Eyitayo Folashade Dada

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a lower court decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party in the all-inclusive amount of $5,000.

B.B. appealed decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board that confirmed her incapacity regarding treatment with antipsychotic medications and a community treatment plan, and upheld a community treatment order.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Board's conclusions regarding B.B.'s lack of capacity, the likelihood of substantial mental deterioration without continuing care, Dr. Pittman's consultations with health practitioners, or the substitute decision-maker's proper consent to the treatment plan.

F.L. appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision that upheld a Certificate of Incapacity, finding him incapable of managing his property.

The appeal raised issues of procedural fairness due to the joinder of the Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) and alleged errors in law regarding the onus of proof and the application of the incapacity test.

The court dismissed the appeal, distinguishing the procedural fairness arguments from a prior case (P.P. v. Oliver) and affirming that the Board correctly applied the legal tests for incapacity, including the appreciation component, and did not improperly shift the burden of proof.

The appellant, an involuntary psychiatric patient diagnosed with a schizophrenic disorder, appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming he lacked capacity to consent to treatment with antipsychotic medication.

The appellant argued he was not provided adequate information about the treatment and that the Board failed to recognize his capacity fluctuated.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the Board made no palpable and overriding error.

The evidence supported the Board's conclusion that the appellant's inability to recognize his illness prevented him from appreciating the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the proposed treatment.

The appellant, MLD, appealed a community treatment order approved by the Consent and Capacity Board.

The appeal raised two main grounds: whether MLD received prompt rights advice as required by the Mental Health Act, and whether the Board erred in finding MLD unable to appreciate the foreseeable consequences of a lack of treatment.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the 15-day delay in rights advice was not unreasonable given diligent efforts by the rights advisor and lack of prejudice.

On the capacity issue, the court upheld the Board's majority finding that MLD lacked the ability to appreciate the foreseeable consequences of not adhering to treatment, emphasizing that the Board's weighing of conflicting evidence was not a palpable and overriding error.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision finding him incapable of consenting to a community treatment plan and antipsychotic medications.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the Board committed a palpable and overriding error.

The treating psychiatrist could not recall informing the appellant of the benefits and consequences of the proposed treatment during the assessment, meaning the presumption of capacity was not displaced.

Furthermore, the community treatment plan was fatally defective because it was signed before the appellant was examined.

On an appeal from a Consent and Capacity Board decision, the court upheld the Board’s finding that the appellant was incapable of consenting to a community treatment plan under s. 4(1) of the Health Care Consent Act, 1996.

The court also upheld the Board’s conclusion that certain plan terms were not impermissibly vague or overbroad and that the statutory deterioration criterion under the Mental Health Act was met.

However, the court held that the Board erred in law in finding that the physician had complied with the consultation requirement in s. 33.1(4)(d) of the Mental Health Act, because a written referral to a community agency without any response or agreement before issuance of the order did not amount to consultation.

The appeal was therefore allowed in part and the community treatment order was set aside, with no costs.

The appellant, diagnosed with schizophrenia, appealed a Superior Court decision affirming a Community Treatment Order (CTO) issued by the respondent psychiatrist.

The appeal challenged the Consent and Capacity Board's finding of the appellant's incapacity to consent to treatment and the validity of the CTO.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Board's application of the two-part capacity test under the Health Care Consent Act, as interpreted by Starson v. Swayze, and its assessment of the CTO's compliance with the Mental Health Act.

The court affirmed that the appellant failed to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of not receiving treatment, despite his history of non-compliance and subsequent deterioration.

S.S. appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board that found her incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic medication.

S.S. argued the Board applied an incorrect legal test by focusing on her best interests and failed to consider evidence supporting her capacity.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board correctly applied the legal test, which requires assessing a patient's ability to understand information and appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of their decision, not whether they act in their best interests.

The court also found no palpable and overriding error in the Board's assessment of the evidence regarding S.S.'s capacity to appreciate the consequences of refusing treatment, despite her understanding of medication side effects.

The appellant appealed decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming her involuntary admission and incapacity to consent to treatment for an eating disorder.

Following the hearing, the appellant was discharged, regained capacity, and her community treatment order was terminated.

The respondent moved to admit fresh evidence of these developments and argued the appeal was moot.

The Superior Court allowed the fresh evidence and dismissed the appeal as moot, finding no live controversy or special circumstances to justify hearing it.

In the alternative, the court held it would have dismissed the appeal on the merits, as the Board's decisions were reasonable and free of palpable and overriding error.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision that confirmed his incapacity to consent to antipsychotic medication and a community treatment plan, and the validity of a community treatment order.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board correctly applied the legal standard for capacity and had ample evidence to determine the appellant's incapacity to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of treatment or lack thereof.

The court also found that the Board had a sufficient basis to confirm that all statutory criteria for issuing the community treatment order were met.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming the renewal of a Community Treatment Order (CTO) and a finding of incapacity to make decisions about his antipsychotic medications.

The court upheld the Board's finding of incapacity and the validity of the CTO, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Board's assessment of the appellant's inability to appreciate the foreseeable consequences of discontinuing medication.

However, the court found an error in the Community Treatment Plan (CTP) by not accounting for COVID-19 public health restrictions.

The CTP was amended to allow for flexible meeting formats (videoconference, teleconference, or in-person) at the discretion of the respondent physician, considering public health and the appellant's needs.

This is a Hague Convention Application brought by the father seeking the return of three children to the United Kingdom.

The children were removed from the UK on August 25, 2018, by their mother without the father's knowledge or consent.

The application was commenced within one year of removal.

The court found that while the children's habitual residence was in the UK and the father held parental responsibility under UK law, he had not actively exercised custody rights at the time of removal.

The father was characterized as an access parent who maintained contact through visits and financial support but did not exercise day-to-day parental responsibility.

The mother was the primary caregiver and exercised custodial rights.

The application was dismissed as the father failed to meet the threshold requirement under Article 3(b) of the Hague Convention that custody rights be "actually exercised" at the time of removal.

In this family law trial, the court set aside a 2001 separation agreement after finding the parties' post-agreement conduct was inconsistent with an actual separation and that the respondent had been misled as to the agreement's true purpose.

The court fixed the separation date as August 2, 2010, declared the Brampton residence to be the matrimonial home, and ordered an equalization payment of $51,867.20, with sale of the home only if the payment could not otherwise be made.

The interim child support order was varied retroactively due to a material change in the respondent's income, but arrears were cancelled because of hardship and social assistance dependence.

Retroactive s. 7 expenses were denied as delayed and prejudicial, though future s. 7 expenses were ordered proportionately.

The respondent was awarded symbolic non-compensatory spousal support below guideline levels because the applicant bore almost all ongoing child-related expenses.