Edward Vincent Boyd Bergeron

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident for which the defendants admitted liability.

The trial proceeded by judge alone to determine whether the plaintiff's injuries met the statutory threshold and to assess damages.

The court found that the plaintiff sustained a permanent serious impairment of an important physical, mental, or psychological function, specifically chronic widespread pain, mild neurocognitive disorder, and psychological symptoms.

The court dismissed the defendants' threshold motion and awarded the plaintiff $100,000 in general damages, $38,371 for past income loss, $201,294.72 for housekeeping, and various amounts for future care costs and out-of-pocket expenses, with future income loss to be calculated based on a projected retirement date.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 59.06(2)(a) to vary a consent order that established a wait-and-see deadline for striking their jury notice due to COVID-19 court capacity limits.

The defendants argued that recent communication from defence counsel in a conflicting criminal jury trial constituted new facts justifying an extension of the deadline.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the communication did not amount to new facts that could not have been known earlier, and emphasized that courts should rarely vary voluntary consent orders.

This endorsement addresses three issues arising from a prior trial judgment: the statutory deductible for non-pecuniary damages, the prejudgment interest rate, and the costs of the action.

The court determined that the 2019 statutory deductible applied, reducing the net non-pecuniary damages.

The prejudgment interest rate was fixed at 1%, rejecting the plaintiff's request for a higher rate due to the defendant's conduct.

On costs, the court found the plaintiff was entitled to partial indemnity costs up to the Rule 49 offer date and substantial indemnity costs thereafter, criticizing the defendant's inflexible settlement approach.

The court adjusted the plaintiff's requested hourly rates and disbursements, ultimately fixing fees at $300,000 plus HST and disbursements at $39,864.56 plus HST.

The applicant sought income replacement benefits following a 2002 motor vehicle accident, which the respondent denied in 2011.

The applicant commenced an application at the Tribunal five years after the two-year limitation period expired.

The Tribunal found the respondent's denial was valid and clear, triggering the limitation period.

Applying the four-factor test for extending time under section 7 of the LAT Act, the Tribunal declined to extend the limitation period due to the significant five-year delay and resulting prejudice to the respondent.

The application was dismissed as statute-barred.

The plaintiff, Peter St. Marthe, sued the defendant for injuries sustained in a bicycle-car collision.

The defendant admitted liability, leaving the court to determine damages, contributory negligence, whether the plaintiff met the permanent serious impairment threshold, and if the action was statute-barred.

The court found the plaintiff's claim was not statute-barred, he met the permanent serious impairment threshold, and was not contributorily negligent.

Damages were awarded for non-pecuniary loss, past and future income loss, and future housekeeping and home maintenance expenses.

Following a 17-day trial resulting in a net judgment of approximately $472,000 for the plaintiffs, the court assessed costs.

The plaintiffs sought over $445,000 in fees and disbursements.

The court reduced the senior counsel's hourly rate, applied a 60% partial indemnity rate, and deducted amounts for unsupported time and disbursements.

The court declined the defendants' request to impose a $40,000 remedial penalty on the plaintiffs for refusing to mediate, noting such penalties should be proportionate to a party's financial strength.

Costs were fixed at $204,811.50 for fees and $42,545.30 for disbursements, plus HST.

Following a jury verdict in a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle collision involving a cyclist, the court addressed post-verdict issues including the statutory threshold for recovery of non-pecuniary damages, the applicable statutory deductible, and the appropriate rate of pre‑judgment interest.

The court found that the injured plaintiff established a permanent serious impairment of an important physical function under the Insurance Act threshold.

The court further held that the increased statutory deductible introduced by O. Reg. 221/15 applied to pending actions, characterizing the deductible as procedural in nature and applicable to quantification of damages.

However, the court concluded that entitlement to and quantification of pre‑judgment interest are substantive matters and therefore the amended Insurance Act provisions did not apply retrospectively.

Pre‑judgment interest was therefore calculated under Rule 53.10 until December 31, 2014 and under s. 128(1) of the Courts of Justice Act thereafter.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident in Alberta.

His insurer brought a subrogated action in his name for property damage without his knowledge, which was resolved by a consent judgment.

The plaintiff subsequently commenced a personal injury action in Ontario.

The defendant appealed the dismissal of a summary judgment motion, arguing the personal injury claim was barred by res judicata as one wrong cannot generate multiple causes of action.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Alberta Insurance Act differentiates subrogated property damage claims from personal injury claims, and an implied term in the consent judgment preserved the plaintiff's right to sue for personal injuries.

The defendant municipality sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from an order dismissing its summary judgment motion in a slip-and-fall action involving alleged failure to comply with the ten‑day notice requirement under s. 44(10) of the Municipal Act.

The motion judge had previously ordered a trial on whether the municipality suffered prejudice from the late notice and whether the plaintiff had a reasonable excuse under s. 44(12).

The court held that the authorities cited by the municipality did not create conflicting jurisprudence and that the prior decision merely determined that the issues required viva voce evidence at trial.

The court further found no good reason to doubt the correctness of the order and concluded the matter was not of general importance warranting appellate review.

Leave to appeal was therefore refused.

The defendant moved for leave to appeal an order dismissing his motion for summary judgment.

The underlying action involved a personal injury claim arising from a motor vehicle accident, which the defendant argued was barred by cause of action estoppel because the plaintiff's insurer had previously obtained a consent judgment for property damage in a subrogated action.

The court found conflicting decisions in Ontario and Alberta regarding whether a single wrong can generate more than one cause of action in these circumstances.

Leave to appeal to the Divisional Court was granted to definitively address the issue.

The defendant municipality moved for summary judgment dismissing a personal injury action arising from a winter slip-and-fall on a sidewalk, arguing the claim was statute-barred because the plaintiff failed to provide notice within the ten-day period required by s. 44(10) of the Municipal Act, 2001.

The plaintiff argued that the municipality suffered no prejudice because weather conditions changed shortly after the accident and any evidence of snow or ice would have dissipated even with timely notice.

The court considered the summary judgment framework under Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the statutory saving provision in s. 44(12) permitting late notice where there is a reasonable excuse and no prejudice to the municipality.

The motion judge held that the issues of prejudice and reasonable excuse could not be determined on the motion record and required a trial.

Summary judgment was therefore refused and a trial ordered to determine whether the municipality was prejudiced and whether the mistaken belief about ownership of the sidewalk constituted a reasonable excuse for late notice.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought payment for a physiotherapy treatment plan and an in-home assessment.

The insurer denied the claims, arguing the applicant's ongoing symptoms were related to pre-existing health conditions rather than the accident.

The arbitrator found that while some symptoms were pre-existing, the accident was a significant contributing factor to the applicant's shoulder and neck pain.

The arbitrator ordered the insurer to pay for the portion of the physiotherapy plan related to the neck and shoulders, as well as the cost of the in-home assessment.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits after allegedly being struck by a school bus door.

The insurer denied she was involved in an accident and terminated benefits.

The arbitrator found that the applicant was indeed struck a glancing blow by the bus door, constituting an accident.

While the physical injuries were minor, the psychological response and exacerbation of pre-existing migraines resulted in a partial inability to carry on a normal life.

The arbitrator awarded caregiver benefits for a limited period, ongoing housekeeping expenses, physiotherapy, psychological counselling, and related travel expenses, but denied a special award and the cost of sunglasses.