Luke Hamer

The appellants sought to overturn a jury verdict finding them negligent for a fatal fire and challenging the quantum of damages awarded for loss of care, guidance, companionship, mental distress, and future costs of care.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the jury's findings of negligence based on fire safety violations and affirming the damages awards, finding they did not "shock the conscience of the court" despite being high.

The court also clarified that Section 76 of the Fire Protection and Prevention Act does not immunize landlords from negligence related to fire safety precautions, even if the fire's origin is accidental.

The court issued an endorsement on costs and the deductibility of a prior settlement following a jury trial.

The plaintiffs were awarded damages and punitive damages against the defendants.

The court ruled that a settlement received by one plaintiff from the City of Brampton, explicitly labeled as general damages, was not deductible from the jury's award for loss of income, rejecting the defendants' claim of double recovery.

Regarding costs, the court found the defendants' Rule 49 offer to be improper due to its non-severable nature for multiple plaintiffs and that the plaintiffs' net award exceeded the offer.

Considering the complexity, importance of issues, and the defendants' aggressive litigation tactics, the court awarded the plaintiffs partial indemnity costs, fixing the total at $445,000, which included fees, disbursements, and costs thrown away due to an adjournment.

The appellant, Linda-Sue Pearce, appealed from a motion judge's refusal to allow her to withdraw an admission made during a summary judgment motion regarding ownership of a Ford truck.

The truck was driven by her son, Trevor Middleton, when it was involved in a collision with a Honda Civic.

Middleton was convicted of criminal negligence causing bodily harm and aggravated assault.

The respondent Liu sued his own insurer, The Personal Insurance Company, for relief against uninsured or underinsured motorists.

During the motion, all parties agreed that if Pearce was found to be the owner, Wawanesa would respond and the action against Personal could be dismissed.

After the motion judge found Pearce was the owner and dismissed the action against Personal, Pearce sought to withdraw her admission, arguing that section 192(2) of the Highway Traffic Act made her liable only for negligence, not intentional torts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the interests of justice did not favour allowing withdrawal of the admission.

The defendant sought leave under Rule 39.02(2) to file additional evidence (articles, text messages, emails) after cross-examination, in response to the plaintiff's allegations of psychological abuse affecting the limitation period.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the evidence largely irrelevant, of slight probative value, and that the defendant failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for its late inclusion, as the abuse allegations were raised early in the proceedings.

Following a seven‑day personal injury trial arising from an accident at an amusement park, the plaintiffs obtained damages totalling $304,863.23 and the defendant’s counterclaim for contribution and indemnity against the father was dismissed.

The plaintiffs sought partial indemnity costs exceeding $226,000, while the defendant by counterclaim sought its own costs.

The court applied the principles under s.131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rules 49 and 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, emphasizing proportionality, the principle of indemnity, and the reasonableness of preparation time and disbursements.

The court reduced excessive preparation hours and excluded certain disbursements but accepted the reasonableness of counsel’s hourly rates.

Costs were fixed at amounts considered fair and reasonable in light of the trial result and proportionality considerations.

Following a trial, the defendant requested production of opposing counsel’s computer dockets to obtain evidence of the time and expenses incurred for the purpose of assessing costs.

The plaintiffs objected, arguing such detailed disclosure was not required under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court reviewed the principles governing costs assessments, emphasizing that fixing costs is not a mechanical calculation based on hours multiplied by rates.

Considering the significant expense and privilege concerns associated with producing detailed dockets, the court held that such production was not appropriate in the circumstances.

The request for production of the dockets was dismissed and the responding party was directed to deliver its costs submissions within two weeks.

The minor plaintiff, who had a pre-existing condition making his bones prone to fracture, was injured while attempting to board a continuously moving amusement park ride.

The plaintiffs sued the amusement park operator for negligence under the Occupiers' Liability Act.

The court found the defendant breached its duty of care by failing to post warning signs, failing to provide verbal instructions that the ride did not stop, and failing to have sufficient staff present.

The court dismissed the defendant's claims of contributory negligence against the minor and his father.

Damages were awarded to the minor plaintiff and his parents, taking into account the minor's pre-existing condition under the crumbling skull rule.