Vanessa De Sousa

The moving party defendants sought summary judgment dismissing the responding party defendants' crossclaim for independent damages and equitable set-off relating to environmental contamination of a purchased property.

The moving parties argued the claims were brought more than two years after the responding parties knew or ought to have known of the contamination.

The court dismissed the motion, finding a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding when the responding parties, who were unsophisticated purchasers, ought to have discovered the claim given conflicting evidence about which environmental reports were provided prior to closing.

The court also held that the independent damages claim was not a new cause of action but an additional form of relief based on facts already pled.

The plaintiff, Joel Pilotte, sought production of Father Roy’s personnel file from the non-party Archdiocese of St.-Boniface, arguing its relevance to allegations of sexual assault and institutional knowledge of Roy’s history.

The court found the documents relevant to a material issue and ordered their production, emphasizing the need for a fair trial and the balancing of interests under Rule 30.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellants appealed the Director's decision to issue a Certificate of Property Use (CPU) for a former industrial property in Guelph, arguing that the CPU failed to adequately address the risk of contaminated groundwater migrating offsite to their adjacent properties.

The Tribunal found that while there was a risk of contaminant migration to one of the adjacent properties (10 Kingsmill), there was no risk of migration to the other (490 York).

The Tribunal held that the CPU's groundwater monitoring program and contingency requirements provided sufficient safeguards to address the potential for adverse effects, and that implementing physical barriers would be premature and potentially harmful given the complex fractured bedrock environment.

The Tribunal ordered minor amendments to the CPU to reclassify two monitoring wells as downgradient and to require the City to provide advance notice of groundwater sampling to the adjacent property owners, but otherwise confirmed the CPU.

Electrolux Home Care Products Canada Inc. brought a motion to be added as a Party to an appeal regarding a Certificate of Property Use issued for a neighbouring property.

Electrolux is a defendant in related civil proceedings concerning historic contamination.

The Director and the City opposed the motion.

The Tribunal found that Electrolux had a genuine interest in the proceeding because the issue of historic contamination was relevant to both the Tribunal appeal and the civil proceedings.

The Tribunal granted Electrolux Party status, limited to providing evidence and submissions on the specific issue of historic contamination, and required it to shelter under the appellants' issue without altering the existing procedural schedule.

At a case management conference regarding an appeal of a Director's Order under the Environmental Protection Act, the Tribunal considered requests for party status from Electrolux Home Care Products Canada Inc., Florence Lane Residents Group Inc., and the City of Guelph.

Finding that all three entities had a genuine and direct interest in the proceeding and would assist the Tribunal, party status was granted to each.

The parties also provided an update on settlement discussions and a subsequent case management conference was scheduled.

The Appellant brought a motion to stay a Director's Order requiring it to take actions to address potential contamination at its property, pending an appeal.

The Tribunal found it had the authority to grant a stay under section 143 of the Environmental Protection Act, as the historic contamination did not pose an immediate danger to health or safety.

However, applying the RJR MacDonald test, the Tribunal denied the stay.

The Appellant failed to establish irreparable harm, as its financial costs were potentially recoverable in ongoing civil litigation and did not outweigh the public interest in identifying and managing the source of trichloroethylene contamination.

The appellant brought a motion seeking an interim stay of a Director's Order requiring it to undertake actions to address contamination on its property.

The parties agreed to stay several items, but disputed whether Items 8 and 9, which required a Groundwater Monitoring Program and Report, could be stayed.

The Tribunal found that the items, as they related to existing wells, constituted an order to monitor, record, and report, which cannot be stayed under section 143(2)(a) of the Environmental Protection Act.

The motion for an interim stay of those items was dismissed, though requirements relating to newly installed wells were stayed pending the main motion.

The Ontario Land Tribunal held a Case Management Conference regarding appeals of a Certificate of Property Use issued for a property in Guelph.

The parties agreed on most issues for the hearing, and the Tribunal resolved a disagreement over the wording of one issue regarding contaminant migration.

The Tribunal scheduled a 12-day video hearing to commence in December 2023 and approved the Procedural Order and Issues List.

The appellant appealed a Director's Order issued by the Ministry of the Environment, Conservation and Parks regarding potential contamination at a site in Guelph.

At a Case Management Conference, the appellant sought an interim stay of several items in the Order pending a full motion for a stay.

The Tribunal granted an interim stay of Item 3 on consent, noting that the requirements for Items 4 through 7 are only triggered following the completion of Item 3.

The issue of whether the Tribunal has the authority to stay Items 8 and 9, which relate to a groundwater monitoring program, was adjourned to a further Case Management Conference.

Following a successful appeal that reversed a Small Claims Court decision for lack of monetary jurisdiction, the appellants sought costs of $19,016.45.

The respondent argued the amount was excessive.

The Divisional Court found the issues were of moderate complexity and fixed the appellants' costs at $5,000 inclusive for both the appeal and the Small Claims Court proceeding, noting the amount claimed in the underlying action was less than $70,000.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding the respondent $35,000 for unpaid trailer fees under an agency agreement.

The respondent had sued for only three of seven outstanding invoices to stay within the Small Claims Court's monetary jurisdiction, intending to bring a second action for the remainder.

The Divisional Court held that the right to trailer fees flowed from a single contract, meaning the separate invoices did not constitute separate causes of action.

By splitting the claim to fit within the monetary limit without waiving the excess, the respondent engaged in impermissible cause of action splitting.

The Divisional Court quashed the Small Claims Court decision as a nullity for lack of jurisdiction and ordered the matter to proceed as a Simplified Rules action in the Superior Court of Justice.

The defendants to the counterclaim brought a motion to set aside a noting in default.

Their counsel inadvertently missed the deadline to deliver a defence to the counterclaim after a negotiated resolution of a prior motion to strike.

The court found that the moving parties demonstrated a clear intention to defend the counterclaim, the delay was due to counsel's inadvertence, and the motion to set aside was brought promptly.

The court exercised its discretion to set aside the noting in default to allow the complex claims to be resolved on their merits.

Kin Canada and The Kinsmen Club of Oshawa (Applicants) brought an application seeking a declaration that their insurers, Ecclesiastical Insurance Office Public Company Limited and Certain Non-Marine Underwriters o/a Lloyd’s Of London and Lloyd’s Canada (Respondents), had a duty to defend them in an underlying lawsuit.

The underlying claim involved damages related to the discovery of underground oil storage tanks (USTs) on a property sold by The Kinsmen Club of Oshawa in 2005, with allegations of negligent misrepresentation and mismanagement, and vicarious liability against Kin Canada.

The court found that the pollution exclusion clauses in both insurance policies applied, as the true nature of the underlying claim was environmental pollution arising from leaking USTs and the failure to comply with regulatory requirements for their removal.

Consequently, the court dismissed the application, ruling that the duty to defend did not arise for either insurer.

The moving party sought leave to bring a motion to discharge a construction lien and dismiss or stay the action based on the plaintiff's delayed disclosure of an assignment agreement, arguing it constituted an abuse of process.

The court held that leave is not required to bring a motion under s. 47 of the Construction Lien Act, as the merits of whether the ground is 'proper' should be determined on the motion itself.

However, the court found that seeking relief under Rule 21.01(3)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and s. 106 of the Courts of Justice Act constitutes an 'interlocutory step' requiring leave under s. 67(2) of the CLA, even if the relief sought is final.

The court granted leave, concluding that the proposed motion would expedite the resolution of the issues in dispute in the lien action.

The plaintiff brought an action for injuries sustained after slipping and falling on a retaining wall dividing the parking lots of a KFC and a TD Bank.

The remaining defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action on liability.

The court found that the barrier was intended to block vehicles, not for pedestrian crossing, and there was no evidence of regular pedestrian use that would create a duty to maintain it for that purpose.

Furthermore, the plaintiff's evidence regarding the fall was contradictory and unreliable.

The court granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action.

This endorsement addresses three issues arising from a prior trial judgment: the statutory deductible for non-pecuniary damages, the prejudgment interest rate, and the costs of the action.

The court determined that the 2019 statutory deductible applied, reducing the net non-pecuniary damages.

The prejudgment interest rate was fixed at 1%, rejecting the plaintiff's request for a higher rate due to the defendant's conduct.

On costs, the court found the plaintiff was entitled to partial indemnity costs up to the Rule 49 offer date and substantial indemnity costs thereafter, criticizing the defendant's inflexible settlement approach.

The court adjusted the plaintiff's requested hourly rates and disbursements, ultimately fixing fees at $300,000 plus HST and disbursements at $39,864.56 plus HST.

The plaintiff brought an action for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident.

Following a jury verdict awarding net general damages of $11,181.03, the court considered whether the plaintiff's injuries met the statutory threshold under the Insurance Act.

The court found that the plaintiff, whose primary role was a homemaker, sustained permanent and serious impairments to important physical and psychological functions, including PTSD and depression.

The court ruled that the injuries met the threshold and dismissed the defendant's motion.

The plaintiff, Peter St. Marthe, sued the defendant for injuries sustained in a bicycle-car collision.

The defendant admitted liability, leaving the court to determine damages, contributory negligence, whether the plaintiff met the permanent serious impairment threshold, and if the action was statute-barred.

The court found the plaintiff's claim was not statute-barred, he met the permanent serious impairment threshold, and was not contributorily negligent.

Damages were awarded for non-pecuniary loss, past and future income loss, and future housekeeping and home maintenance expenses.