Chris T.J. Blom

Following a trial, the defendant requested production of opposing counsel’s computer dockets to obtain evidence of the time and expenses incurred for the purpose of assessing costs.

The plaintiffs objected, arguing such detailed disclosure was not required under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court reviewed the principles governing costs assessments, emphasizing that fixing costs is not a mechanical calculation based on hours multiplied by rates.

Considering the significant expense and privilege concerns associated with producing detailed dockets, the court held that such production was not appropriate in the circumstances.

The request for production of the dockets was dismissed and the responding party was directed to deliver its costs submissions within two weeks.

The minor plaintiff, who had a pre-existing condition making his bones prone to fracture, was injured while attempting to board a continuously moving amusement park ride.

The plaintiffs sued the amusement park operator for negligence under the Occupiers' Liability Act.

The court found the defendant breached its duty of care by failing to post warning signs, failing to provide verbal instructions that the ride did not stop, and failing to have sufficient staff present.

The court dismissed the defendant's claims of contributory negligence against the minor and his father.

Damages were awarded to the minor plaintiff and his parents, taking into account the minor's pre-existing condition under the crumbling skull rule.

The defendant brought a motion to transfer four Toronto actions to Brampton so that they could be tried with two related Brampton actions arising from the same motor vehicle accident.

The motion relied on Rule 13.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure governing transfers of proceedings between courts.

Although the accident occurred in Toronto and several Rule 13.1.02 factors appeared to favour Toronto as the venue, the evidentiary record lacked information regarding the convenience of parties and witnesses and whether judicial resources were available in the proposed receiving region.

The court also noted that the required consultation protocol with the Regional Senior Justices had not been followed.

The motion was therefore dismissed without prejudice to bringing a motion to transfer the Brampton actions to Toronto.

The respondent sought weekly benefits from the appellant insurer pursuant to the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule 1990.

The insurer terminated benefits, and the respondent sued for past and ongoing benefits, including interest on overdue amounts under s. 24(4).

The insurer brought a motion to determine whether s. 24(4) provides for simple or compound interest.

The motion judge found it provides for compound interest, and the insurer appealed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 24(4) unambiguously provides for compound interest when read in its entire context and harmoniously with the legislative scheme.

The insured was injured in a motor vehicle accident and subsequently developed a crack cocaine addiction.

He applied for attendant care benefits to supervise him and prevent drug abuse, which the insurer denied on the basis that he was not catastrophically impaired.

An arbitrator later found the insured was catastrophically impaired and ordered the insurer to pay past attendant care benefits, even though the insured had not actually received or paid for the care during that period.

The Director's Delegate upheld this decision.

On judicial review, the Divisional Court dismissed the insurer's application, holding that it was not patently unreasonable to interpret 'incurred' as including reasonable and necessary expenses that would have been provided but for the insurer's improper denial of benefits.

The appellant was injured while riding as a passenger with an intoxicated driver after both were over-served at the respondent tavern.

The jury found the appellant 35.5% contributorily negligent for failing to wear a seatbelt and accepting a ride with an impaired driver.

In these supplementary reasons, the Court of Appeal apportioned that 35.5% contributory negligence, assigning 60% to the appellant and 40% to the tavern for its breach of duty in over-serving him.

The Court upheld the trial judge's costs rulings regarding a Rule 49 offer and the Victims' Bill of Rights, but set aside the denial of 14 months of postjudgment interest, finding it was an unwarranted penalty for a delay in delivering a bill of costs.

The appellant suffered a serious brain injury in a single-car accident after drinking at a tavern with the defendant driver.

At trial, the defendants admitted 100% liability for causing the accident, but the jury was only asked to assess the appellant's contributory negligence for not wearing a seatbelt and riding with an impaired driver.

The jury was not asked to apportion fault to the tavern for over-serving the appellant and failing to ensure his safe passage home.

The Court of Appeal held that the failure to instruct the jury to apportion fault among all parties as required by the Negligence Act was an error of law.

To avoid the cost of a new trial, the Court of Appeal invited submissions to apportion fault itself.

The respondent's vehicle became stuck on a country road on a cold winter night.

She left the vehicle to seek help, became disoriented, fell into a river, and suffered severe frostbite requiring amputations.

She claimed statutory accident benefits.

The insurer denied the claim, arguing the injuries were not directly caused by the use or operation of an automobile.

The motions judge ruled in favour of the respondent.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the decision, holding that while the respondent met the purpose test, she failed the causation test because the use of the vehicle was not a direct cause of her injuries due to numerous intervening acts.

The appellant insurance company appealed a motions judge's decision that the plaintiff was not an 'occupant' of a motorcycle when she was struck by an uninsured motorist while standing near the parked vehicle.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, applying the 'objective observer' test to find that the plaintiff was a passenger and therefore an occupant under s. 224(1) of the Insurance Act.

As a result, the respondent insurer was solely liable for the plaintiff's claim.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding the limitation period for claiming no-fault benefits.

The insurer had terminated benefits but had not provided a clear and unequivocal refusal to pay.

The Court of Appeal held that the two-year limitation period under s. 281(5) of the Insurance Act applies, which commences only upon a refusal to pay.

The six-year limitation period under s. 45(1)(g) of the Limitations Act does not apply because the Insurance Act specially limits the time for bringing an action.

The appeal was allowed.