Molly Lowson

The applicant sought judicial review of an administrative penalty order issued to his father, the registered owner of a vehicle caught speeding by an automated camera.

The applicant was the driver and acted as his father's agent before the tribunal.

The Divisional Court held that under section 21.1(9) of the Highway Traffic Act, the driver does not have standing to seek judicial review.

The court adjourned the hearing and ordered the title of proceedings amended to substitute the father as the proper applicant.

The applicants, who are neighbours of the respondent property owner, sought judicial review of a Committee of Adjustment decision approving minor variances.

Following legislative amendments that removed third-party appeal rights to the local appeal body, the applicants argued they had public interest standing to seek judicial review and alleged procedural unfairness and inadequate reasons.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the applicants lacked public interest standing, were afforded adequate procedural fairness, and that the Committee's reasons were sufficient when read in context.

The applicants sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent the City of Toronto from clearing a homeless encampment, arguing the bylaw authorizing the clearance breached section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court applied the three-part test for interlocutory injunctions.

While a serious issue was found, the court determined that the irreparable harm was minimal given the City's offer of hotel shelter accommodation to encampment residents.

The balance of convenience heavily favored the City due to significant fire risks at the encampment and the availability of safer alternative housing.

The motion for an interlocutory injunction was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Review Body decision revoking his rent-geared-to-income (RGI) subsidy and a subsequent decision refusing to reconsider the revocation.

The applicant's subsidy was revoked after he failed to provide original tax documents and submitted falsified documents.

The Divisional Court held that the initial revocation was reasonable.

While the Review Body erred in concluding it lacked jurisdiction to reconsider the decision simply because the applicant was no longer a tenant, the court found that declining reconsideration was nonetheless reasonable given the 18-month delay and the applicant's failure to provide valid documentation.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicant, 2708266 Ontario Inc. o/a Nelli Construction, sought damages after the respondent, the City of Toronto, improperly failed to award it "Contract B" following a Request for Tender (RFT) process.

The court previously found the City liable for failing to award the contract.

This endorsement addresses the effect of a broad limitation of liability clause (LL Clause) in the RFT.

Applying the three-pronged Tercon test, the court found the LL Clause applied to the circumstances, including post-bid conduct, and was broad enough to preclude liability for damages beyond the costs of preparing the bid.

The court also determined there was no explicit finding of a breach of the duty of good faith as per Wastech, and that public policy did not override the enforcement of the LL Clause.

Consequently, the City was not liable for damages beyond the bid preparation costs, though costs from the initial application were still payable to the applicant.

The applicant submitted the lowest bid for a City of Toronto sewer and watermain project.

The City disqualified the bid, concluding the applicant lacked the requisite corporate experience because its personnel's experience was gained at a different company.

The City then cancelled and reissued the tender.

The court found the applicant's bid was compliant, a Contract A was formed, and the City breached the contract by cancelling the tender without a valid basis.

However, the court noted the tender's broad limitation of liability clause might preclude expectation damages and requested further submissions on its enforceability, while awarding the applicant costs of the motion.

The appellant, Don Mills Residents Inc., appealed a Superior Court decision that dismissed its application seeking a declaration and injunction to compel the City of Toronto and C/F Realty Holding Ltd. to construct a community centre as per minutes of settlement.

The application judge found the minutes were not a binding contract and specific performance was inappropriate.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding that the minutes of settlement, in the context of land-use planning, were not a binding contract but rather a planning instrument under the Planning Act, revisable in the public interest.

The court also found no legal obligation on the City to build the centre, as that obligation rested with C/F Realty Holding Ltd.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the City of Toronto Review Body denying her late request to review the loss of her rent-geared-to-income (RGI) subsidy.

The applicant lost her eligibility in 2019 for failing to provide required income and asset information, but did not request a review until over two years later.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Review Body met its duty of procedural fairness, which was at the lower end of the spectrum, and that its decision to deny the late request was reasonable given the applicant's failure to provide an adequate explanation for the delay.

The applicant, the lowest bidder on a municipal construction contract, sought judicial review of the City of Toronto's decision to award the contract to a competing bidder.

The applicant brought the application before the Superior Court of Justice without seeking leave under section 6(2) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act.

The court declined jurisdiction, holding that applications for judicial review must be brought before the Divisional Court in accordance with the Act and the Consolidated Practice Direction.

The application was dismissed for being brought in the wrong forum.

The applicant sought a declaration that it held an implied easement by common intention over the airspace occupied by a private bridge connecting its properties over a city-owned public road.

The bridge was built as compensation for a 1968 expropriation.

The respondent argued the applicant only held a revocable license.

The court found that the 1973 conveyance of private road lands abutting the bridge evinced a common intention to grant an easement over the airspace, as a mere license would defeat the commercial purpose of the bridge.

The court declared the bridge a fixture to the applicant's lands and ordered the registration of an implied easement.

A residents' association sought declaratory and injunctive relief to compel construction of a community centre at a specified site under minutes of settlement arising from planning appeals.

The court held the minutes were part of a planning framework under the Planning Act, not a final and everlasting commercial contract, and that essential terms remained dependent on further agreements including a section 37 agreement and related instruments.

The court further held the minutes did not obligate the municipality to construct, maintain, or operate the facility, and that the discretionary letters-of-credit provision did not create such an obligation.

Specific performance was refused, and the application was dismissed.

The applicants, homeless individuals living in encampments in City of Toronto parks, brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to prevent the City from enforcing its by-law prohibiting camping in parks during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The applicants argued that enforcement violated their rights under sections 7, 12, and 15 of the Charter.

The City moved to exclude the applicants' expert medical evidence on the basis of bias, which the court dismissed, finding the evidence relevant and necessary.

On the injunction test, the court found the applicants raised a serious issue to be tried and established irreparable harm.

However, the balance of convenience favoured the City, as the City had taken significant steps to provide safe shelter spaces with physical distancing, and the public interest in maintaining parks for everyone's use outweighed the applicants' interest in a sweeping suspension of the by-law.

The motion was dismissed.