peel Regional Police. In November 2023, approximately one and a half years after the murder that is before this court, Constable MacLeod was asked to examine the spent ammunition casings found at the scene of the murder and the ammunition seized from Mr. Singh in May of 2022. His report concludes that the same three distinctive types of bullets were present at the scene of the murder, were retrieved in the autopsy, and were seized from Mr. Singh’s car. They consist of: (1) 9 mm copper-tipped with chrome casing – Hornady 9 mm Luger; (2) 9 mm blue-tipped polymer with brass casings – FC9 mm Luger; and (3) Hornady 9 mm Luger +P 20. The fact that some of the Hornady bullets had a “20” stamped on them indicates that they came from a different box than the other Hornady bullets and were manufactured in 2020. Most importantly, Constable MacLeod indicates that the blue tipped polymer type of ammunition manufactured by Federal Cartridge (“FC”) are rarer in his experience. Of his close to 200 examinations while in this position, these bullets have only been discovered in 5% to 7% of his examinations. His colleagues have seen them less often. He states that in his experience, he has never come across an instance where two separate, unrelated investigations yielded the same combination of ammunition with such close characteristics.
[41] The likelihood that another individual had this unique collection of ammunition is more than a pure coincidence. The similarities are more than generic or commonplace.
[42] I have also concluded that there is evidence that links Mr. Singh to the ammunition found in his BMW. First, the car is registered in his name. The firearm within which the ammunition was found had Mr. Singh’s DNA on it. There was no other way to get the ammunition in to that other firearm other than to handle it.
[43] Accordingly, in light of all the evidence presented, I find that the proposed ammunition evidence has high probative value. It cannot be viewed in isolation. The police had already tied Mr. Singh to the address where the shooter was seen leaving before the murder. There is evidence tying Mr. Singh’s black sedan to the white van which was used in the murder. The proposed ammunition evidence found in Mr. Singh’s car shows that he had access to this particular combination of ammunition that was used in the murder.
[44] I acknowledge that there is some other circumstantial evidence which is not as strong. Mr. Singh argues that the surveillance evidence is not clear, and the descriptions of the shooter by the eyewitnesses are partially inconsistent. One witness describes the shooter as taller than Mr. Singh. An eyewitness also stated that the shooter held the gun in his left hand, when Mr. Singh’s sister gave evidence at a prior hearing that Mr. Singh is righthanded. Also, there is a period of almost three months between the time of the murder and the discovery of this other ammunition. Mr. Singh argues that evidence of an unrelated gun, and ammunition not used at the murder can do little to assist the jury with the identity of the shooter of Mr. McKoy in light of the weak nature of the other circumstantial evidence.
[45] Nonetheless, I must assess the proposed evidence in light of all the evidence, and in doing so, I do find that all the circumstantial evidence viewed together adds to the probative value of the ammunition found.
[46] The same cannot be said about the firearm. I acknowledge the Crown’s position that possession of the firearm alone, ten weeks later, can be probative. In R. v. Riley, at para. 100, the court found that evidence of an accused’s association with guns, such as possession or use of guns, is relevant to show opportunity and means, and hence, assists to identify the shooter. This is also true even if it could not be proven that the other firearm which formed the basis of the application was the murder weapon.
[47] In this case though, the firearm itself has little probative value other than to show Mr. Singh’s propensity to access and possess firearms. On the other hand, the combination of ammunition is probative. It is Mr. Singh’s possession of this ammunition that is introduced to identify Mr. Singh as the perpetrator, not the gun. It is the similarity between the ammunition found at the scene of the murder and the ammunition found in Mr. Singh’s possession some ten weeks later that is probative.
[48] Accordingly, I find that the probative value of the firearm, as a means to provide identity, is not high. On the other hand, the probative value of the ammunition is high given the degree of similarity between the ammunition used at the murder and the ammunition found later in Mr. Singh’s car.
C. Prejudical Impact
[49] “Prejudice” in this context is not the risk of conviction. Instead, it is the risk of an unfocused trial and a wrongful conviction: Handy, at para. 139. It is the risk that the evidence may be used inappropriately by the trier of fact: R. v. L.B. (1997), 35 O.R. (3d) 35 (C.A.), at p. 16.
[50] There are two types of prejudice which the court must guard against: moral prejudice and reasoning prejudice. Moral prejudice identifies the risk of convicting the accused because of the belief that he is a bad person, rather than on proof that he committed the offence for which he is being tried. On the other hand, reasoning prejudice addresses the risk that a trier of fact will be distracted from the charge or issue at hand because of the undue consumption of time in dealing with allegations of multiple incidents: Handy, at para. 144; J.W., at paras. 28-35.
i. Moral Prejudice
[51] The courts must remain highly aware of moral prejudice when the discreditable conduct is reprehensible: J.W., at para. 31. The moral prejudice is greater when the discreditable conduct is outside the facts the case, as opposed to discreditable conduct that is related to other offences on the indictment: J.W., at para. 32; R. v. J.H., 2018 ONCA 245, at para. 24; R v. J.M., 2010 ONCA 117, at para. 87.
[52] When the proposed evidence is not as serious as the conduct charged, the prejudice is mitigated: R. v. Brissard, 2017 ONCA 891, at para. 24; R. v. D. (L.E.), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 111, at pp. 123-125.
[53] In the case before me, I find that there would be a risk of moral prejudice, but that it is somewhat diminished. Possession of the firearm and of the ammunition are less serious offences than the offence of the murder. This is even more so the case with respect to the ammunition alone. The murder in this case appeared to be planned, deliberate and calculated to kill. Those events are serious and outweigh any moral prejudice associated with possessing a firearm and ammunition some weeks later.
ii. Reasoning Prejudice
[54] In order to tender the discreditable conduct evidence, the Crown indicates it will have to call two other officers involved in the discovery of the firearm and ammunition, as well as a witness who will give evidence about the DNA found on the firearm. It claims that it will not take up more than a half day or day of the trial.
[55] It is already the Crown’s intention to call evidence about the ownership of Mr. Singh’s BMW, as they intend to call evidence about the damage to the sedan. It is also the Crown’s intention to call evidence about their surveillance of Mr. Singh’s car. The Crown will make it immediately clear that the firearm found was not the murder weapon.
[56] Mr. Singh argues that, in order to show any relevance of the ammunition, the Crown will have to call evidence about the commonality of the bullets, which could be time consuming and distracting to the jury.
[57] This potential distraction can be minimized. The evidence will be limited to this one search of the car. The Crown will not present any evidence about how they came to search the car, or why they searched the car, other than by valid warrant. They will not adduce evidence about what charges came from this search. The sole focus will be who owned the car in which the gun was found (which would already be in evidence), the fingerprints on the gun, and what was found in the firearm and on the floor of the car. The identification and nature of the ammunition at the crime scene and the ammunition that is the subject of this application is not highly disputed evidence. Where the parties disagree is what this evidence means. This evidence will not hijack the trial.
D. Weighing Probative Value and Prejudical Affect
[58] With respect to the firearm, I find that the probative value is low given the lack of similarity or connection to the crime before the court. While the prejudical impact of the firearm is diminished, it still outweighs its low probative value, making it too dangerous to admit. If the jury hears about Mr. Singh having a loaded firearm some weeks after the murder, there is a risk that the jury will assume that Mr. Singh is the type of man to carry around loaded firearms such as the one used to kill Mr. McKoy, despite there being no connection between that firearm and the one used in the murder.
[59] The ammunition, on the other hand, has high probative value. As indicated, the unique combination of the ammunition found in Mr. Singh’s car and at the murder scene, is more than a coincidence. Also, the prejudical effect of the ammunition is low. Possession of ammunition is a much lesser offense than murder. The risk of moral prejudice is reduced if the ammunition is represented in isolation.
[60] As for reasoning prejudice, this proposed evidence will be only a small part of the Crown’s case. The majority of the Crown’s evidence will be focused on their surveillance, the investigation surrounding the murder, the eyewitnesses, and Mr. Singh’s BMW.
[61] As well, mid-trial and final limiting instructions, if required, will go a long way to neutralizing any potential prejudice. The law assumes the jury can follow such instructions unless the character inferences are too great and will prove to be overwhelming: R. v. Puddicombe, 2013 ONCA 506, at para. 93, leave to appeal refused, [2013] S.C.C.A. No. 496; R. v. Chizanga and Meredith, 2019 ONSC 5737, at para. 49.
[62] The charge would not be overly complex. It will warn about the danger of propensity reasoning. It will direct the jury only to that part of the evidence which is relevant and how they may consider it. This is a common element of many jury instructions.
[63] Mr. Singh relies on R. v. Millard and Smich, 2015 ONSC 7357, in support of the exclusion of the discreditable conduct evidence. In that case, the court determined that the evidence of an incinerator purchased prior to the murder would be dangerously prejudicial and did not allow it to be introduced at trial. The facts of the case before me though, are not similar. The circumstances of that case were such that there was a risk that the introduction of an incinerator would unduly distract the jury with thoughts of other dead bodies that were burned. It would lead to questions about another murder investigation. The justice found that the danger of propensity reasoning was insurmountable and that no jury charge could remedy it.
[64] That danger would not be present in this case, where the Crown’s questioning on the discreditable conduct evidence will be focused and not related in any way to another murder investigation. The finding of a firearm and ammunition is not as reprehensible as an incinerator.
[65] Mr. Singh also relied on R. v. Johnson, 2020 ONSC 1320. In that case, Mr. Johnson was charged with a home invasion and robbery with a firearm. The discreditable conduct which the Crown sought to admit was the accused’s earlier guilty plea to participation in a robbery with a firearm. In that case, the court found that the probative value did not outweigh the prejudical effect.
[66] While these cases are helpful, each case should be reviewed on its own facts. The probative value of evidence and the risk of prejudice of each case will be unique. I cannot reach the same conclusion on the facts before me as my esteemed colleagues did on the particular facts of the cases before them. The facts of this case are simply different. In this case, the proposed evidence would not make up the significant part of the evidence to be called at trial. It is simply another proposed piece of circumstantial evidence that the jury will be asked to consider.
[67] Finally, with respect to the Crown’s argument that the jury will be confused by evidence of the ammunition in a vacuum, I also find that this can be managed. The Crown will be permitted to advance evidence that the ammunition was found in a car owned by Mr. Singh, being a black BMW. If Mr. Singh adduces evidence that denies ownership or association with the ammunition, this ruling can be revisited.
IV. Conclusion
[68] Accordingly, I find that the probative value of Mr. Singh’s possession of the particular ammunition on May 11, 2022 in his car, outweighs the prejudical impact, and thus, is admissible at trial. The Crown will be permitted to adduce evidence that this ammunition was found in Mr. Singh’s car on May 11, 2022 pursuant to a valid search warrant. No evidence will be led regarding the other investigation that led to the issuing of this search warrant.
[69] With respect to the firearm found in Mr. Singh’s car, which housed all but one of the bullets, and the fact that Mr. Singh’s DNA was found on the firearm, the probative value of that evidence is outweighed by its prejudical impact. That being said, if Mr. Singh adduces evidence at trial that the ammunition found in his car was not his or not associated with him, I will reconsider my ruling during the trial and consider allowing the Crown to introduce evidence of the firearm, where it was found in the car, and the fact that Mr. Singh’s DNA was found on it.
Fowler Byrne J. DATE: April 12, 2024