Ikenna Emmanuel Aniekwe

The defendant Kinark brought a motion for leave to issue a third-party claim and to compel the plaintiff to answer refusals from examinations for discovery.

The plaintiffs brought a cross-motion for the production of a workplace investigation report over which Kinark claimed solicitor-client privilege.

The court first ordered the parties to obtain an order under the Youth Criminal Justice Act before further using youth records.

The court denied leave for the third-party claim, finding it was statute-barred and would prejudice the plaintiffs.

The court ordered the plaintiff to answer most of the refused discovery questions, subject to obtaining a YCJA order where applicable.

Finally, the court ordered the production of the workplace investigation report, finding it was not protected by solicitor-client privilege as the lawyer who authored it was not retained to provide legal advice.

The applicant mortgagor challenged the respondent mortgagee's sale of her residential property under power of sale proceedings, alleging the sale was improvident and that the respondent breached her right of redemption.

The court found that the respondent took reasonable precautions to obtain the true market value in a declining market, actively marketing the property and reasonably accepting the final offer.

The court also held that the applicant's request to complete a conditional sale herself did not constitute a valid tender to exercise the right of redemption.

The application was dismissed.

Appeal under s. 80 of the Health Care Consent Act, 1996 from a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming a health practitioner's finding that the appellant was incapable with respect to proposed treatment in the classes of antipsychotic medications, mood stabilizers, and anxiolytics.

The appellant argued the Board erred by accepting a seven-day gap between the psychiatrist's last capacity assessment and the hearing, misapprehending a social worker's note as a clinical assessment, and failing to carefully weigh hearsay.

The court found the Board applied the correct legal test from Starson, acknowledged the presumption of capacity and onus on the health practitioner, and reasonably concluded that incapacity persisted as of the hearing date based on enduring lack of insight and corroborative clinical entries.

Appeal dismissed and Board's decision confirmed.

The appellant, J.A., appealed a decision of the Superior Court of Justice upholding a finding by the Consent and Capacity Board that he was incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic medication.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error in the lower court’s decision, upholding the dismissal of the appellant’s adjournment request and the application of the relevant legal principles regarding capacity and consent.

The appeal was dismissed.

The case concerns whether an assessor appointed under the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992 must provide disclosure of materials collected and reviewed prior to a capacity assessment, and whether the assessor and the Consent and Capacity Board considered the correct factors relevant to the management of property.

The court held that there is no legal obligation for the assessor to provide such disclosure in advance, and that the Board did not err in its application of the legal test for capacity.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent psychiatrist brought a motion under s. 19(1) of the Health Care Consent Act to administer antipsychotic medication to an involuntary patient pending his appeal of a Consent and Capacity Board decision.

The Board had confirmed the psychiatrist's finding that the patient was incapable of consenting to treatment for a schizophrenia relapse.

The court granted the motion, finding that the patient's condition was likely to deteriorate rapidly without treatment, that he had previously responded well to the proposed medication, and that the treatment was necessary before the final disposition of the appeal.

The defendants, a lawyer and his law firm, brought an interpleader motion seeking to pay disputed funds held in their trust account into court.

The funds arose from the sale of a property by the plaintiff corporation, 2823373 Ontario Inc., whose director, Diane Salman, was also a plaintiff.

A dispute arose among the corporation's shareholders regarding the release of these funds.

The plaintiffs opposed the interpleader motion, arguing the funds should be released to the corporation.

The court found that Ms. Salman, on behalf of the corporation, had initially instructed the defendants to hold the funds in trust, but later instructed their release.

The court denied the interpleader motion, concluding that the defendants were not neutral stakeholders and had a beneficial interest in the funds due to the lawyer's involvement as a director of the majority shareholder and the source of investment funds.

The court also declined to invoke its inherent jurisdiction to order the funds into court.

Consequently, the defendants were ordered to release the disputed funds to 2823373 Ontario Inc.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's order requiring him to pay retroactive and ongoing child and spousal support based on imputed income, and a costs order.

The trial judge had drawn a strong adverse inference due to the appellant's "monumental and transnational" failure to make meaningful financial disclosure, imputing income of $130,000 (except $110,000 for 2020).

The appellant argued procedural unfairness regarding document admissibility and errors in income imputation.

The Court of Appeal found no procedural unfairness, noting the appellant's own strategic decisions regarding evidence, and upheld the trial judge's findings on income imputation, dismissing the appeal.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal an order of Emery J. The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

The court made no order as to costs because the responding party failed to provide a costs outline.

In an oppression application, the applicant sought the production of corporate books and records to prove financial irregularities that allegedly led to his termination as Chief Operating Officer.

At a case conference, the respondents objected that the applicant had not yet served an affidavit.

The court ordered the applicant to serve a preliminary affidavit and a detailed request for production, and scheduled a further case conference to resolve the production issue, noting that case conference judges have the power to make orders to prevent unnecessary delays.

A.K. appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board (CCB) that found him incapable of consenting to treatment for schizophrenia.

The appeal focused on whether A.K. could appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of taking or refusing treatment, as per the second prong of the capacity test under the Health Care Consent Act.

The court reviewed the CCB's findings for palpable and overriding error, considering A.K.'s denial of symptoms and his understanding of medication benefits.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the CCB's conclusion that A.K. was unable to appreciate the manifestations of his illness and the consequences of treatment.

This is an appeal from a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming the appellant's involuntary patient status and incapability to consent to antipsychotic medication.

The respondent submitted new evidence via affidavit, which the court admitted, demonstrating that the appellant had been discharged from the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH) and his involuntary status terminated, rendering the appeal moot.

The court considered whether "special circumstances" existed to hear the appeal despite mootness, referencing Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence on the issue.

Finding no such circumstances, the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming his treating psychiatrist's finding that he was incapable of consenting to a Community Treatment Plan and long-acting antipsychotic medication.

The Board also confirmed that the Community Treatment Order met the statutory criteria under the Mental Health Act.

The Superior Court of Justice found no error of law or palpable and overriding error of fact in the Board's capacity analysis or its assessment of the statutory criteria.

The appeal was dismissed.

The parties separated after a five-year marriage.

The mother sought retroactive and ongoing child and spousal support, and equalization of net family property.

The court found that the father engaged in monumental and self-serving financial nondisclosure regarding his businesses in Canada and Nigeria.

Drawing a strong adverse inference, the court imputed the father's income at $130,000 for most years due to intentional underemployment and hidden income.

The father was ordered to pay child support and indefinite spousal support at the high end of the SSAG range, along with a substantial equalization payment.

The applicant sought costs after successfully obtaining a spousal support order.

The court considered the applicant's offers to settle, which were more favourable than the trial outcome, triggering Rule 18(14) of the Family Law Rules.

The decision clarifies the application of Rule 18(14) regarding costs for prior steps in a case, distinguishing between costs incurred before and after a qualifying offer to settle.

The court awarded the applicant $12,000 in costs, inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST, payable in monthly installments, finding the amount reasonable and proportionate given the respondent's unreasonable conduct and failure to provide timely disclosure.

The applicant sought indefinite spousal support from the respondent.

The court found the applicant was entitled to both compensatory and non-compensatory spousal support, though limited.

The court imputed income to the applicant and determined the respondent's current income.

Spousal support was ordered for a fixed duration of five years at $475 per month, starting prospectively, and retroactive support was denied due to various factors including lack of blameworthy conduct by the respondent and potential hardship.

The appellant, JS, appealed two decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board: one declining jurisdiction over his appeal regarding capacity to manage property, and another upholding a finding of incapacity to consent to antipsychotic medication.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal on property management capacity, finding the Board erred in declining jurisdiction due to an administrative glitch that denied JS his statutory right to prompt rights advice.

This issue was remitted back to the Board for a hearing on the merits.

The court dismissed the appeal on capacity to consent to treatment, finding the Board applied the correct test and had ample evidence to support its findings, without conflating mental illness with lack of capacity or failing to consider up-to-date evidence.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment that dismissed their action as statute-barred by the 15-year ultimate limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

They argued that exceptions for concealment of information and incapacity applied, and also challenged the derivative nature of claims under the Family Law Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence to support the asserted exceptions to the limitation period and affirming that Family Law Act claims are derivative and tied to the principal claim, not independent.

The appellant, a 20-year-old diagnosed with schizophrenia, appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision upholding a doctor's finding that he was incapable of making treatment decisions regarding anti-psychotic medication.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the Board and the doctor applied the incorrect legal test by requiring the appellant to accept his diagnosis and have an actual appreciation of the consequences of treatment.

The court also found that the Board erred in considering the appellant's best interests and the impact of his refusal on his family, and made a palpable and overriding error by failing to make necessary inquiries to assess capacity.

The Board's decision was quashed, and the appellant's presumption of capacity was restored.

The appellant, diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board upholding his treating psychiatrist's finding that he was incapable of making treatment decisions regarding anti-psychotic medication.

The appellant argued the physician applied the wrong legal test, lacked corroborating evidence under the Evidence Act, and that the record did not support a finding of incapacity.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the Board correctly concluded the physician applied the proper test, the evidence was sufficiently corroborated by other doctors and the appellant's own testimony, and the record supported the finding that the appellant's denial of any mental condition rendered him incapable of appreciating the consequences of treatment.