Adrienne Zaya

The plaintiff brought a motion for default judgment against the defendants for the shortfall on a loan secured by a second mortgage and a personal guarantee.

The court granted judgment for the outstanding principal, NSF fees, and accrued interest, finding the defendants breached the loan agreement and guarantee.

However, the court dismissed the plaintiff's claim for $150,000 in lost opportunity costs related to a planned condominium purchase, holding that expectation damages are limited to the repayment of the loan and contractual interest.

The defendants sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain the plaintiff from enforcing its mortgage security by way of power of sale, pending the resolution of their counterclaim alleging misrepresentation.

The court found that while there was a serious issue to be tried regarding alleged misrepresentation, the defendants failed to establish irreparable harm, as any losses could be compensated by damages.

The motion for an injunction was dismissed.

Following a successful appeal that set aside the dismissal of their action under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, the appellants sought costs of the motion below.

The respondents argued that the presumption against costs in s. 137.1(8) should apply.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the appellants that the presumption should not apply because the underlying dispute was a private matter and not a SLAPP.

The court awarded the appellants costs of the motion below fixed at $30,000.

The appellants, a home builder and its owner, brought a defamation action against the respondent homeowners over negative social media posts following a renovation dispute.

The motion judge dismissed the action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the online reviews reflected a purely private dispute and did not relate to a matter of public interest.

The Court also held that the motion judge erred in her approach to the 'no valid defence' requirement and the public interest weighing exercise, concluding that the defamation action should be permitted to proceed.

The appellant appealed an application judge's order declaring a basement unit part of the premises leased by the respondent.

The original lease defined the premises as "the whole" and while an amended lease changed the rent calculation method, the definition of the premises did not change.

The appellant argued the new rent calculation implied the basement was excluded.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's interpretation that the rent calculation merely changed the method for the entire building, especially given the original landlord's knowledge of basement subletting and the illogical outcome of decreased space with increased rent.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal where the appellants' appeal was allowed.

The Court of Appeal addressed the disposition of costs for a motion previously heard in the Superior Court.

The appellants sought $20,098.48 for the motion costs.

Applying s. 137.1(8) of the Courts of Justice Act, the court fixed the motion costs at the requested amount and ordered them payable to the appellants by the respondents, conditional on the appellants' success in the ongoing main action.

The court noted the respondents' original motion had a low prospect of success.

The Corporation of the Township of Strong brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims for defamation, malicious prosecution, and misfeasance in public office.

The plaintiffs alleged that the Township made defamatory statements to police, initiated a malicious prosecution for public mischief, and engaged in misfeasance in public office, all stemming from a dispute over land ownership.

The court dismissed the Township's motion, finding genuine issues for trial on all three causes of action, particularly regarding the Township's alleged malice and reckless disregard for the truth in its communications with the police.

The court also found that partial summary judgment was inappropriate due to the intertwined factual and legal issues.

The appellants, a cat rescue operation and its director, appealed the dismissal of their defamation action under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The motion judge had dismissed the action against all defendants, including non-moving parties, and awarded costs.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by misapplying the s. 137.1 criteria, specifically by using a higher standard for assessing the substantial merit of the claim, mischaracterizing the "sting" of the defamation, relying on inadmissible hearsay, and improperly assessing the harm suffered by the appellants.

The Court also held that the motion judge erred in dismissing the action against defendants who had not brought a motion to dismiss.

The appeal was allowed, the dismissal order set aside, and the matter remitted for further proceedings.

The Ontario Land Tribunal issued a procedural order to govern the proceedings leading up to a 9-day video hearing scheduled to commence on April 9, 2024.

The appeal concerns a Director's Order issued under the Environmental Protection Act requiring work to prevent, decrease, or eliminate an adverse effect from a contaminant.

The procedural order sets out deadlines for disclosure, witness lists, witness statements, expert meetings, and the filing of a hearing plan.

At a case management conference regarding an appeal of a Director's Order under the Environmental Protection Act, the Tribunal considered requests for party status from Electrolux Home Care Products Canada Inc., Florence Lane Residents Group Inc., and the City of Guelph.

Finding that all three entities had a genuine and direct interest in the proceeding and would assist the Tribunal, party status was granted to each.

The parties also provided an update on settlement discussions and a subsequent case management conference was scheduled.

The defendants brought an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' defamation action arising from posts made in a Facebook group about animal rescue practices.

The court found that the posts related to matters of public interest, specifically animal welfare.

The plaintiffs failed to show that the defendants lacked valid defences of justification and fair comment, and failed to provide evidence of harm sufficient to outweigh the public interest in protecting the expression.

The action was dismissed.

The applicant, EDE Capital Inc., sought to set aside two arbitral awards: a Partial Award on Damages and a Partial Award on Costs.

The applicant argued that the arbitrator breached procedural fairness by reopening issues and making inconsistent findings, exceeded jurisdiction by affecting non-parties, and mischaracterized claims under the Securities Act.

The court determined that the International Commercial Arbitration Act (ICAA) and the Model Law applied due to one respondent's habitual residence in China.

The court dismissed the application, finding no serious procedural unfairness or excess of jurisdiction, and affirmed the arbitrator's decision, including the costs award.

The Seafarers’ International Union of Canada (SIU) commenced a defamation action against the defendant for publishing false statements on social media regarding a COVID-19 vaccination survey.

The defendant failed to deliver a statement of defence and was noted in default.

The court held an uncontested hearing for the assessment of damages, granting mandatory and permanent injunctions against the defendant.

The court awarded the SIU general damages of $50,000 and punitive damages of $25,000, along with substantial indemnity costs of $17,175, finding the defendant's conduct egregious and unapologetic.

The decision clarifies the assessment of damages for corporate plaintiffs in defamation cases, distinguishing them from individual plaintiffs regarding mental distress and the scale of damages without proven economic loss.

This costs endorsement followed a successful appeal by the appellant, Dong Jin Qiu, regarding the quantum of damages.

The appeal resulted in the respondent, Biao Liu, owing the appellant $10,496.68.

The court determined that the appellant was the successful party at both trial and appeal, contrary to the respondent's argument for partial indemnity costs based on a forfeited deposit.

As the appellant did not request costs, no order for trial costs was made.

The moving party, who was the respondent on a previous appeal, brought a motion under Rules 37.14 and 59.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to vary the Court of Appeal's decision and dismiss the appeal.

The moving party argued the court erred by misreading the record regarding the interpretation of a partnership agreement.

The court found Rule 37.14 inapplicable as it pertains to specific procedural errors, and Rule 59.06 (accidental slip or omission) also inapplicable, as the submission was a re-argument of a point already considered and not supported by the trial judge's findings or the agreement's wording.

The motion was dismissed with costs.

The appellant, a subtenant, appealed a lower court decision that found no rent reduction agreement existed and dismissed its claim for damages after being locked out for non-payment of rent.

The appellant argued the lockout was unlawful and sought damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's factual finding that no rent reduction agreement was made, noting deference is owed to such findings in the absence of palpable and overriding error.

The court also found the landlord was not liable for damages under the Helping Tenants and Small Businesses Act, 2020, as the lockout occurred before the Act's non-enforcement period began, and the tenant regained possession shortly after the Act came into force.

Leave to appeal the costs award was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding the measure of damages for breach of a joint venture partnership agreement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding of a binding partnership agreement and its breach but found an error in the quantification of damages.

The trial judge had incorrectly awarded the respondent the extra capital he invested as damages.

The Court of Appeal clarified that damages should be limited to the cost of borrowing the additional capital incurred due to the breach, up to the date of trial, less a retained deposit.

The appeal was allowed with costs to the appellant.

The plaintiffs obtained a default judgment against the defendant following a fatal motor vehicle collision.

The defendant's insurer, Certas, brought a motion to be added as a statutory third party under s. 258(14) of the Insurance Act, having denied coverage to the defendant.

The plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing Certas delayed and should be bound by the default judgment.

The court granted the motion, finding Certas met the statutory conditions and that the plaintiffs' failure to notify the insurer of their imminent default judgment motion negated any claim of prejudice.

The appellant, executor of an estate, appealed a summary judgment dismissing a claim against a brokerage for damages arising from a margin account sell-out.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding that the brokerage had provided clear warnings about the undermargined accounts and its right to sell out, and that the action was not too complicated for summary judgment.