Glynnis P. Burt

The appellants, representative plaintiffs in a certified class proceeding concerning universal life insurance policies, appealed the dismissal of their motion to amend their statement of claim and add a new common issue regarding an 'Investment Spread Claim'.

The motion judge refused the amendments on the basis that the claim was a new cause of action that was discoverable in 2016 and therefore statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, agreeing that the claim was not captured by existing pleadings, was discoverable based on a 2016 repricing report, and did not engage a rolling limitation period as it involved discrete decisions rather than periodic breaches.

The plaintiffs in this class proceeding moved to amend their statement of claim to add a new cause of action related to an "investment spread" and sought certification of a new common issue.

The defendant opposed, arguing the claim was time-barred and the amendment would fundamentally alter the certified action.

The defendant also moved to strike portions of the plaintiffs' expert report as irrelevant.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' motion to amend, finding the claim discoverable in 2016 and thus out of time, and that the amendment would cause non-compensable prejudice and delay.

The court granted the defendant's motion to strike the expert report portions related to the investment spread and profitability, deeming them irrelevant to the certified common issues.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming she was incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic and mood stabilizing medications for a schizoaffective condition.

The appellant, supported by amicus curiae, argued the initial capacity assessment was inadequate and that she was denied procedural fairness.

The Superior Court of Justice found no palpable and overriding error in the Board's conclusion that the appellant could not recognize she was affected by manifestations of a mental condition and was therefore unable to appreciate the consequences of treatment decisions.

The appeal was dismissed.

S.S. appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board that found her incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic medication.

S.S. argued the Board applied an incorrect legal test by focusing on her best interests and failed to consider evidence supporting her capacity.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board correctly applied the legal test, which requires assessing a patient's ability to understand information and appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of their decision, not whether they act in their best interests.

The court also found no palpable and overriding error in the Board's assessment of the evidence regarding S.S.'s capacity to appreciate the consequences of refusing treatment, despite her understanding of medication side effects.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to settle the Notices of Certification and the Litigation Plan in a class action concerning universal life insurance policies.

The court excluded certain sentences from the Notices of Certification, finding them unnecessary and potentially confusing for class members deciding whether to opt out.

The court also heavily edited the plaintiffs' proposed Litigation Plan, removing extraneous, premature, and confrontational information, noting that a post-certification litigation plan should focus on implementation rather than litigation strategy.

This is a costs endorsement addressing the allocation of costs for certification and summary judgment motions in the Superior Court and the costs of the appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The plaintiffs appealed from orders of Justice Paul M. Perell denying certification and granting summary judgment.

On appeal, the plaintiffs achieved partial success: they obtained certification on some common issues but not on their negligent misrepresentation claim, and they reversed summary judgment on some claims while others remained time-barred.

The Court of Appeal awarded costs to the plaintiffs reflecting their overall success.

This appeal concerns a proposed $2.5 billion class action involving more than 230,000 universal life insurance policies sold by Metropolitan Life Insurance Company between 1985 and 1998.

The plaintiffs alleged misrepresentation in the sale of policies and breach of contractual duties relating to premiums and fees.

The motions judge dismissed the certification motion for misrepresentation claims and initially declined to certify breach of contract claims.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, certifying the breach of contract common issues and allowing the plaintiffs to pursue individual misrepresentation claims.

The court found the motions judge erred in principle by failing to conduct individualized and contextual analyses of the limitation period defences and by improperly deciding the merits of the breach of contract claims at the certification stage.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' motion for class certification and the defendant's mixed success on a summary judgment motion, the defendant sought costs of $3.6 million on a substantial indemnity basis.

The plaintiffs argued the award should not exceed $775,000.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs, finding no reprehensible conduct by the plaintiffs in pleading misrepresentation.

Considering the defendant's technical loss on the summary judgment motion, which nonetheless provided a strategic victory in defeating certification, the court fixed costs at $1.0 million on a partial indemnity basis as a fair and reasonable amount.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to certify a class action against a life insurance company, alleging breach of contract regarding increases to the cost of insurance and administrative fees for universal life insurance policies.

The court had previously adjourned the motion to allow for further evidence on how the fees were calculated.

After reviewing actuarial evidence, the court found that the insurer had set and adjusted the fees in accordance with the policy terms and industry practice.

Concluding there was no basis in fact for the breach of contract claims, the court dismissed the certification motion in its entirety.

The plaintiffs sought certification of a proposed $2.5 billion class proceeding against an insurer arising from alleged misrepresentations in the sale and administration of universal life insurance policies originally issued by another insurer.

The defendant opposed certification and brought a cross‑motion for summary judgment arguing the representative plaintiffs’ claims were statute‑barred.

The court held that the alleged misrepresentation, deceit, good faith, and rescission claims lacked commonality and largely mirrored deficiencies identified in prior appellate authority concerning insurance misrepresentation class actions.

The court further found most negligent misrepresentation claims were statute‑barred under applicable provincial limitation statutes, while certain breach of contract claims relating to cost‑of‑insurance and administrative fee adjustments were not clearly time‑barred but required further evidentiary development.

Certification was dismissed except that the motion was adjourned to permit further evidence regarding potential breach of contract claims concerning cost‑of‑insurance and administrative fee calculations.

The plaintiffs brought an unsuccessful refusals motion in a proposed class action.

The successful defendant sought $30,000 in costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiffs argued the amount was excessive for an uncomplicated motion and suggested $5,000.

The court found the motion was important and vigorously contested, but agreed the defendant's claim was excessive.

Costs were fixed at $18,000 payable to the defendant in any event of the certification motion.

In a proposed class action against an insurer, the court addressed procedural directions for the hearing of a certification motion and a defendant’s summary judgment motion.

The plaintiffs sought a further and better affidavit of documents before the summary judgment motion, arguing procedural unfairness.

The court held that there was no automatic entitlement to an affidavit of documents at this stage and emphasized proportionality principles and the court’s discretion under s. 12 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The court directed that no affidavits of documents were required and restricted the defendant’s summary judgment motion to limitation period defences against the proposed representative plaintiffs.

The certification motion and the focused summary judgment motion were ordered to be heard together with a revised timetable.

The plaintiffs in a proposed class action sought orders to have a motion for approval of a third party financing and indemnity agreement heard without notice to the defendant, in camera, and with the documents sealed.

They argued that disclosure would compromise solicitor-client privilege and litigation strategy.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that the defendant is affected by the funding agreement and entitled to notice and participation.

The court further held that third party funding agreements are not privileged, or if they are, the privilege is waived when applying for court approval.

The open court principle requires the funding motion to be heard publicly, though the court provided specific procedural directions for the future motion.