Patrick A. Wright

The appellant, Nathalie Xian Yi Yan, sought a panel review of a motion judge’s decision dismissing her motion for a stay pending appeal.

The underlying appeal was from an order declaring her a vexatious litigant under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the review motion, holding that Yan had not obtained leave to bring the motion as required by the vexatious litigant order and the statute.

The court reiterated that a person declared a vexatious litigant may file a notice of appeal without leave, but requires leave for any motions in the appeal.

The court found no error in the motion judge’s decision and awarded costs to the College.

The appellant, MLD, appealed a community treatment order approved by the Consent and Capacity Board.

The appeal raised two main grounds: whether MLD received prompt rights advice as required by the Mental Health Act, and whether the Board erred in finding MLD unable to appreciate the foreseeable consequences of a lack of treatment.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the 15-day delay in rights advice was not unreasonable given diligent efforts by the rights advisor and lack of prejudice.

On the capacity issue, the court upheld the Board's majority finding that MLD lacked the ability to appreciate the foreseeable consequences of not adhering to treatment, emphasizing that the Board's weighing of conflicting evidence was not a palpable and overriding error.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming his treating psychiatrist's finding that he was incapable of consenting to a Community Treatment Plan and long-acting antipsychotic medication.

The Board also confirmed that the Community Treatment Order met the statutory criteria under the Mental Health Act.

The Superior Court of Justice found no error of law or palpable and overriding error of fact in the Board's capacity analysis or its assessment of the statutory criteria.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, JS, appealed two decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board: one declining jurisdiction over his appeal regarding capacity to manage property, and another upholding a finding of incapacity to consent to antipsychotic medication.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal on property management capacity, finding the Board erred in declining jurisdiction due to an administrative glitch that denied JS his statutory right to prompt rights advice.

This issue was remitted back to the Board for a hearing on the merits.

The court dismissed the appeal on capacity to consent to treatment, finding the Board applied the correct test and had ample evidence to support its findings, without conflating mental illness with lack of capacity or failing to consider up-to-date evidence.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming his community treatment order and upholding the finding that he was incapable of consenting to antipsychotic medication and his community treatment plan.

The Superior Court found the appeal regarding the community treatment order was moot because it had expired and a new order was issued under different statutory criteria.

The court also held the Board made no palpable and overriding error in finding the appellant incapable of consenting to treatment, as there was sufficient evidence he could not appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his treatment decisions.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision upholding a finding of incapacity and a Community Treatment Order (CTO).

By the time of the appeal, the CTO had expired and two subsequent CTOs had been issued, including one based on a new capacity assessment rather than the prior CTOs.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal as moot, finding that a decision would have no practical effect on the appellant's rights and no special circumstances warranted hearing the appeal.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, which upheld the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario's decision to take no further action regarding her complaint against a physician.

The applicant, an autism advocate, complained about the physician's use of chelation therapy for children with autism spectrum disorder.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Board reasonably concluded the College's investigation was adequate and its decision not to refer the matter to discipline was reasonable, given the lack of patient-specific evidence of harm and the statutory protections for alternative medicine.