Thomas Kirk Boyd

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike the jury notice in her motor vehicle collision action, seeking to proceed to trial before a judge alone due to concerns about potential delays and prejudice (financial and mental health) related to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court granted leave for the plaintiff to bring the motion but ultimately dismissed it.

The court found that the plaintiff's grounds, such as temporary jury selection bans, were no longer valid as COVID-19 restrictions had been lifted.

The court emphasized the substantive right to a jury trial and determined that the plaintiff's evidence regarding prejudice was insufficient or lacked concrete detail to justify overriding this right.

The court reserved costs to the trial judge and granted both parties leave to bring further motions if the pandemic circumstances change again.

The appellant appealed a Master's order dismissing his action for repeatedly failing to comply with court orders requiring him to answer undertakings.

The appellant argued he should have been given another 'last chance' to comply, especially as a self-represented litigant.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant had already been given a clear last chance order and had willfully disregarded it by demanding inappropriate conditions before he would comply.

The court affirmed that repeated failures to comply with procedural orders justify dismissal.

The applicant filed an Application for Contravention of Settlement alleging the respondents breached a settlement regarding parking accommodations.

The Tribunal found that no settlement had been agreed to in writing and signed by the parties, as required by section 45.9 of the Human Rights Code.

Consequently, the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to hear the application, and it was dismissed.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident in Alberta.

His insurer brought a subrogated action in his name for property damage without his knowledge, which was resolved by a consent judgment.

The plaintiff subsequently commenced a personal injury action in Ontario.

The defendant appealed the dismissal of a summary judgment motion, arguing the personal injury claim was barred by res judicata as one wrong cannot generate multiple causes of action.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Alberta Insurance Act differentiates subrogated property damage claims from personal injury claims, and an implied term in the consent judgment preserved the plaintiff's right to sue for personal injuries.

The applicant, a condominium resident with a disability, alleged discrimination and reprisal after the respondents refused to accommodate his request to park his oversized truck in an above-ground spot.

The respondents' underground parking garage could not accommodate the truck's height.

Following a summary hearing, the Tribunal dismissed the application, finding no reasonable prospect of success.

The medical evidence did not establish a disability-related need for the specific vehicle, rendering the applicant's choice a personal preference rather than a requirement triggering the duty to accommodate.

The reprisal allegations were also dismissed as speculative and lacking evidence of retaliatory intent.

The defendant moved to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim and dismiss the action for failure to comply with a consent order requiring the plaintiff to answer outstanding undertakings.

The plaintiff, representing himself, willfully refused to answer the undertakings, claiming they were irrelevant and too much work.

The Master found no evidence that the plaintiff was under a legal disability and concluded that his failure to comply constituted a willful and intentional disregard of a court order.

The action was dismissed with costs fixed at $2,800 on a partial indemnity scale.

The defendant moved for leave to appeal an order dismissing his motion for summary judgment.

The underlying action involved a personal injury claim arising from a motor vehicle accident, which the defendant argued was barred by cause of action estoppel because the plaintiff's insurer had previously obtained a consent judgment for property damage in a subrogated action.

The court found conflicting decisions in Ontario and Alberta regarding whether a single wrong can generate more than one cause of action in these circumstances.

Leave to appeal to the Divisional Court was granted to definitively address the issue.

The defendant brought a threshold motion during jury deliberations in a motor vehicle personal injury action, seeking a declaration that the plaintiff's injuries did not meet the statutory threshold under s. 267.5(5) of the Insurance Act.

The plaintiff claimed to suffer from chronic pain syndrome resulting from a minor rear-end collision.

The court preferred the evidence of the defendant's medical expert and relied heavily on video surveillance showing the plaintiff engaging in vigorous physical activities inconsistent with her claimed limitations.

The court found the plaintiff failed to prove a permanent, serious impairment of an important physical function.

Consequently, the jury's award of $50,000 for general damages was disallowed, and judgment was entered only for the $32,000 awarded for past loss of housekeeping services.

The applicant in a human rights application alleging discrimination in housing based on disability requested that the adjudicator recuse herself and reconsider procedural decisions made during the hearing.

The applicant sought reconsideration of decisions not to hear similar fact evidence at that stage and regarding the role of his co-agent.

He also sought recusal on the basis that the adjudicator may have predetermined that he did not have a disability.

The Tribunal denied the requests, finding that procedural rulings are not final decisions subject to reconsideration, and that there was no reasonable apprehension of bias or predetermination to warrant recusal.