Chris T.J. Blom

This is a class action settlement approval motion involving sexual assault and voyeurism by a physician at a university health clinic.

The representative plaintiffs sought court approval of a $21,050,000 settlement on behalf of a class of approximately 150-200 patients who were photographed, videotaped, and/or sexually assaulted without their knowledge or consent.

The settlement was reached after extensive negotiations including mediation and three days of judicial pre-trial conferences.

The court approved the settlement as fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class members, addressing concerns about the claims process, trauma-informed procedures, honoraria for representative plaintiffs, legal fees, and various disbursements.

The plaintiffs sought partial summary judgment in a civil action for damages following a motor vehicle accident, arguing that the defendant should be bound by findings made in a prior provincial offences trial acquitting the driver of careless driving.

The court denied the motion, holding that the findings in the earlier trial were not determinative of the issues in the civil action, given the different burdens of proof and the fact that the defendant was not a party to the earlier proceeding.

The court found that relitigation of the driver’s role in the accident was not an abuse of process and that the defendant should be permitted to fully marshal evidence at trial.

The appellant insurer appealed a partial summary judgment declaring it responsible for covering water damage to the respondent's property.

The insurer had denied coverage based on an exclusionary clause for water entering through basement walls, arguing it applied because water from a burst watermain entered via a pipe transecting the basement wall.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the plain meaning of 'wall' does not include a pipe, as they serve conflicting functions.

The court held that any ambiguity in the exclusionary clause must be resolved against the insurer who drafted the policy.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal three orders of Morgan J. The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the respondent in the amount of $35,500.

The Plaintiff, Nordik Windows Inc., was successful in a certification motion and related motions.

This endorsement addresses the costs for these motions, which involved two rounds of hearings due to a recusal by the initial judge.

The court determined the appropriate costs, considering the re-usable work from the first hearing and the work for the second hearing, ultimately awarding the Plaintiff $1,000,000.00 in all-inclusive costs.

This case concerns a re-hearing of a certification motion for a class action against Aviva Insurance Company of Canada, Aviva General Insurance Company, and Aviva Canada Inc. regarding business interruption insurance claims arising from the COVID-19 pandemic.

The plaintiff, Nordik Windows Inc., sought to certify a class of businesses whose claims were denied or not submitted due to the defendants' alleged blanket denial policy.

The defendants brought cross-motions for summary judgment against Nordik and a declaration concerning the tolling of the limitation period.

The court certified the class action, dismissed the defendants' summary judgment and limitation tolling motions, and allowed the addition of three new representative plaintiffs (Cash and Carry Inc., Hangar9 Studios Inc., and Real Food for Real Kids Inc.).

The decision addresses the adequacy of the representative plaintiff, the identifiable class, and the common issues, particularly regarding notice requirements and the interpretation of insurance policy clauses in the context of pandemic-related business closures.

This endorsement addresses two motions for leave to appeal before the Divisional Court.

The Plaintiffs' motion for leave to appeal a "set aside" order was dismissed with costs awarded to the Defendants.

Concurrently, the Defendants' motion for leave to appeal earlier certification decisions was dismissed without costs, having become moot.

This endorsement addresses a request from the parties to schedule a 20-day judge-alone trial in two non-consecutive, two-week tranches to secure earlier trial dates.

The court, acting as the local administrative judge for civil cases, granted the request.

The decision acknowledged the general preference for continuous trials but found the non-continuous format warranted due to significant delays in the case (partially administrative and pandemic-related) and the consent of all parties.

The court emphasized the need to avoid further deterioration of evidence and provide closure to the plaintiff, who had been involved in litigation for many years.

The plaintiff brought a motion to add three additional representative plaintiffs during a certification hearing for a class action regarding COVID-19 business interruption insurance claims.

The court found that the original plaintiff, Nordik Windows Inc., had an arguable cause of action and was a suitable representative plaintiff.

The court also found that the three proposed additional plaintiffs—Hangar9 Studios Inc., Cash and Carry Inc., and Real Food for Real Kids Inc.—had viable causes of action and met the requirements under s. 5(1)(e) of the Class Proceedings Act.

The class action was fully certified with all four as representative plaintiffs.

The plaintiff brought an action for injuries sustained after slipping and falling on a retaining wall dividing the parking lots of a KFC and a TD Bank.

The remaining defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action on liability.

The court found that the barrier was intended to block vehicles, not for pedestrian crossing, and there was no evidence of regular pedestrian use that would create a duty to maintain it for that purpose.

Furthermore, the plaintiff's evidence regarding the fall was contradictory and unreliable.

The court granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action.

The plaintiffs brought motions to certify three proposed class actions against Aviva Insurance for the blanket denial of coverage for COVID-19-related business loss claims.

The claims focused on 'restricted access' and 'negative publicity' coverage provisions in Aviva's standard-form policies.

The court found that the requirements for certification under the Class Proceedings Act were met, noting the commonality of the standard-form policies and the identical denial letters.

The two Lerners Actions were certified, and the Nordik Action was conditionally certified pending a motion regarding the representative plaintiff.

The defendant taxi dispatch company brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action against it.

The plaintiff, who claimed $1.6 million in damages for various torts allegedly committed by a taxi driver, did not participate in the motion.

The court granted the motion, finding that the defendant's uncontradicted evidence showed no dispatch call was made to the taxicab in question on the date of the alleged incident, thereby establishing no genuine issue for trial.

This case conference order, issued amidst temporary court suspensions due to COVID-19, established a timetable for a class action proceeding.

The court provided specific directions for the conduct of a "Wagg motion" and set a tentative date for the certification motion.

Directions included provisions for electronic swearing of affidavits, service methods, and electronic filing of materials, aiming to facilitate the litigation process under the prevailing restrictions.

This is a costs endorsement on appeal from a jury trial judgment in a historical sexual assault case.

The appellant challenged the jury instruction on loss of income damages, the punitive damages award, and the prejudgment interest rate.

The Court of Appeal upheld the entitlement to and quantum of damages for loss of income and punitive damages but reversed the prejudgment interest award.

The respondent sought substantial indemnity costs of $179,660.31, relying on a presumption under the Victims' Bill of Rights.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs of $100,000, finding that the full amount sought would not be in the interests of justice, particularly given the disproportionate relationship between trial costs and appeal costs.

The respondent was sexually abused by a priest while a student at a school run by the appellants.

The trial judge and jury found the appellants vicariously liable.

The jury awarded $350,000 in general damages, $75,000 in aggravated damages, $56,400 in future treatment costs, $1,588,781 for past and future income loss, and $500,000 in punitive damages.

The appellants appealed on three grounds: the jury instruction on burden of proof for past income loss was erroneous, the punitive damages award was excessive, and prejudgment interest should not have been set at 5 per cent.

The Court of Appeal upheld the jury instruction and punitive damages award but found the trial judge erred in setting prejudgment interest at 5 per cent instead of 1.3 per cent.

The respondent was sexually assaulted by a priest when he was 11 years old.

The priest fondled and performed oral sex on the respondent on one occasion.

The respondent sued the Diocese for damages on the basis of vicarious liability.

After years of denying liability, the Diocese admitted liability on the first day of trial.

The only issue was damages.

The jury awarded general and aggravated damages of $250,000, loss of income of $280,000, treatment expenses of $5,000, and punitive damages of $15,000.

The Diocese appealed on multiple grounds.

The Court of Appeal upheld the damages awards but split on the punitive damages issue, with the majority upholding the award and the dissent setting it aside.

This costs endorsement followed a three-week jury trial where the plaintiff was awarded $2,570,181 for general, aggravated, economic, special, and punitive damages arising from historical sexual assault.

The court addressed the plaintiff's entitlement to substantial indemnity costs under the Victims' Bill of Rights and the calculation of prejudgment interest.

The court found the plaintiff was entitled to substantial indemnity costs throughout the proceedings, rejecting the defendants' argument for partial indemnity prior to the offer date.

While the court reduced the quantum of legal fees claimed due to perceived duplication and 'heavy-handed' process, it upheld the principle of substantial indemnity.

The court also determined that the default prejudgment interest rate of 5% applied to non-pecuniary damages, rejecting the defendants' argument for a lower rate based on the Insurance Act, as the case did not involve a motor vehicle accident.

The plaintiff, Byron Gracey, brought a motion on consent for certification of a class action under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The action sought compensation for persons who contracted Giardiasis from the Ramada Beacon Harbourside Hotel pool between September 2012 and January 2013, including derivative claims under the Family Law Act.

The defendant, 1093823 Ontario Limited, and third parties, Regional Municipality of Niagara and Margaret Parks Swimming Schools Limited, consented to certification.

The court found that all criteria for certification under s. 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 were satisfied, and the motion for certification was granted.

Following a two-week jury trial where the plaintiff was awarded $81,658.83 net, the court determined costs.

The defendant argued that its $100,000 settlement offer engaged Rule 49 consequences.

The court applied the principles from Rooney v. Graham, finding that when the costs terms of the offer were factored in, the judgment achieved was more favourable than the offer.

Furthermore, the offer was not served at least seven days before the hearing as required by Rule 49.

The plaintiff was awarded partial indemnity costs throughout.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The matter proceeded to an arbitration hearing.

The applicant's former representative had been removed from the record prior to the hearing.

The applicant failed to attend the hearing and presented no evidence to support the claims for benefits.

The arbitrator dismissed the application for arbitration.

No expenses were ordered.