ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
Richard Ramcharran P.O.A. for Dolly Ramcharran
Applicants
– and –
Neville Ramcharran and Hemwantie Ramcharran
Respondents
Conner Harris, for the Applicants
Siddharth S. Joshi, for the Respondents
AND BETWEEN
Neville Ramcharran and Hemwantie Ramcharran
Applicants
-and-
Dolly Ramcharran, Richard Ramcharran (in his personal capacity and as Power of Attorney for Dolly Ramcharran)
Siddharth S. Joshi for the Applicants
Conner Harris for the Respondents
HEARD: January 8, 2026
C. Gilmore, J.
Introduction
1The Applicants, Neville Ramcharran (“Neville”) and Hemwantie Ramcharran (“Sandy”), in Application CV-24-00722713 (the “Eviction Application”), seek to evict the Respondent Dolly Ramcharran (“Dolly”) from the property located at 1201-29 Rosebank Drive, Toronto (“Rosebank”), which Neville and Sandy own.
2The Applicant, Richard Ramcharran (acting as POA for Dolly) in Application CV-23-0007715-00ES (“the Estate Application”), seeks the recovery of Rosebank and another property at 162 Bonspiel Drive (“Bonspiel), Toronto (also owned by Neville and Sandy) on behalf of Henry Ramcharran’s Estate (“the Trust claims”) from the Respondents Neville and Sandy.
3The Eviction Application and the Estate Application have been ordered to be heard together.
4Richard and Neville are brothers and the sons of Dolly. Sandy is Neville’s wife. Henry Ramcharran (“Henry”) was Dolly’s husband and the father of Richard and Neville. He died intestate on November 6, 2022.
5Dolly and Henry emigrated from Guyana. Henry worked in a metal factory until his retirement in 2002. Dolly worked in a clothing factory until 1994 when she became unable to work. She has not worked since 1994 and was financially dependent on Henry.
6The issues to be decided on these Applications are as follows:
a. Whether Richard has standing to advance the trust claims;
b. Whether the trust claims are statute barred;
c. Whether Henry’s estate has an ownership interest in Rosebank;
d. Whether Henry’s estate has an ownership interest in Bonspiel;
e. Whether the Matrimonial Home designation registered by Dolly is valid;
f. Whether Dolly has a right of possession of Rosebank; and
g. Whether Richard has a right of possession of Rosebank.
7Richard and Neville have been cross-examined. The non-party witnesses, Muriel Singh and Irving Wolkowicz, have also been examined. Their transcripts were made available to the court for this hearing.
8For the reasons set out below, the Eviction Application is allowed and the Estate Application is dismissed. Dolly lacks standing and her claims are statute barred. If I am wrong and her trust claims remain intact, I find that there is insufficient evidence to support them.
The Motion to Strike
9Neville and Sandy request that Dolly’s pleadings be struck based on the following:
a. Dolly has breached the order of Sanfilippo J., dated November 28, 2024:
i. She failed to attend mediation by January 24, 2025, as ordered;
ii. Richard provided his answers to undertakings on January 7, 2026, late in the evening. Those answers were required by August 8, 2025.
iii. Facta were to be exchanged by September 12, 2025. Richard and Dolly’s factum was uploaded to Case Centre at 11:48 p.m. on January 7, 2026.
iv. The revised timetable set by Sanfilippo J. on March 10, 2025 could only be varied by further court order and a motion could be brought to strike the Application of any party in breach of the timetable;
v. At a Case Conference in July 2025, Myers J. indicated that the timetable set in March 2025 by Sanfilippo J. was to be strictly enforced; and
vi. Given the late filing of the factum, counsel for Neville and Sandy did not have time to bring a formal motion to strike, but sought to strike Dolly’s pleadings by way of oral motion and in accordance with the March 10, 2025 order of Sanfilippo J.
10Dolly’s counsel, Mr. Harris, does not deny that his factum and answers to undertakings were late. He cited some personal issues which prevented proper filing.
Ruling on Motion to Strike
11Dolly’s counsel has had since September 2025 to file a factum. Further, on Sunday January 4, 2026, while attempting to prepare for this matter, I emailed counsel and specifically requested that Mr. Harris file a factum as required by the timetable and the rules. His factum was not filed until late in the evening on January 7, 2026, leaving both the Court, and Mr. Joshi, counsel for Neville and Sandy, little time to review its contents.
12There is no doubt that there has been a breach of the strict timetable set by Sanfilippo J. and further enforced by Myers J. This has put Mr. Joshi at a disadvantage as he had no time to prepare a motion to strike, thoroughly review Dolly’s factum, or file a reply factum.
13In other circumstances, I may have struck Dolly’s Application or adjourned the matter to allow a reply factum to be filed. However, as will be set out below, Dolly’s Application is dismissed. As such, there is no need to strike her Application. The issues quite rightly raised by Mr. Joshi in relation to the breach of previous orders shall go to the issue of costs.
Neville’s Position and Evidence
14In 2000, Neville decided he wanted to buy a home. Henry, Neville and Dolly had been living in an apartment building and wanted a change. In August 2000, Neville and Henry bought Rosebank as tenants in common. Henry, Dolly and Neville moved into Rosebank.
15Neville denies that his father gifted him money for Rosebank in exchange for caring for his parents when they became older. He has always been there for his parents but the arrangement was that Rosebank belonged to Neville because he agreed to make the mortgage payments.
16Neville concedes that his father gifted him approximately $43,000 in order to buy Rosebank and that he could not qualify for the mortgage on his own so Henry co-signed the mortgage. Neville’s position has always been that since Rosebank was intended to be his property, that he would make the mortgage payments. Neville has provided proof that he has paid the mortgage on Rosebank since 2000. His evidence is that Henry and Dolly never paid the Rosebank mortgage.
17In June 2000, after purchasing Rosebank, Neville opened a chequing account at RBC ending in “806.” He arranged to have his salary paid into that account and the mortgage payments were then withdrawn from 806. Neville produced evidence by way of his pay stubs and bank statements as well as statements from MCAP, the mortgage financing company, to prove that he made the mortgage payments on Rosebank.
18In 2003, Neville and Sandy were married. Sandy moved into Rosebank in June 2003.
19In 2006, Henry wanted his name removed from the mortgage and property. According to Neville, he told Neville that he wanted to apply for low-income seniors’ housing and did not want to own any assets. Rosebank and its mortgage were transferred to Neville and Sandy jointly in May 2006. The consideration for the transfer was the removal of Henry’s obligation on the mortgage, which at the time was $88,080 (the mortgage balance at that time being $176,175.34).
20After Sandy and Neville moved into their own home in 2007, Henry began to pay the property taxes and maintenance fees of $700 per month for Rosebank although some of those funds came from third party rental income for the basement and driveway which rental income was paid to Henry. In 2017 Henry reduced his monthly contribution towards Rosebank maintenance to $500 per month plus property taxes. Henry and Dolly never paid any rent to Neville and Sandy for their occupancy of Rosebank.
21In September 2007, Neville and Sandy purchased the Bonspiel property. They made a down payment and took a mortgage of $363,987. Neville and Sandy have exclusively covered the expenses of Bonspiel; no other family member has contributed. Neville and Sandy continued to pay the mortgage for Rosebank even after they moved to Bonspiel. Henry’s income after he retired in 2002 was approximately $16,800 per year. Dolly had no income. Dolly and Henry did not have the means to make mortgage payments on Rosebank.
22In 2009, Neville and Sandy refinanced Rosebank and increased the mortgage to $212,000. Refinancing proceeds of $26,000 were used to pay off Neville’s personal credit card debt.
23In 2011, Richard asked Neville and Sandy if he could move into Rosebank as he needed temporary accommodation. Since then, Richard never left Rosebank, and he has never paid rent. Richard claims he paid his parents rent of $1,800 a month until 2022 when his father died. He concedes he has paid no rent since then. Richard has failed to provide proof of any rent payments or contributions to Rosebank during the 15 years he has resided there.
24There has never been any tenancy agreement between Neville and Sandy and Richard and/or Dolly.
25After their father died in 2022, Richard confessed to Neville that his father left him life insurance proceeds of $30,000 and a Honda Accord. Henry also gave him a $50,000 gift just before he died.
26Dolly is 85. Her health has declined, and she has experienced several hospitalizations. Neville alleges that Richard has brought Dolly’s Application out of self interest and because he wants to continue to live rent free at Rosebank.
27On May 1, 2023, Richard, acting as Dolly’s Attorney for Property, registered a Matrimonial Home designation on Rosebank. Neville and Sandy seek to remove the Matrimonial Home designation and sell or rent Rosebank. As such, they require a Writ of Possession in the event that Dolly and Richard refuse to leave.
28Neville and Sandy made it clear that they are seeking declarations of ownership such that they have the option of enforcing their ownership rights. They do not want to be seen as heartlessly forcing Dolly out of Rosebank but will consider their options if they are successful in this litigation.
Richard’s Position
29Richard’s position is that Neville convinced his father to put Rosebank in both of their names because if he did not do so it would affect Henry’s government pension entitlement. Neville denies he ever had any such discussion with his father.
30The transfer of title from Neville and Henry as tenants in common to Neville and Sandy as joint tenants in 2007 was done for the same reason. That is, Neville convinced Henry that the transfer was necessary so as not to jeopardize Henry’s pension entitlements. Richard submits that his father was “tricked” into putting Neville’s name on title in 2000 and transferring Rosebank to Neville and Sandy in 2007. The “pension” issue raised by Neville was false. Henry bought Rosebank without contribution from Neville. Neville denies he had any discussions about government pension entitlements with his father.
31Richard alleges that in 2009, Neville and Sandy put another mortgage of $212,000 plus a further mortgage of $42,000 on Rosebank without the consent of Henry or Dolly. Neville denies this. His evidence was that Rosebank was refinanced and the proceeds were only $26,000, which he used to pay his personal debt. There was never any mortgage for $42,000. This was security for a line of credit with RBC. Neville and Sandy have never drawn on the line of credit.
32Richard alleges that Neville withdrew $18,000 that was in a joint account with Henry, Richard and Neville. Neville does not deny this but submits it was done with his father’s permission. Further, Richard received certain gifts from his father both before and after his death, as set out above.
33Richard alleges that Henry sent cheques to Neville every month to pay the mortgage on Rosebank. Further, Dolly told him that Neville would frequently call her saying he did not have enough money to pay the mortgage and she would try to help him. Neville denies this allegation. He did not call his mother asking for money. His father did not send him money to pay the mortgage. His father paid the property taxes and made a small monthly contribution towards the maintenance of Rosebank. Richard has never provided any bank statements to confirm that Henry made the mortgage payments on Rosebank. In his cross-examination, Richard claimed he had such statements and would produce them but never did.
34Richard alleges that Neville and Sandy used the money from refinancing Rosebank, the $18,000 taken from the joint account, and the monthly payments made by Henry, to finance the purchase of Bonspiel. Neville denies this and points out that the refinancing of Rosebank took place in 2009 and the purchase of Bonspiel was in 2007.
35Richard deposed that in June 2021, Dolly contacted Neville about Henry’s wish to reclaim ownership of Rosebank. According to Richard, Neville agreed to transfer title when the mortgage was renewed in June 2022. When the transfer did not occur, Henry spoke to Neville in October 2022 about the transfer and Neville agreed to transfer a 50% interest to Henry. No steps were taken. In February 2023, Richard alleges that Dolly asked Neville for the return of her home and he refused. Neville denies that any conversations took place.
36In 2023, Richard had a conversation with his mother which he transcribed on his computer and produced as an exhibit to his affidavit sworn October 13, 2023. Neville’s counsel has asked for the metadata for this document but it has never been produced. In the typed transcript, it is alleged that Dolly told Richard that Henry bought Rosebank using $40,000 from his savings. Neville was put on title based on his promise to care for his parents as they aged. Neville also took $18,000 from a joint account without permission. Neville requests that the court put no reliance on this document given its questionable provenance and reliability.
37In his cross-examination Richard gave the following answers:
a. Dolly believes that the house is hers. She has not paid any rent to Neville and Sandy because Rosebank is her home.
b. Richard agrees that he was not present for any discussions in 2000 when Rosebank was purchased or in 2006 when the home was transferred from Neville and Henry to Neville and Sandy.
c. Richard insists that his father was paying Neville for the Rosebank mortgage and that Neville could not have afforded to pay the mortgage on Rosebank on his own. Richard’s evidence was that his father told him he was making the mortgage payments on Rosebank. Those payments were $1,700 a month when Rosebank was purchased in 2000. The payments decreased over time.
d. Richard insists that, even after being shown proof of mortgage payments made by Neville, his father made the mortgage payments on Rosebank and that Neville could not afford the mortgage as he was only working part time. Henry would give Neville the monthly mortgage payment and then Neville would pay the mortgage. Richard was asked to produce documents proving his father made such payments to Neville. No documents have been produced.
e. Richard’s evidence is that he was paying his parents rent of $1,800 per month after he moved in 2011 until his father died in 2022. He has paid no rent since then. He has produced no proof that he was paying rent to his parents. He claims to be making utility payments for Rosebank but provided no proof of this.
f. Richard’s evidence was that he moved into Rosebank in 2011 at his parents’ insistence because they wanted his help. Richard was paying $600 a month for his apartment at the time but gave that up to move in with his parents.
g. Richard claims that Neville and Sandy refinanced the mortgage on Rosebank in order to buy Bonspiel. However, Richard did not deny that the refinancing of Rosebank took place in 2009, and Bonspiel was purchased in 2007.
The Evidence of Muriel Singh
38Muriel Singh is Henry’s sister. She swore an affidavit on January 26, 2024. She deposed that until approximately 2022, she lived close to Henry and Dolly and visited them at least once a week.
39Muriel deposed that Henry told her that he bought Rosebank and put Neville’s name on title because of Neville’s commitment to live with his parents and care for them as they aged. Henry told her that Neville did not commit anything to the expenses of Rosebank.
40Henry told Muriel that in 2006, Neville convinced him to transfer title to Rosebank to Neville and Sandy as Henry would not receive a full government pension if he owned property. Muriel deposed that Dolly was stressed and upset about Neville and Sandy taking her home.
41Muriel’s evidence was that she spoke to her sister-in-law by phone daily. During her examination, she was asked to produce her phone records to verify this. No records have been produced. Muriel further agreed that she was not present during any discussions between Henry and Neville about the purchase of Rosebank in 2000 or the title transfer in 2006.
42Muriel agreed that she had never seen any proof that Henry made the mortgage payments on Rosebank. During her examination, Mr. Joshi offered to show her Neville’s bank statements as proof that Henry did not make the mortgage payments. Muriel stated that she would not change her position about Henry paying the mortgage on Rosebank even in the face of such proof.
The Law and Analysis
Issue #1 – Does Dolly Have Standing to Bring her Application and/or is it Statute Barred?
43Richard brings this Application as Dolly’s Power of Attorney for Property. Dolly is not well but she is not incapable. As such, I required that Richard provide a signed consent from Dolly with respect to Richard bringing the Application on her behalf. No signed consent was ever provided by Dolly. The Court has concerns about Dolly’s awareness of these proceedings and the cost consequences which she will incur. It is unclear what Richard was specifically authorized to do on her behalf.
44As well, the claims brought by Dolly are claims made in relation to Henry’s Estate. Henry died intestate and no Application for a Certificate of Appointment of Estate Trustee without a Will has been produced. Without an Estate Trustee, it would not be possible to advance trust claims on behalf of Henry as there is no representative of the Estate.
45In Beirat v. Khiyal, 2024 ONCA 790, the Court of Appeal for Ontario confirmed that trust claims are personal, and a non-titled spouse cannot assert a trust claim against a third party: at para. 14. In Morris v. Nicolaidis, 2021 ONSC 2957, the court dealt with whether a non-titled spouse can advance a trust claim on behalf of a former spouse. The court held that because a trust claim is a private equitable claim, it is not a public interest claim. Therefore, “one cannot sue upon an interest one does not have”: Morris, at para. 33.
46In light of the caselaw, I find that Dolly has no standing to advance her claims. She is not a titled spouse or an Estate Trustee, and as such she cannot advance a claim against a third party (Neville and Sandy). In terms of her having a constructive trust claim based on contributions to Rosebank, I find that she cannot make such a claim as she was clearly a dependent spouse without income. There is simply no evidence that she made any financial contribution at all to Rosebank.
47On the limitations issue, it is clear that trust claims for the recovery of land are based on the 10-year limitation period in the Real Property Limitations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.15 (the “RPLA”). The subject transactions took place in 2000 (purchase of Rosebank) and 2006 (transfer of title of Rosebank), which are well outside the limitation period in relation to the commencement date of Dolly’s Application in 2023.
48However, Richard argues that discoverability applies in this case and that Dolly did not discover the claim until 2021, when she requested that the property be transferred back to her and Henry and Neville refused or said he would make the transfer and took no steps. Section 5 of the Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sched. B, sets out as follows:
5 (1) A claim is discovered on the earlier of,
(a) the day on which the person with the claim first knew,
(i) that the injury, loss or damage had occurred,
(ii) that the injury, loss or damage was caused by or contributed to by an act or omission,
(iii) that the act or omission was that of the person against whom the claim is made, and
(iv) that, having regard to the nature of the injury, loss or damage, a proceeding would be an appropriate means to seek to remedy it; and
(b) the day on which a reasonable person with the abilities and in the circumstances of the person with the claim first ought to have known of the matters referred to in clause (a).
49Neville and Sandy argue that section 5(1)(b) applies, and that Dolly ought to have known of the claim when she provided her spousal consent to the transfer of Rosebank in 2006. It is clear that at the time of the transfer in 2006, the solicitor acting on the transfer, Mr. Irving Wolkowicz, advised Dolly and Henry to obtain independent legal advice. They did not elect to do so. The fact that they chose not to obtain independent legal advice does not vitiate the transfer.
50The evidence relating to the alleged discoverability of the claim by Dolly in 2021 is not reliable. First, all of the evidence of discoverability comes by way of hearsay evidence from Richard. Second, Dolly has never sworn an affidavit in this proceeding despite the fact that, although she is elderly, there is no evidence that she lacks capacity. As such, there is no direct evidence from Dolly about discoverability.
51The “dictated” statement from Dolly has many problems. First, there is no way to determine its authenticity. A request for metadata was made at Richard’s examination but nothing was ever produced. Further, the statement was allegedly dictated in 2023 but not attached to Dolly’s original application. It did not appear until the responding material to Neville and Sandy’s Application was filed in 2024. If Dolly has capacity, why did she not file an affidavit in these proceedings upon which she could be cross-examined? Counsel for Neville and Sandy could not cross-examine Dolly on the dictated statement. It is not sworn evidence. Given all of the above, I place no weight or reliance on the dictated statement from Dolly.
52Finally, the court has concerns about Richard’s interest in these proceedings. He has been living at Rosebank for 15 years. He claims to have paid rent until his father died but has never produced any proof of this. He concedes he has paid no rent since his father died. He claims to have made contributions to the maintenance of Rosebank but did not provide proof of this either.
53I infer that Richard would be content to have the status quo remain in place. The current situation is financially beneficial to him. As well, he claims he does not really want to stay at Rosebank but feels obligated to care for his mother. There was no evidence filed by Richard that he does anything to care for his mother. For example, there were no medical records filed which indicated that Richard was present at his mother’s doctor’s appointments or other medical records indicating Richard’s interaction with his mother’s doctors as her Attorney for Personal Care. As such I have concerns about the reliability of Richard’s evidence. I therefore approach Richard’s evidence regarding the conversations between Dolly and Neville about the transfer of title between 2021 to 2023, and its relevance to discoverability, with caution and concern.
54Returning to the discoverability issue, Dolly consented to the transfer in 2006 as a spouse. It was recommended that she obtain independent legal advice. She did not choose to obtain such advice. I find that Dolly’s knowledge of how title was held for Rosebank was made known to her and Henry in 2006 when she gave her spousal consent to the transfer. Neither she nor Henry objected to this arrangement. If they were allegedly “tricked” into transferring the property because of an alleged statement from Neville about Henry having to divest himself of property for pension purposes, they had decades to rectify this alleged misstatement. Of course, Neville denies having made any such statements to his father and denies any “trickery” with respect to either the purchase or transfer of Rosebank.
55In summary, I find that Dolly’s claims are statute barred under the RLPA. The 10-year limitation period has long passed given that a reasonable person would have discovered the claim in 2006. The alleged discoverability of the claim in 2021 is supported solely by Richard’s evidence, which I have found to be unreliable.
Does Henry’s Estate have a Trust Interest in Rosebank or Bonspiel?
56In the event I am wrong with respect to Dolly’s standing or her claims being statute barred, I turn to the trust claims she asserts on behalf of Henry’s Estate in relation to Rosebank and Bonspiel.
57The trust claims are based on statements by Muriel, Richard and Dolly (as reported by Richard and Muriel) that Neville essentially tricked his father into buying Rosebank, registering it in both names, and then tricked him into transferring it to him and Sandy. The “trickery” relates to a statement which Neville denies making and relates to Henry taking the steps he did to reduce his property interests in order to preserve his government pension entitlements.
58First, apart from Neville’s denials, the claims make no sense. In general, government pensions are available based on past contributions (CPP) or income-based entitlement (GIS and OAS) There was no evidence provided by any party about the specifics of Henry’s pensions, his contributions or his eligibility for such pensions.
59Further, Richard and Muriel have admitted under oath that they were not present during the 2000 and 2006 transactions and were not present for any discussions between Neville and his father about the reasons for title holding or the transfer of title. Rather, Richard relies on the dictated statement from Dolly which I have found to be unreliable and given no weight.
60Richard’s arguments that Henry was not proficient in English are not borne out by the evidence. The cheques written to Neville from Henry for monthly contributions to Rosebank are in English. The cheques written to the City of Toronto by Henry for property taxes are in English. Mr. Wolkowicz did not make any notes in his file or give evidence on his examination that there was a language difficulty with either Henry or Dolly.
61There is no evidence that Henry made the mortgage payments on Rosebank. While Richard claimed to have evidence of such payments, he never produced that evidence. In contrast, Neville produced substantial evidence of the amounts being deducted from his salary for the mortgage payments and the mortgage payments coming out of his RBC account. This evidence spans the period of 2000-2024.
62As noted above, Henry’s income after 2002 was only $16,800. He simply did not have the ability to make the mortgage payments from a monthly gross income of approximately $1,400.
63The only documented payments which Henry paid towards Rosebank (substantiated by productions from Richard) were the property taxes and a monthly contribution of $700 for maintenance, which was reduced to $500 a month in 2017. Neville does not deny his father made those payments, but the payments were intended as contribution to the expenses of his parents’ occupancy of Rosebank and were not mortgage payments.
64Henry was able to make these payments from rent paid by Neville’s cousin who resided at Rosebank from 2007 to 2012, and rental of the driveway parking space. Richard submits that Neville was in breach of the condominium by-laws by allowing a tenant and driveway rental, but took no steps because he was not actually an owner. While it is quite likely that notice of a tenant and driveway rental was required under the by-laws, I do not see that this is relevant to the issues to be decided by this court.
65If Henry had actually been receiving an additional $1,800 a month rent from Richard, it may have been more feasible to assume he was contributing to the mortgage. But there is no evidence that Richard has ever actually paid anything for his occupancy of Rosebank.
66I reject Muriel’s evidence with respect to the purchase of Rosebank in 2000, the transfer in 2006 and her evidence that Henry was paying all of the expenses for Rosebank. The evidence of what Dolly reported to Muriel is clear hearsay and without corroboration. Further, Muriel refused to accept the documentary evidence of Neville’s payment of the mortgage on Rosebank. She preferred to rely on what Dolly told her over the phone despite the fact that there was no evidence of any phone records produced.
67Richard submits that his father acted as an owner of Rosebank because he rented out space to Richard’s cousin, rented parking in his driveway and attended meetings of the condominium corporation. Attendance by Henry at condominium association meetings does not create an interest in Rosebank.
68Finally, Richard submits that Neville and Sandy have not rebutted the presumption of resulting trust which would apply with respect to the 2006 transfer from father to son. As per Pecore v. Pecore, 2007 SCC 17, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 795, at para. 36, the Supreme Court of Canada found that a transfer by a parent to an adult child is often done out of convenience and to assist the aging parent in managing their affairs. As such, the adult child is presumed to hold the property in trust for their parent.
69While the presumption would apply in this case, it is easily rebutted. First, Dolly is the sole surviving parent. She has never had an ownership interest in Rosebank. Richard makes mention of Dolly being a beneficiary of Henry’s Estate and therefore having an entitlement to Rosebank. This is an obtuse argument given that there is no evidence on what assets are in Henry’s Estate and there is no one with authority to make any claims on behalf of the Estate.
70Further, with respect to the repeated position of Richard and Dolly that title to Rosebank was transferred in exchange for caregiving of Dolly and Henry by Neville, this position is denied by Neville. Moreover, there is no corroborated evidence from Henry on this issue (as required by s. 13 of the Evidence Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.23). There are only bald statements from Richard, whose evidence I have found unreliable, and by Dolly, who never swore an affidavit in this proceeding.
71As such, I find that there is ample evidence to rebut the presumption of advancement. Although this was a transfer of title from father to son (and daughter-in-law), it was done for consideration (the assumption of half the balance of the mortgage) and in furtherance of Henry minimizing his financial commitments post-retirement (he was not required to pay the mortgage on Rosebank).
72In summary, I do not find that Henry had a resulting or constructive trust interest in Rosebank nor does the presumption of advancement apply. He was not an owner nor did he make any significant contributions to the property (other than what may be expected from an occupant who was not paying rent). I have already found that Dolly had no standing to make a trust claim against Henry’s Estate but if I am wrong, I would also find that Dolly has no trust interest in Rosebank. There is no evidence that Dolly made any financial contribution to Rosebank.
73Turning to the Bonspiel property, Richard argues that the refinancing of Rosebank was used to purchase Bonspiel and as such, Dolly’s trust claims extend to that property. This claim has no merit. There is evidence that the refinancing of Rosebank took place two years after the purchase of Bonspiel and the proceeds used to pay Neville’s personal debt. Richard does not deny this.
74The claim against Bonspiel is a derivative trust claim which is dependent on a finding that Dolly or Henry’s estate has a trust interest in Rosebank. Given that I have already found that there can be no trust claim by the Estate or Dolly against Rosebank, such a claim cannot be extended to Bonspiel.
Remaining Issues
75Richard and Dolly claim a possessory interest in Rosebank. This claim must also be dismissed. Neither Richard nor Dolly has an ownership interest in Rosebank and neither are tenants. There is no right to occupy Rosebank by either Dolly or Richard.
76Dolly registered a Designation of Matrimonial Home against Rosebank in 2023 after Henry’s death. This designation was improperly registered and must be removed. Pursuant to s. 20(6)(d) of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, a property ceases to be a matrimonial home after one of the spouses dies. Henry died on November 6, 2022, and as such, Dolly has no right to possess Rosebank as a spouse.
77The fact that Neville has permitted his mother and his brother to live at Rosebank does not confer any form of possessory or tenancy rights upon them. While it is certainly hoped that Neville and Sandy choose not to throw their mother and brother onto the street, it is up to them as to how they exercise their ownership rights.
78Dolly’s counsel suggests that if not successful, Dolly be granted a life interest in Rosebank. That is not a remedy available to this court without the consent of the owners.
79While occupation rent was sought from Richard, no evidence was tendered as to what that rent ought to be. Without expert evidence on market rent during the relevant periods, this court is not able to award occupation rent. The process suggested by Neville’s counsel (which involves the parties agreeing on a real estate agent to determine historical rent) is bound to fail given the animosity between these parties. As such, I decline to make any order for occupation rent.
Orders and Costs
80Given all of the above, I make the following orders:
a. The Eviction Application is allowed other than the claim for occupation rent.
b. The Estate Application is dismissed.
c. Mr. Joshi may provide a revised judgment for both applications to Mr. Harris for approval. The approved order may be sent to me for review and signature.
Costs
d. All of Dolly’s claims were rejected. Many of them were entirely without merit and based on hearsay or uncorroborated evidence from Richard. There are also the issues related to the Motion to Strike. Richard did not comply with clear court orders which put opposing counsel at a disadvantage.
e. Richard’s counsel did not serve an Offer to Settle. Neville and Sandy’s counsel served an informal Offer to Settle by way of letter on September 6, 2023. This offer was renewed at mediation. Neville offered to settle on the following terms:
i. The Matrimonial Home designation to be removed;
ii. Dolly and Richard to vacate Rosebank within 60 days;
iii. 15% of the net sale proceeds of Rosebank would be paid to Dolly;
iv. The parties to execute any required documents to effect the settlement.
f. While this was not a formal offer to settle, it was not withdrawn prior to the hearing and the court is entitled to advert to offers if even they are not formalized as per Rule 49.03. As such, Neville and Sandy did far better than the offer in the 2023 letter, as they are not required to pay any portion of the sale proceeds to Dolly.
g. Neville and Sandy sought partial indemnity costs of $37,254 and substantial indemnity costs of $55,881.
h. Given the success of Neville and Sandy, the issues raised in the Motion to Strike and the informal offer to settle, costs are payable at an increased scale. Costs of $50,000 plus disbursements of $4,000 plus HST are awarded against Dolly and payable forthwith.
C. Gilmore, J.
Released: January 20, 2026
CITATION: Ramcharran et al. v. Ramcharran et al., 2026 ONSC 390
COURT FILE NO.: CV-23-00707715-00ES and CV-24-00722713-0000
DATE: 20260120
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
Richard Ramcharran P.O.A. for Dolly Ramcharran
Applicants
– and –
Neville Ramcharran and Hemwantie Ramcharran
Respondents
AND BETWEEN
Neville Ramcharran and Hemwantie Ramcharran
Applicants
-and-
Dolly Ramcharran, Richard Ramcharran (in his personal capacity and as Power of Attorney for Dolly Ramcharran)
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
C. Gilmore, J.
Released: January 20, 2026