Alison Barclay

The appellant appealed a decision regarding the Chief Building Official's decision and an encroachment permit for a patio.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, adopting the reasons of the lower court.

The court held that the lower court properly excluded legal opinions tendered through an expert witness and rejected the argument that the process was unfair due to the issue of prematurity not being raised by the parties.

Costs were awarded to the respondents on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellant, Peter Wu, appealed the dismissal of his motion to add parties and amend his claim, and the dismissal of his action on summary judgment, with costs awarded against him.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered dismissing the appeal under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding it to be frivolous and vexatious.

The court determined that the appellant's lengthy and unarguable submissions, containing unparticularized allegations of conspiracy and fraud, had no chance of success.

Upholding the motion judge's finding that the appellant was a vexatious litigant, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The respondents brought a motion for security for costs of an appeal regarding a proposal to locate a homeless shelter.

The appellant, a corporation, admitted it had insufficient assets to pay costs but did not claim impecuniosity.

The court assessed the merits of the appeal, finding the grounds relating to prematurity and the rejection of expert evidence on domestic law to be weak.

Considering the holistic factors and the justice of the case, the court ordered the appellant to pay $7,500 into court as security for costs.

The applicant sought a declaration that the proposed use of a property as a municipal shelter was not permitted under Toronto's zoning by-laws, arguing it was not a permitted use and that a proposed patio was prohibited.

The respondents asserted the matter should have been brought as an appeal under the Building Code Act, 1992, and that the intended use was permitted.

The court found the proceeding was properly an appeal of the chief building official's decision, not a Rule 14 application.

The court affirmed the chief building official's decision, finding no error in the determination that the shelter use was permitted and that the patio issue was premature as no final decision had been made on it.

The applicants sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent the City of Toronto from clearing a homeless encampment, arguing the bylaw authorizing the clearance breached section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court applied the three-part test for interlocutory injunctions.

While a serious issue was found, the court determined that the irreparable harm was minimal given the City's offer of hotel shelter accommodation to encampment residents.

The balance of convenience heavily favored the City due to significant fire risks at the encampment and the availability of safer alternative housing.

The motion for an interlocutory injunction was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of HRTO decisions that summarily dismissed his complaints against various City of Toronto officials and departments.

The applicant alleged discrimination based on race and place of origin regarding the City's handling of his zoning by-law inquiries.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, finding the HRTO's conclusions that the complaints had no reasonable prospect of success and lacked a factual link to Code-protected grounds were reasonable and procedurally fair.

The plaintiff, Mizen Holdings Corporation, initiated a subrogated action against the City of Toronto and Ontario Excavac Inc. (OE) for water losses during condominium construction, alleging negligence.

The City and OE issued third-party claims for contribution and indemnity against Mizen's contractors: YYZed Project Management, Otomic Contractors Ltd., and Shor-Cais Foundation Contractors (the "third parties").

The third parties moved for summary dismissal of these claims, arguing Mizen had no right to sue them due to contractual waivers, covenants to insure, and the anti-subrogation rule, which would, under the Giffels principle, bar the defendants' claims.

The court dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues for trial regarding the scope of the covenant to insure and concluding that the contractual waivers had not crystallized at the time of the losses.

The anti-subrogation rule was also found not to apply to uninsured losses or to prevent the defendants' claims in these circumstances, particularly where waivers were post-tort conduct.

The plaintiff set the action down for trial and counsel attended trial scheduling court to fix a date.

The judge convened a case conference and determined that the action, commenced in 2014 regarding a construction dispute, was not ready for trial.

Interlocutory steps including undertakings, potential refusal motions, and expert reports were incomplete, and a companion action had sat dormant.

The judge struck the action from the trial list, directing counsel to return only when the matter is truly ready for trial.

The defendants, Toronto Hydro and the City of Toronto, sought leave to issue third-party claims against the plaintiffs (a building owner and two tenants) and various former owners and property managers for contribution and indemnity following a fire in a hydro vault.

The plaintiffs opposed the motions, arguing that covenants to insure in their leases shielded them from liability to each other, rendering the third-party claims legally untenable under the Supreme Court's decisions in T. Eaton Co. and Giffels.

The court granted leave in part, allowing claims against parties in capacities not shielded by the insurance covenants (e.g., former owners, property managers), but dismissed the motions regarding claims against the landlord and tenant in their capacities governed by the leases.

The court also rejected the argument that covenants to insure should be treated as exclusion clauses subject to public policy exceptions.

The applicants sought judicial review of a Community Council decision denying them a front yard parking pad permit.

The permit was refused because the proposed pad was on the same side of the street as authorized permit parking and was too close to a protected tree.

The applicants argued they were denied procedural fairness and that their application was grandparented by a 31-year-old abandoned application.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Community Council's decision was reasonable and that the applicants were afforded an appropriate level of procedural fairness given the context.

The applicants brought a motion to enforce an interim settlement agreement with the City of Toronto regarding physical distancing standards in the city's shelter system during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The City had asserted compliance with the agreement on June 15, 2020, which would trigger the termination of the agreement.

The court found that the City breached the agreement by asserting compliance when it had not used its 'best efforts' to achieve the required physical distancing standards across all sites.

The court ordered the City to continue its pre-compliance reporting obligations until it fully met its obligations under the agreement.

The applicants brought a refusals motion to compel answers and document production from the City of Toronto and Ontario in a Charter application challenging shelter standards during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The motion sought to enforce an Interim Settlement Agreement regarding physical distancing and bed capacity in shelters.

The court granted the motion in part, finding many of the City's refusals improper regarding system-wide compliance data for the May 15-June 15, 2020 period, but upheld other refusals based on proportionality, particularly concerning the Central Intake service, daily capacity data, and information outside the specified period.

The plaintiff brought a civil action alleging assault and excessive force by police officers during an arrest that resulted in a shoulder injury.

The plaintiff conceded that the officers had reasonable and probable grounds for arrest but argued that the arresting officer used excessive force.

The court found that the officer used only a simple grab to pull the plaintiff away from discarded drugs and another suspect, causing the plaintiff to fall and injure his shoulder.

Applying principles under s. 25 of the Criminal Code and relevant case law on justified use of force, the court held that the force used was reasonable in the circumstances.

The action for damages was dismissed.