Nicole Catherine Fielding

J.F. appealed a decision by the Consent and Capacity Board that found him incapable of consenting to anti-psychotic medication.

The core issue was whether J.F. could appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his treatment decisions, particularly his inability to acknowledge the manifestations of his mental condition.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Board's determination that J.F. was incapable of consenting to treatment, as he failed to recognize the possibility that he was affected by the manifestations of a mental condition.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal decision that summarily dismissed his complaints regarding his treatment at the respondent facility.

The applicant alleged age discrimination and negligence, claiming his medical records contained errors and his condition was not as serious as indicated.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Tribunal's decision reasonable as the complaint did not raise a serious issue of discrimination on a prohibited ground.

The appellant challenged the appeal judge’s dismissal of her appeal from a Consent and Capacity Board decision, which had confirmed her involuntary admission to the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH).

The appeal judge dismissed the appeal as moot because the appellant had been discharged from CAMH.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding no live controversy and no special circumstances to warrant exercising its discretion to hear the moot appeal.

The court rejected arguments that the appeal right would become illusory or that appellate guidance was needed on the interpretation of Box B criteria under the Mental Health Act.

The appellant appealed an order from the Consent and Capacity Board (CCB) confirming his involuntary patient status and incapacity to consent to treatment.

The appeal regarding involuntary status became moot as the appellant was discharged.

The court focused on the finding of incapacity.

The CCB found the appellant incapable of consenting to treatment, relying on his repeated denial of a mental disorder despite exhibiting symptoms.

The court applied a palpable and overriding error standard of review to the CCB's factual conclusions.

The appeal was dismissed, as the court found no palpable and overriding error in the CCB's conclusion that the appellant's condition prevented him from appreciating the consequences of his treatment decisions.

This is an appeal from a Superior Court order that upheld a Consent and Capacity Board decision.

The Board found the appellant incapable of consenting to treatment for antipsychotic medications and maintained her involuntary status.

The appellant argued a denial of procedural fairness, specifically that the Board failed to appoint amicus curiae.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reviewable error in the Board's determination of capacity or its decision to proceed without amicus, noting the appellant had access to counsel and chose to self-represent.

The appellant, Rees Kozoubenko, appealed a Superior Court decision upholding a Consent and Capacity Board finding that he was incapable of consenting to anti-psychotic medication in 2018.

The Court of Appeal considered a motion by the respondent, Dr. Milena Gosk, to dismiss the appeal as moot due to the passage of time and the appellant no longer being an in-patient or having proposed treatment.

The court granted the motion, dismissing the appeal as moot, finding that a decision on the merits would not have a practical effect on the appellant's rights given the time- and treatment-specific nature of capacity assessments under the Health Care Consent Act.

M.F. appealed a decision affirming his incapacity to make treatment decisions regarding antipsychotic medication.

The Consent and Capacity Board and the Superior Court of Justice had previously confirmed Dr. Milovic's finding of incapacity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board properly weighed the evidence, including the medical opinion that M.F.'s psychosis was due to schizophrenia, not drug-induced psychosis, despite arguments about cannabis use.

This is an appeal from a Consent and Capacity Board decision finding the appellant, SBJ, incapable of consenting to psychiatric treatment.

The appeal raised two main issues: whether gaps in the hearing transcript prevented effective appellate review and whether the Board applied the correct test for capacity.

The court found that despite transcript gaps, no prejudice to appeal rights occurred as the core issue on appeal was a legal error in applying the capacity test, not a misapprehension of facts.

The court also found that while the Board's language regarding "gamesmanship" and "red herring" for side effects might suggest a "best interests" approach, the Board ultimately applied the correct legal test by focusing on SBJ's inability to appreciate the depth of his disorder and its manifestations.

The appeal was dismissed.

This is an appeal from a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming the appellant's involuntary patient status and incapability to consent to antipsychotic medication.

The respondent submitted new evidence via affidavit, which the court admitted, demonstrating that the appellant had been discharged from the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH) and his involuntary status terminated, rendering the appeal moot.

The court considered whether "special circumstances" existed to hear the appeal despite mootness, referencing Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence on the issue.

Finding no such circumstances, the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming her involuntary patient status.

However, she was discharged shortly after the board's decision, rendering the appeal moot.

The appellant and amicus curiae argued the court should hear the appeal to address procedural fairness and the sufficiency of evidence, noting the potential negative impacts of the underlying medical diagnosis.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot appeal, finding that the issues were highly factual, did not require appellate guidance, and that hearing the appeal would not alter the underlying medical diagnosis.