Conner Harris

The defendants, RepVisor Portfolio Systems Inc. et al., brought a motion seeking $100,000 (later reduced to $81,000) in security for costs from the plaintiff, Ian McLean, in his capacity as Trustee of the JSL Trust.

The moving parties argued that the plaintiff was a nominal plaintiff and lacked sufficient assets in Ontario to cover a potential costs award.

The plaintiff countered that he was not a nominal plaintiff, possessed sufficient assets, and that section 249(3) of the Ontario Business Corporations Act (OBCA) provided immunity from posting security for costs for oppression remedies.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff, as a trustee with fiduciary duties, was not a nominal plaintiff, and the moving parties failed to demonstrate insufficient assets.

Furthermore, the court noted that the action, in substance, was an oppression remedy, which weighs against ordering security for costs under the OBCA.

The plaintiff was awarded $5,000 in costs.

The appellant, Don Mills Residents Inc., appealed a Superior Court decision that dismissed its application seeking a declaration and injunction to compel the City of Toronto and C/F Realty Holding Ltd. to construct a community centre as per minutes of settlement.

The application judge found the minutes were not a binding contract and specific performance was inappropriate.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding that the minutes of settlement, in the context of land-use planning, were not a binding contract but rather a planning instrument under the Planning Act, revisable in the public interest.

The court also found no legal obligation on the City to build the centre, as that obligation rested with C/F Realty Holding Ltd.

In the context of a pending summary judgment motion regarding an alleged negligent misrepresentation of intent to acquire property for a GO Train station, both parties brought motions to compel answers to questions refused during cross-examinations on affidavits.

The Master applied the principles from Ontario v. Rothmans Inc. to determine the proper scope of cross-examination.

Notably, the Master found that the defendant waived solicitor-client privilege by relying on its counsel's advice to support its defence of good faith and to allege ulterior motives by the plaintiffs.

Both parties were ordered to answer specific questions and re-attend for further cross-examination.

The plaintiff sued his neighbours in nuisance and negligence, alleging that their home reconstruction altered drainage patterns and caused water to infiltrate his basement.

The defendants counterclaimed for trespass, nuisance, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process, alleging the plaintiff's own landscaping caused the water issues and that the plaintiff's wife maliciously sought a peace bond against them.

The court dismissed both the claim and the counterclaim.

The court found the defendants' construction was reasonable, approved by the city, and did not breach the standard of care.

Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to prove causation, as expert evidence indicated the plaintiff's own landscaping likely caused the water accumulation.

The counterclaims were dismissed as trivial or lacking evidence of malice.

The applicant property owner sought a mandatory injunction requiring the respondent municipality to remove a watermain that had been installed on its property in 1979 or 1980.

The municipality brought a cross-application seeking a declaration that it had acquired a prescriptive easement over the land.

The court found that the municipality had established continuous, uninterrupted, open, and peaceful use of the land for the watermain for over 20 years prior to the property's conversion to the Land Titles system, without permission from or objection by the property owners.

The court granted the municipality a prescriptive easement and dismissed the property owner's application for removal.

The appellant's property was damaged by flooding following significant rainfalls in May 2013.

The floodwaters originated from adjacent land expropriated by the respondent municipality in 2009 for a construction project.

The appellant had commenced an injurious affection claim before the Ontario Municipal Board in 2011.

Following the flooding, the appellant commenced an action in Superior Court in June 2015.

The respondent moved for summary judgment on the basis that the action was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The motion judge found the claim was discoverable when the flooding occurred in May 2013.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred by failing to consider whether an action in Superior Court would be an appropriate means to seek a remedy, and by misapprehending the evidence regarding the appellant's belief that the OMB had exclusive jurisdiction over injurious affection claims.

The appellant purchased a commercial property that was contaminated by hydrocarbons that had migrated from an adjacent former gas station property.

The respondents moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, arguing that the appellant knew or ought to have known of the contamination more than two years before commencing the action.

The motion judge granted the motion, finding that the appellant had knowledge of the claim by March 9, 2012, or alternatively by March 30, 2012.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge made palpable and overriding errors by equating the appellant's suspicion of contamination with actual knowledge of contamination, and by failing to consider the relevant circumstances of the multi-property transaction and the waiver of conditions.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing an action alleging environmental contamination of the plaintiff’s property by petroleum hydrocarbons migrating from a neighbouring former gas station site.

The defendants argued the claim was statute‑barred under the Limitations Act because it was commenced more than two years after the claim was discoverable.

The court held that the plaintiff knew or ought reasonably to have known of the material facts supporting a claim by March 2012 through environmental investigations conducted during its due diligence period.

The later Phase II environmental report merely confirmed suspicions already known.

The court also rejected the argument that ongoing contamination constituted continuing damage that created a new limitation period due to lack of evidence of fresh damages.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the action as out of time.