Roberto Emanuele Zuech

The appellant, Don Mills Residents Inc., appealed a Superior Court decision that dismissed its application seeking a declaration and injunction to compel the City of Toronto and C/F Realty Holding Ltd. to construct a community centre as per minutes of settlement.

The application judge found the minutes were not a binding contract and specific performance was inappropriate.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding that the minutes of settlement, in the context of land-use planning, were not a binding contract but rather a planning instrument under the Planning Act, revisable in the public interest.

The court also found no legal obligation on the City to build the centre, as that obligation rested with C/F Realty Holding Ltd.

A residents' association sought declaratory and injunctive relief to compel construction of a community centre at a specified site under minutes of settlement arising from planning appeals.

The court held the minutes were part of a planning framework under the Planning Act, not a final and everlasting commercial contract, and that essential terms remained dependent on further agreements including a section 37 agreement and related instruments.

The court further held the minutes did not obligate the municipality to construct, maintain, or operate the facility, and that the discretionary letters-of-credit provision did not create such an obligation.

Specific performance was refused, and the application was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of decisions by the Ministry of Transportation (MTO) and the City of Toronto revoking permits for a sign on its property adjacent to Highway 401.

The MTO revoked its permit after determining the sign was a third-party billboard, which is prohibited within 400 metres of a controlled-access highway, rather than a permitted first-party location sign.

Toronto subsequently revoked its municipal permit because a valid MTO permit is a prerequisite.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the MTO's characterization of the sign as a third-party advertisement was reasonable, as the advertised law firm did not genuinely conduct business at the premises.

The court also found the applicant was not denied procedural fairness.

The plaintiff's statement of claim was reviewed by the court under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for being frivolous and vexatious.

Despite the plaintiff's submissions, the court found the claim incomprehensible, failing to comply with Rule 25.06 by not concisely stating material facts or the basis for relief.

Consequently, the claim was dismissed, with no order as to costs.

The applicants sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Municipal Board denying their request for consent to grant an easement over a neighbouring property to access utility services for their landlocked property.

The Board had determined that only the owner of the servient tenement could apply for such consent under s. 53(1) of the Planning Act.

The Divisional Court found no reason to doubt the correctness of the Board's decision that the dominant tenement owners did not constitute the 'owner' of the servient tenement for the purpose of the Act, and denied leave to appeal.

The appellants appealed a Divisional Court decision that set aside an Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) ruling.

The OMB had found that the City of Toronto's Official Plan Amendment No. 2 (OPA 2), which restricted the demolition and conversion of rental housing, was illegal and conflicted with the Tenant Protection Act.

The Court of Appeal held that while the OMB had limited jurisdiction to determine whether OPA 2 was an official plan within the meaning of the Planning Act, it erred in concluding that the City lacked the authority to enact it.

The Court found that the Planning Act permitted municipalities to include policies ensuring an adequate supply of rental housing.

Furthermore, OPA 2 did not conflict with the Tenant Protection Act, as dual compliance was possible.

The appeal was dismissed.

Arrêt constitutionnel majeur portant sur l'exclusion des couples de même sexe de la définition du mariage aux fins de la common law.

La Cour a appliqué l'analyse du par. 15(1) de la Charte et conclu que la définition hétérosexuelle du mariage portait atteinte à la dignité et aux droits à l'égalité des couples de même sexe, sans justification au regard de l'article premier.

La Cour a rejeté les prétentions fondées sur la liberté de religion et l'égalité religieuse de l'église intervenante, concluant que l'affaire visait l'institution juridique du mariage plutôt que sa dimension religieuse.

Comme réparation, la Cour a déclaré invalide la définition existante dans la mesure où elle contenait les mots « d'un homme et d'une femme », l'a reformulée immédiatement comme l'union de deux personnes, et a ordonné la délivrance et l'enregistrement des mariages visés.

The appellants sought a stay of a declaration that their restaurant and lounge violated the City's zoning by-law, pending their appeal of that decision.

The effect of the stay would be to adjourn an expedited trial on remedy issues (whether to permanently enjoin the operation).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding the appellants failed to establish a serious issue to be adjudicated or irreparable harm, as their business operations had not changed and any harm would be purely economic.

The balance of convenience favoured proceeding with the expedited trial so all issues could be heard in a single appeal.