John Ian Barzo

Two groups of landowners appealed the Surveyor General's confirmation of a survey that extended road allowances to the water's edge of Georgian Bay, separating their properties from the beach.

The appellants argued the Surveyor General erred by ignoring a previous Divisional Court decision, misapplying common law principles of accretion, and rejecting estoppel arguments.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeals, finding the Surveyor General made reasonable findings of fact supported by evidence, including that no accretion had occurred and that the original 1820s survey intended the road allowances to reach the water.

The court held the standard of review was correctness for law and palpable and overriding error for fact, and found no such errors.

The applicants, owners of cottage properties in Tiny Township, sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent the respondent municipality from interfering with their use of a grassy area between their properties and the beach.

The applicants claimed exclusive possession of the grassy area for decades, while the municipality claimed ownership based on a 1931 dedication.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found a serious issue to be tried regarding ownership, that the applicants would suffer irreparable harm through loss of enjoyment and potential environmental impact, and that the balance of convenience favoured maintaining the status quo.

The motion for an interlocutory injunction was granted.

The plaintiff son and defendant father were involved in a family business dispute over well drilling companies.

The son brought a motion for partial summary judgment seeking to be appointed as a director and to have the corporate assets evaluated, while the father brought a cross-motion seeking to wind up the company.

The court dismissed both motions, finding that the voluminous conflicting affidavit evidence and credibility issues required a full trial.

However, the court granted an interim order increasing the land rent paid by the corporation to the father based on an unchallenged appraisal.

The appellant appealed a decision upholding a fee levied against him by the municipality for fire department services.

The municipality had invoiced the appellant's home insurer through a third-party billing agent, and when the insurer declined to pay, added the fee to the appellant's tax bill.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the municipal bylaw, properly interpreted, did not authorize charging the fee to the homeowner personally when the insurer declined to pay.

The municipality was ordered to reimburse the fee and penalties.

The appellants, owners of waterfront properties on Nottawasaga Bay, appealed a decision of the Coordinator in the Office of the Surveyor General confirming a municipal resurvey under the Surveys Act.

The resurvey extended two road allowances straight across accreted lands to the water's edge, effectively cutting off the appellants' water access.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeals, finding that the Coordinator's decision was unreasonable.

The Court held that the Surveys Act does not displace the common law principles of accretion, which dictate that accreted lands attach to riparian properties and should be equitably allocated.

The matter was remitted for a trial of an issue regarding whether the survey should be confirmed with or without amendments.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Surveyor General of Ontario confirming the location of a road allowance under the Surveys Act.

The dispute arose because the confirmed location placed the road allowance on the portion of the appellants' property bordering water, thereby removing their riparian status.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Surveyor General had jurisdiction, the fact-finding hearing process was procedurally fair, and her substantive conclusions regarding historical survey evidence and natural boundaries were reasonable and entitled to deference.

A spouse without legal title sought an interlocutory injunction restraining mortgagees from exercising power of sale over Muskoka properties alleged to constitute a matrimonial home.

The mortgagees relied on a statutory declaration by the titled spouse asserting that another property had been designated as the matrimonial home under s. 21(3)(d) of the Family Law Act.

The court found strong evidence capable of belief that the lender had actual or constructive notice that the property was used as a family cottage and therefore a matrimonial home.

The presumption in s. 21(3)(d) could not protect a lender who knew facts inconsistent with the declaration.

Applying the three-part injunctive test, the court found a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm to the spouse, and a balance of convenience favouring preservation of the property pending trial.

Following a successful trial in which the plaintiff established that a property transfer between a debtor and her parents constituted a fraudulent conveyance designed to defeat a creditor, the plaintiff sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court held that the defendant’s litigation conduct, including implausible testimony denying the fraudulent nature of the conveyance, justified elevated costs.

The court also considered whether costs could be awarded against non-parties who had funded and effectively controlled the litigation.

Applying principles governing non‑party costs liability, the court found that the parents were the real parties behind the defence and that it was just to hold them responsible.

Costs of $60,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST were awarded against the defendant and the non‑party parents.

The appellant appealed from a judgment declaring him a vexatious litigant under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

He argued the application judge erred by denying his request for an adjournment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the application judge's discretionary decision, noting the appellant's motivation for the adjournment was delay and he had outstanding costs awards against him.

The applicant, a director of an insolvent company, sought review of a Director Order to Pay for unpaid wages.

She raised two preliminary issues: first, that the Employment Standards Officer lacked authority to issue the order without first issuing one against the employer; and second, that the matter was res judicata because the trustee in bankruptcy had disallowed the employees' claim.

The Board dismissed both preliminary arguments, finding that the Employment Standards Act does not require an order against an insolvent employer as a precondition to director liability, and that issue estoppel did not apply because the trustee's determination under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act involved a different legal question than the one under the Employment Standards Act.