Theodore Nemetz

J.F. appealed a decision by the Consent and Capacity Board that found him incapable of consenting to anti-psychotic medication.

The core issue was whether J.F. could appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his treatment decisions, particularly his inability to acknowledge the manifestations of his mental condition.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Board's determination that J.F. was incapable of consenting to treatment, as he failed to recognize the possibility that he was affected by the manifestations of a mental condition.

The appellant, K.S., appealed a decision by the Consent and Capacity Board (CCB) that confirmed a Community Treatment Order (CTO) and her incapacity regarding the Community Treatment Plan (CTP).

The appeal argued that the respondent physician failed to obtain proper consent from K.S.'s substitute decision-maker (SDM) in accordance with the Health Care Consent Act, 1996 (HCCA), specifically concerning informed consent (s. 11(3)) and prior capable wishes (s. 21).

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the s. 11(3) issue was not properly raised before the CCB, and that the CCB made no palpable and overriding error in concluding that consent was obtained in accordance with s. 21, distinguishing the case from G.A. v. Kantor.

This case involved two consolidated applications concerning the Estate of William R. Harper.

The primary dispute was over the beneficiary designation of a Registered Retirement Savings Plan (RRSP) and a Life Income Fund (LIF) held with National Bank Financial Inc. (NBF).

Erin Forsyth claimed to be the beneficiary of both, based on a disputed beneficiary designation form.

Dona Jean Murphy, as Estate Trustee, argued the Estate was the beneficiary and challenged Forsyth's designation on grounds of undue influence and lack of capacity.

The court found the disputed form valid for the RRSP only, designating Forsyth as beneficiary, and dismissed claims of undue influence and lack of capacity.

The LIF was determined to be part of the Estate.

This case involved two consolidated applications concerning the Estate of William R. Harper.

The primary dispute was over the beneficiary designation of a Registered Retirement Savings Plan (RRSP) and a Life Income Fund (LIF) held with National Bank Financial Inc. (NBF).

Erin Forsyth claimed to be the beneficiary of both, based on a disputed beneficiary designation form.

Dona Jean Murphy, as Estate Trustee, argued the Estate was the beneficiary and challenged Forsyth's designation on grounds of undue influence and lack of capacity.

The court found the disputed form valid for the RRSP only, designating Forsyth as beneficiary, and dismissed claims of undue influence and lack of capacity.

The LIF was determined to be part of the Estate.

The applicant sought an order enforcing Minutes of Settlement requiring the respondent to transfer title to the matrimonial home, and determining the adjustments to the purchase price.

The court found that the Minutes waived post-separation adjustments prior to the settlement date, but allowed post-Minutes adjustments for HELOC and mortgage default costs.

The court ordered the transfer of title upon payment of an agreed amount into trust, and directed a reference to an Associate Justice to determine the remaining disputed adjustments.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming her incapacity to consent to a community treatment plan and upholding a community treatment order.

The appellant, who has a history of bipolar disorder, argued the Board applied the wrong legal test for capacity and that the treatment plan was overbroad regarding mobility and marijuana use.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the Board correctly applied the test from Starson v. Swayze and made no palpable and overriding error in its factual findings or its interpretation of the treatment plan.

The appellant, a subtenant, appealed a lower court decision that found no rent reduction agreement existed and dismissed its claim for damages after being locked out for non-payment of rent.

The appellant argued the lockout was unlawful and sought damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's factual finding that no rent reduction agreement was made, noting deference is owed to such findings in the absence of palpable and overriding error.

The court also found the landlord was not liable for damages under the Helping Tenants and Small Businesses Act, 2020, as the lockout occurred before the Act's non-enforcement period began, and the tenant regained possession shortly after the Act came into force.

Leave to appeal the costs award was also dismissed.

An appeal concerning the termination of child support for two adult children and a costs order.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in applying the material change in circumstances test under the Divorce Act, specifically by misplacing the onus of proof on the recipient parent to demonstrate the children's inability to withdraw from parental charge, and by failing to consider the parties' original contemplation of post-secondary education.

The court also identified an inconsistency between the motion judge's reasons and the final order regarding the termination of support for the second child.

The appeal was allowed, reinstating child support and setting aside the costs order.

A costs decision arising from a motion for custody and return of a child.

The applicant (mother) sought custody of five children and the return of her 14-year-old son who had been removed from Toronto to Sudbury by the respondent (father) without consent or court order.

After multiple adjournments and temporary consent orders, the mother was successful on the motion, obtaining custody of all children including the son.

The court awarded costs to the mother on a full recovery basis, finding the father's conduct unreasonable though not rising to bad faith, and that the mother's offer to settle was as good as the final order.

The applicant father sought sole custody of the youngest child following a high-conflict separation where the respondent mother successfully alienated the three children from him.

Despite numerous attempts at reintegration therapy and various access schedules, the youngest child continued to refuse meaningful contact with the father.

The court found that the mother engaged in unilateral, deliberate, and successful parental alienation, which amounted to emotional abuse.

Concluding that leaving the child with the mother would permanently sever the father-child relationship, the court ordered a custody reversal, granting sole custody to the father and suspending all contact between the child and the mother for a minimum of six months to facilitate reconciliation therapy.

This is a costs decision following a trial on a spousal support claim.

The mother was awarded $1,275 per month in spousal support commencing April 1, 2017.

The mother had served an Offer to Settle seeking $900 per month commencing September 1, 2017, which was more favourable than the trial outcome.

The father failed to accept the offer and did not file responding costs submissions.

The court awarded the mother full recovery of costs from the date of the offer and partial recovery prior to that date, totalling $14,203.30, payable within 45 days.

The applicant mother sought spousal support from the respondent father in a short marriage that ended following the father's criminal assault on the mother.

The father conceded that some spousal support was owing but disputed the amount.

The father failed to file his evidence in chief as ordered and did not testify at trial.

The court awarded spousal support of $1,275 per month for an indefinite duration, reviewable after December 31, 2021.

The court rejected the father's argument that the mother should be working or that income should be imputed to her, finding her decision to pursue English language education and vocational training reasonable given her circumstances as sole caregiver of two children, one of whom suffered emotional trauma from witnessing the father's assault.

This is a costs endorsement following a trial concerning parenting arrangements, child support, and spousal support for two children.

The mother sought $9,040 in costs while the father sought $4,221.

The court found the mother was the more successful party overall, particularly on custody and child support issues.

The father's unreasonable behaviour, including failure to provide complete financial disclosure and refusal to sever the custody issue, was a significant factor in the costs determination.

The court awarded the mother $6,500 in costs inclusive of fees, disbursements and HST, payable at $500 per month starting March 1, 2017, and dismissed the father's costs claim.

This trial decision addresses parenting arrangements, child support, and spousal support for two young children following the separation of the parties.

The mother sought sole custody with specified access for the father, child support based on an imputed income of $100,000, and spousal support of $950 monthly for three years.

The father sought sole custody and child support, opposing the mother's claims.

The court granted sole custody to the mother, finding her to be the primary caregiver in a stable home environment.

The court imputed income to both parties: $16,000 to the mother (recognizing her part-time work capacity while pursuing education) and $67,652 to the father (based on his excavator income plus unreported business income from his driving school, grossed-up for tax purposes).

The court awarded child support of $1,005 monthly retroactive to May 1, 2015, and spousal support of $200 monthly indefinite (subject to review after five years), recognizing the mother's strong compensatory claim based on her childcare role during the marriage.

The applicant sought sole guardianship of Juliet Eastlyn Hamilton for personal care under the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, to implement a "Do Not Resuscitate" (DNR) direction and manage end-of-life care.

The co-guardian, Nicole Hamilton, and Juliet's spouse, Trevor Hamilton, opposed this, citing Juliet's religious beliefs and previous wishes for all possible steps to prolong life.

The court granted sole guardianship to the applicant, finding that his request was in Juliet's best interests based on objective medical evidence of her deteriorating health and constant pain, and that his intention was not to actively terminate life but to allow natural progression with a DNR.

AJ appealed a decision by the Consent and Capacity Board that found him incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic medication.

The Board's decision was based on the two-part capacity test under the Health Care Consent Act, as interpreted by Starson v. Swayze.

The court upheld the Board's finding, concluding that AJ, despite possessing cognitive ability, was unable to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his decision due to his persistent denial of any mental condition, which was deemed a symptom of his disorder.

The appeal was dismissed, affirming the Board's reasonable conclusion based on the evidence and the applicable standard of review.

Unmarried parents of a child born in Mexico brought the child to Chicago, Illinois in June 2015.

The mother left with the child in July 2015 and entered Canada, claiming she was fleeing an abusive relationship.

The father applied under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction for the child's return to Illinois.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the child had no habitual residence because the mother did not have a settled intention to reside in Illinois when she entered the United States.

Additionally, even if Illinois were the habitual residence, the removal was not wrongful because the father had no custody rights under Illinois law at the time of removal, and the emergency protection order he obtained was issued after the child had already entered Canada.

The applicant sought non-time limited spousal support and a lump sum payment to compensate for her lost share of the respondent's pension following his bankruptcy.

The court found the applicant was entitled to spousal support on both compensatory and non-compensatory grounds following a 15-year traditional marriage.

However, the court imputed a minimum wage income to the applicant, finding she was intentionally unemployed despite physical limitations.

The court ordered periodic spousal support of $2,800 per month indefinitely.

The claim for lump sum spousal support was dismissed because no equalization of net family property had ever occurred, making a lump sum award an improper redistribution of assets.

The applicant sought leave to appeal an order requiring him to post $30,000 as security for costs and pay $21,000 in costs.

The underlying dispute involved the applicant's claim to one-half of the matrimonial home based on a domestic contract.

The court applied the test for leave to appeal under Rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and found no conflicting decisions and no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent on a full recovery basis.

The applicant mother sought permission to relocate her son from Toronto to Surrey, British Columbia, and to vary the access order accordingly.

The respondent father opposed the relocation.

The court found that the mother had established a material change in circumstances (a 25% reduction in her income) that affected her ability to meet the child's needs.

Applying the two-part test from Gordon v. Goertz, the court conducted a fresh inquiry into the child's best interests and found that the proposed move would not materially alter the father's ability to exercise access.

The court granted the mother's application to relocate, finding that her views as the custodial parent were entitled to great respect and that the move was made in good faith for legitimate financial and personal reasons.