Claudia Jane Brabazon

The self-represented applicant, facing sexual assault and other charges, brought an O'Connor application for third-party records from the Toronto South Detention Centre.

The applicant sought records relating to the provision of French language services during his pre-trial detention, arguing that inadequate services contributed to an abuse of process justifying a stay of proceedings.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to meet the likely relevance threshold.

The court held that inadequate French language services in a detention centre do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under section 12 of the Charter, nor do they engage trial fairness or the integrity of the justice system under section 7 to justify a stay of proceedings.

The appellants appealed a trial decision awarding the respondent $15,270 in Charter damages for breaches of his s. 10(b) rights during a police detention.

The respondent had previously been granted a stay of criminal proceedings for the same breaches.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge failed to properly apply the Ward test for Charter damages.

The Court held that the stay of proceedings adequately served the functions of vindication and deterrence, and that an award of damages was not an appropriate and just remedy in the circumstances.

The applicant, Simon Bridle, sought an O'Connor order for the production of third-party records (communications of Detective Inspector Patton of the Ontario Provincial Police) to support an allegation of improper preparation and communication by the police witness in prior pre-trial applications.

The court dismissed the application at Stage 1 of the O'Connor test, finding that the records were not likely relevant to any issue at trial, as DI Patton was not expected to testify at trial and her credibility was not a live issue.

The court also found the applicant's assertions of improper conduct to be speculative and based on misinterpretations of the cross-examination transcript.

Following the dismissal of an appeal as an abuse of process, the Crown sought costs.

The appellant, a declared vexatious litigant, had used an alias to subvert a prior order and commence the appeal without leave.

The court found the appellant's conduct reprehensible and outrageous, warranting full indemnity costs.

Costs were fixed at $6,000 payable to the Crown.

The Crown moved to dismiss an appeal brought by 'Maxine Adwella' against a decision of the Animal Care Review Board regarding the removal of abandoned pets.

The Crown argued that 'Maxine Adwella' was an alias for Althea Reyes, who had previously been declared a vexatious litigant and was prohibited from commencing proceedings without leave.

The court found that the appellant was indeed Althea Reyes using an alias to circumvent the vexatious litigant order.

The appeal was dismissed pursuant to Rule 2.1.03(1) and as an abuse of process.

The offender was convicted of fraud over $5,000 after defrauding a woman he met on a dating website of $595,000.

He used a false surname and convinced her to invest in a fictitious internet app and second mortgages, but instead used the funds for personal expenses, gambling debts, and restitution for a prior fraud conviction.

The court found the offender's actions highly exploitative and noted his extensive related criminal record.

The court sentenced the offender to 6 years' imprisonment, less 462 days of pre-trial custody credit, and ordered restitution and a fine in lieu of forfeiture, each in the amount of $558,456.

The applicant brought a private prosecution against his wife's employer and her superiors, alleging criminal harassment, obstruction of justice, intimidation, and retaliation.

Following a pre-enquete hearing, the Justice of the Peace refused to issue process on six counts due to insufficient evidence, and the Crown Attorney stayed the remaining count.

The applicant sought certiorari and mandamus to quash the refusal and review the stay.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding no jurisdictional error by the Justice of the Peace and confirming the Crown Attorney's absolute discretion to stay the charge.

The applicant, who had been convicted of fraud, applied to reopen a stay of proceedings application based on alleged Charter violations.

He argued that his s. 8 rights were violated by the frequent and allegedly public manner of strip searches while in pre-trial custody, and that his s. 7 rights were violated by the previous Crown counsel's refusal to consent to an adjournment amidst late disclosure.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the strip searches were conducted in accordance with policy and justified by institutional security concerns, and that the Crown's conduct did not amount to bad faith or shock the conscience of the community.

The court concluded that this was not one of the clearest of cases warranting the extraordinary remedy of a stay of proceedings.

The applicant was found guilty of fraud over $5,000.

In the same reasons for judgment, the trial judge dismissed the applicant's pre-trial application for a stay of proceedings based on alleged abuse of process by correctional officers, without allowing a full evidentiary record.

The applicant brought an application for a mistrial, arguing the denial of procedural fairness gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias tainting the entire proceeding.

The court dismissed the mistrial application, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias and concluding that re-opening the stay application to allow a full evidentiary record was the appropriate and proportionate remedy.

The accused, Shaun Rootenberg, was charged with fraud over $5,000.00.

The defence brought an application for a stay of proceedings based on late disclosure and alleged abuse during pre-trial custody (strip searches).

The court dismissed the stay application, finding no prejudice from late disclosure and that the strip search complaints were not properly brought in the criminal forum.

On the fraud charge, the court found no deceit or falsehood in the initial investments by the complainant, Victoria Smith, but found the actus reus and mens rea of fraud established through "other fraudulent means" due to the unauthorized diversion of Ms. Smith's investment funds for personal use and to third parties.

Rootenberg was found guilty.

The appellant, a police sergeant, appealed a Hearing Officer's decision finding him guilty of deceit under the Police Services Act Code of Conduct and demoting him to third-class constable.

The deceit charge arose from the appellant recording on three Provincial Offence Notices that he had used a LIDAR device to measure speed, when he had actually used RADAR or paced the vehicles.

The Commission upheld the conviction, finding the Hearing Officer's conclusion that the appellant intended to deceive was reasonable and supported by the evidence.

However, the Commission varied the penalty, finding the Hearing Officer erred in principle by treating the appellant's fabricated testimony as an aggravating factor and by penalizing him for an uncharged intent to mislead the courts.

The penalty was varied to a demotion to second-class constable for six months, and to first-class constable thereafter.

The appellant police officer was involved in an off-duty domestic altercation and subsequently ordered by a superior to answer questions during a Professional Standards Bureau investigation.

The appellant refused to answer, arguing there was no legal authority to compel statements regarding off-duty conduct, and was found guilty of insubordination.

On appeal, the Ontario Civilian Police Commission confirmed the finding of guilt, holding that the order was lawful and that police officers can be compelled to answer questions regarding off-duty conduct that may amount to misconduct.

The appellant, a police officer, was transferred and had 200 hours removed from his vacation bank after an investigation into unapproved overtime.

The respondent conceded the transfers were disciplinary but had not held a hearing under the Police Services Act.

The appellant appealed to the Ontario Civilian Police Commission.

The Commission found it had jurisdiction over disguised discipline despite the lack of a first instance hearing.

It directed the Commissioner of the OPP to hold a hearing regarding the transfers, but held that the vacation bank dispute was a payroll matter to be resolved through the collective agreement grievance process.

The union renewed its request for the production of documents held by the Office of the Fire Marshall, which had previously been denied due to an ongoing OPP investigation.

On consent of the parties, including the OPP, the Grievance Settlement Board ordered the documents produced forthwith, subject to strict confidentiality conditions limiting access to counsel and one instructing client, and requiring any such documents marked as exhibits to be sealed.

The applicant alleged discrimination with respect to services because of disability and reprisal.

At the hearing, the self-represented applicant elected not to testify and failed to comply with pre-hearing disclosure obligations.

Given the lack of evidence and non-compliance with the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure, the application was dismissed.

A subsequent request by the applicant to withdraw the application was denied given the time and resources already expended.

The union sought production of documents in the employer's possession.

The employer acknowledged relevance but notified the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) because the documents formed part of an ongoing criminal investigation.

The OPP opposed production, arguing it could compromise the investigation into potential arson and criminal negligence causing death.

Applying the Wagg test, the Grievance Settlement Board declined to order production at this time to protect the integrity of the ongoing investigation, but allowed the union to renew its request in six months or if circumstances materially change.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Chief Coroner's decision not to hold a discretionary inquest into the death of his son, who died by suicide while on constant watch in a hospital psychiatric department.

The applicant argued the decision was unreasonable and that the Chief Coroner's remarks about the efficacy of lay juries raised a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Chief Coroner reasonably concluded that the hospital had already addressed the specific contributors to the death and there was no evidence of systemic failure.

The court also held the Chief Coroner's remarks represented professional judgment and did not raise a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellant appealed a Master's decision dismissing his motions to set aside the Registrar's dismissal of two actions for delay.

The Master had held she had no discretion to extend the time for bringing the motions and that the expiry of the limitation period created deemed prejudice.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Master erred in law by ignoring the overarching discretion in Rule 2.03 and by presuming prejudice solely from the expiry of the limitation period when the respondents had early notice of the claims.

The dismissal order for the second action was set aside.