Victoria Paris

Following an appeal, the Court of Appeal considered written submissions regarding the costs of the motion before the lower court.

The Court ordered that the costs of the motion be remitted to the motion judge for reconsideration in light of the appellate reasons.

The plaintiffs in a proposed class action appealed a motion judge's decision striking out several claims from their statement of claim against an insurer regarding the sale and administration of universal life insurance policies.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, reinstating the claims for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, breach of contract, and deceit and fraud, finding it was not plain and obvious these claims would fail.

The court upheld the striking of allegations concerning releases because the plaintiffs failed to request specific relief for those who signed them.

The plaintiffs, former students of a post-graduate international business program, brought a class action against the defendant college.

The college's course calendar represented that the program provided the opportunity to complete three industry designations in addition to a graduate certificate.

The students discovered that the college had no agreements with the industry associations and could not confer the designations.

The court found that the college was negligent in making the misrepresentation and breached the Consumer Protection Act, 2002, as the students were 'consumers' under the Act.

The plaintiffs were entitled to monetary compensation, with damages to be determined in a subsequent phase.

The appellants succeeded on a limitation issue in a class action appeal and sought costs for the appeal and the motion below.

The Court of Appeal declined to alter the motion judge's order that costs of the motion remain in the cause.

For the appeal, the court recognized the appellants' success but modified the costs award because the appeal raised a novel issue of law and involved access to justice considerations in a class action.

The court awarded costs of the appeal in the cause, fixing them at $20,000 for the Timminco appellants, $20,000 for the Photon Consulting appellants, and $10,000 for the Walsh appellant.

The plaintiffs in a proposed class action sought orders to have a motion for approval of a third party financing and indemnity agreement heard without notice to the defendant, in camera, and with the documents sealed.

They argued that disclosure would compromise solicitor-client privilege and litigation strategy.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that the defendant is affected by the funding agreement and entitled to notice and participation.

The court further held that third party funding agreements are not privileged, or if they are, the privilege is waived when applying for court approval.

The open court principle requires the funding motion to be heard publicly, though the court provided specific procedural directions for the future motion.

The plaintiff commenced a proposed class action alleging secondary market misrepresentations by the defendants.

The statement of claim asserted common law causes of action and indicated an intention to seek leave to assert a statutory cause of action under section 138.3 of the Securities Act.

Facing a potential limitation issue, the plaintiff successfully moved for a declaration that the limitation period was suspended under section 28 of the Class Proceedings Act.

The defendants appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a statutory cause of action under section 138.3 is not 'asserted' within the meaning of section 28 until leave to proceed has been granted.

The representative plaintiffs in two certified class proceedings regarding allegedly defective implantable defibrillators appealed orders of the motion judge.

The motion judge had ordered the bifurcation of discovery and trial of common issues relating to the quantification of compensation for waiver of tort from the liability issues.

In one of the actions, the motion judge also refused to certify punitive damages as a common issue.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeals, finding no error in principle in the motion judge's exercise of discretion to bifurcate the proceedings to ensure a fair and expeditious determination.

The Court also upheld the refusal to certify punitive damages as a common issue, agreeing that entitlement to punitive damages could not be rationally determined without first determining individual issues of causation and compensatory damages.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to appeal a certification decision that refused to certify class members' entitlement to punitive damages as a common issue and bifurcated common issues relating to the quantification and apportionment of waiver of tort damages.

The Divisional Court found that there were conflicting decisions on both issues and good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order.

Leave to appeal was granted on both issues and the hearing of the appeal was expedited.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to appeal an order bifurcating common issues relating to the quantification and apportionment of any accounting or disgorgement for a claim based on waiver of tort from the other common issues in a class action concerning allegedly defective cardiac defibrillators.

The court granted leave to appeal, finding conflicting decisions on the issue of bifurcation and good reason to doubt the correctness of the order, noting the matter is of sufficient importance to warrant appellate review.

The defendants' motion for leave to appeal a decision substituting the representative plaintiff in a class action was dismissed.

The plaintiff sought costs of $22,858.21, while the defendants argued costs should be in the cause or limited to $2,500.

The court found the plaintiff's costs excessive for a narrow procedural motion that arose partly from a carriage dispute among class counsel.

Applying the principle of fair and reasonable expectations, the court fixed costs at $2,500 payable by the defendants.

The defendants brought a motion for leave to appeal an order substituting two new representative plaintiffs in a proposed class action regarding defective pacemakers.

The original plaintiff, who had a defibrillator, was moved to a consolidated defibrillator action.

The defendants argued the substitution deprived them of a limitation period defence and that the original plaintiff was a mere placeholder.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision that the defendants suffered no non-compensable prejudice and that special circumstances existed.

The appellant, acting as receiver for a yacht manufacturer, appealed the dismissal of its insurance claim against the respondent export credit insurer.

The manufacturer had not been paid for boats delivered to a U.S. dealer and to Spain.

The dealer refused to pay because the manufacturer's receivership meant it could not fulfill warranty obligations.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that while the loss fell within the policy's initial coverage, the insurer successfully proved that an exclusion applied because the buyer did not pay due to a legitimate dispute regarding the export contract.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiffs, a special needs child and his mother, brought a proposed class action against Ontario for negligence and misfeasance in public office, alleging the government unlawfully terminated special needs agreements under section 30 of the Child and Family Services Act.

The Court of Appeal held that the statement of claim failed to disclose a cause of action.

The court found that the statutory discretion to enter into voluntary agreements did not create a private law duty of care, and the plaintiffs failed to plead specific facts demonstrating intentional wrongdoing by a public officer required for misfeasance in public office.

The appeal was allowed and the certification order was set aside.

The appellant, a dentist facing professional misconduct allegations, appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee denying his request for an adjournment.

The appellant sought the adjournment due to the unavailability of his expert witness and because the hearing could not be completed in the allotted time.

When the request was refused, the appellant's counsel withdrew, and the hearing proceeded in their absence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Committee properly exercised its discretion in denying the adjournment and that there was no breach of natural justice, procedural fairness, or reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellant real estate agency appealed the dismissal of its claim for commissions against the respondents.

The trial judge found the listing agreement invalid because the agent failed to leave a copy with the vendor, as required by section 35 of the Business Brokers Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings.

However, the Court noted the trial judge erred in concluding that failure to post the listing on MLS within two days invalidated the agreement, and that agents are required to verify a vendor's authority or sole ownership before signing a listing agreement.

Arrêt constitutionnel majeur portant sur l'exclusion des couples de même sexe de la définition du mariage aux fins de la common law.

La Cour a appliqué l'analyse du par. 15(1) de la Charte et conclu que la définition hétérosexuelle du mariage portait atteinte à la dignité et aux droits à l'égalité des couples de même sexe, sans justification au regard de l'article premier.

La Cour a rejeté les prétentions fondées sur la liberté de religion et l'égalité religieuse de l'église intervenante, concluant que l'affaire visait l'institution juridique du mariage plutôt que sa dimension religieuse.

Comme réparation, la Cour a déclaré invalide la définition existante dans la mesure où elle contenait les mots « d'un homme et d'une femme », l'a reformulée immédiatement comme l'union de deux personnes, et a ordonné la délivrance et l'enregistrement des mariages visés.

The Attorney General of Canada appealed a Divisional Court decision finding that the common law definition of marriage as between 'one man and one woman' violated the equality rights of same-sex couples under s. 15(1) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the exclusion of same-sex couples from the institution of marriage demeaned their dignity and was not justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The Court allowed the cross-appeals on remedy, declaring the existing definition invalid and immediately reformulating it as 'the voluntary union for life of two persons to the exclusion of all others'.